Slide 1

Slide 1 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Security and Trust I: 6. Trust Dusko Pavlovic UHM ICS 355 Fall 2014

Slide 2

Slide 2 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Recommenders and trust authority Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 3

Slide 3 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Recommenders and trust authority Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 4

Slide 4 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust on the Web

Slide 5

Slide 5 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust on the Web: Adverse selection TRUSTE-certified uncertified honest 94.6% 97.5% malicious 5.4% 2.5 % Table: Trustworthyness of TRUSTE [Edelman 2007]

Slide 6

Slide 6 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust on the Web: Adverse selection Google sponsored organic top 4.44% 2.73% top 3 5.33% 2.93 % top 10 5.89% 2.74 % top 50 5.93% 3.04 % Table: Malicious search engine placements [Edelman 2007]

Slide 7

Slide 7 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust on the Web: Adverse selection Yahoo! sponsored organic top 6.35% 0.00% top 3 5.72% 0.35 % top 10 5.14% 1.47 % top 50 5.40% 1.55 % Table: Malicious search engine placements [Edelman 2007]

Slide 8

Slide 8 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust on the Web: Adverse selection Ask sponsored organic top 7.99% 3.23% top 3 7.99% 3.24 % top 10 8.31% 2.94 % top 50 8.20% 3.12 % Table: Malicious search engine placements [Edelman 2007]

Slide 9

Slide 9 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Problem of trust "Pillars of the society" phenomenon ◮ social hubs are more often corrupt ◮ the rich are more often thieves ◮ . . .

Slide 10

Slide 10 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Problem of trust ◮ Why does adverse selection happen? ◮ Can it be eliminated? Limited? ◮ Can we hedge against it? ◮ Is there a rational trust policy?

Slide 11

Slide 11 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Paradox of trust ◮ Trust is not transferrable. ◮ Trust services must transfer trust.

Slide 12

Slide 12 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Paradox of trust ◮ "I should only trust those that I know." ◮ "I often need to trust those that I don’t know."

Slide 13

Slide 13 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Recommenders and trust authority Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 14

Slide 14 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion What is trust? Alice trusts that Bob will act according to protocol Φ.

Slide 15

Slide 15 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion What is trust? Alice trusts that Bob will act according to protocol Φ. Examples ◮ shopping: Bob will deliver goods ◮ marketing: Bob will pay for goods ◮ access control: Bob will not abuse resources ◮ key infrastructure: Bob’s keys are not compromised

Slide 16

Slide 16 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion What is trust? Trust vs honesty ◮ Alice is an honest participant for the role A of protocol Φ is she acts according to this role in this protocol. ◮ Bob trusts Alice for the role A in the protocol Φ if he believes that she is honest.

Slide 17

Slide 17 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion What is trust? Trust vs honesty ◮ Alice is an honest participant for the role A of protocol Φ is she acts according to this role in this protocol. ◮ Bob trusts Alice for the role A in the protocol Φ if he believes that she is honest. Trust is Bob’s internal belief in Alice’s honesty.

Slide 18

Slide 18 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion What is trust? Trust vs reputation ◮ Alice’s reputation is the total (or average) trust that she has accumulated within a network. ◮ Bob’s trust for Alice is a part of her overall reputation.

Slide 19

Slide 19 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion What is trust? Trust vs reputation ◮ Alice’s reputation is the total (or average) trust that she has accumulated within a network. ◮ Bob’s trust for Alice is a part of her overall reputation. Feedback services (e.g. on Amazon or eBay) ◮ specify seller’s reputation as the percentage of satisfied customers ◮ display seller’s trust ratings within in the individual customer’s reviews

Slide 20

Slide 20 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Modeling trust Trust relation A Φ −→ r B ◮ A: trustor ◮ B: trustee ◮ Φ: entrusted concept (protocol, task, property) ◮ r: trust rating

Slide 21

Slide 21 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Views of Trust Local: trust logics A Φ −→ B means that ◮ A requires Φ ◮ B guarantees Φ

Slide 22

Slide 22 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Views of Trust Global: trust networks A d −→ r B d −→ s C d −→ t D b −→ u K means that ◮ A has a delegation certificate for B ◮ B has a delegation certificate for C ◮ C has a delegation certificate for D ◮ D has a binding certificate for the key K

Slide 23

Slide 23 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Views of Trust Global: trust networks A d −→ r B d −→ s C d −→ t D b −→ u K means that ◮ A has a delegation certificate for B ◮ B has a delegation certificate for C ◮ C has a delegation certificate for D ◮ D has a binding certificate for the key K ◮ thus A can use the key K ◮ even compute its trust rating rstu ◮ although they had no direct contact

Slide 24

Slide 24 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Network dynamics Networks are built upon networks: ◮ session keys upon long term keys ◮ strong secrets upon weak secrets ◮ crypto channels upon physical or social channels

Slide 25

Slide 25 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Network dynamics Networks are built upon networks: ◮ session keys upon long term keys ◮ strong secrets upon weak secrets ◮ crypto channels upon physical or social channels ◮ secure interactions upon trust ◮ trust upon secure interactions

Slide 26

Slide 26 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders and trust authority Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 27

Slide 27 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust dynamics For a moment, we assume that the entrusted property Φ is fixed, and analyze dynamics of trust rating A −→ r K

Slide 28

Slide 28 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust rating matrix trustees trustors 6 11 1 2 4 τ1 4 11 6 0 τ2 0 1 0 2

Slide 29

Slide 29 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Private trust dynamics trustees trustors 6 11 4 τ(t) 4 11 6 0

Slide 30

Slide 30 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Private trust dynamics trustees trustors X(t + 1) i Prob X(t + 1) = i = C(t)τi (t) (where C(t) = 1−α i∈J τi (t) )

Slide 31

Slide 31 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Private trust dynamics trustees trustors X(t + 1) new Prob X(t + 1) = new = α

Slide 32

Slide 32 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Private trust dynamics Trust updating process τi (t + 1) =                    τi (t) if i X(t + 1) 0 if i = X, not satisfactory 1 if i = X, satisfactory, new 1 + τi (t) if i = X, satisfactory, not new

Slide 33

Slide 33 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution Task Estimate wℓ (t) = #{i ∈ J | τi (t) = ℓ}

Slide 34

Slide 34 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution w1 (t + 1) − w1 (t) = J · Prob X(t + 1) = i | i new · γ⊥ −w1 (t) · Prob X(t + 1) = i | τi (t) = 1 = Jαγ⊥ − w1 (t)C(t)

Slide 35

Slide 35 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution wℓ (t + 1) − wℓ (t) = wℓ−1 (t) · Prob X(t + 1) = i | τi (t) = ℓ − 1 · γℓ−1 − wℓ (t) · Prob X(t + 1) = i | τi (t) = ℓ = wℓ−1 (t)C(t)(ℓ − 1)γℓ−1 − wℓ (t)C(t)ℓ

Slide 36

Slide 36 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution The system ∆t w1 (t) = Jαγ⊥ − C(t)w1 (t) ∆twℓ (t) = wℓ−1 (t)C(t)(ℓ − 1)γℓ−1 − wℓ (t)C(t)ℓ

Slide 37

Slide 37 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution . . . divided by J becomes ∆tv1 (t) = αγ⊥ − C(t)v1 (t) ∆tvℓ (t) = vℓ−1 (t)C(t)(ℓ − 1)γℓ−1 − vℓ (t)C(t)ℓ where vℓ (t) = wℓ (t) J = Prob(i ∈ J | τi (t) = ℓ) form a stochastic process v : N → DR

Slide 38

Slide 38 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution . . . and since v : N → DR is a martingale, it extends to v : R → DR and the system becomes dv1 dt = αγ⊥ − c t v1 dvℓ dt = γℓ−1c(ℓ − 1)vℓ−1 − cℓvℓ t where C(t) ≈ c t , for c = 1−α 1+αγ⊥ (see Appendix)

Slide 39

Slide 39 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution The steady state of v : R → DR will be in the form vℓ (t) = t · υℓ , where υ1 = αγ⊥ − cυ1 υℓ = γℓ−1 c(ℓ − 1)υℓ−1 − cℓυℓ

Slide 40

Slide 40 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution The steady state of v : R → DR will be in the form vℓ (t) = t · υℓ , where υ1 = αγ⊥ c + 1 υℓ = (ℓ − 1)γℓ−1c ℓc + 1 υℓ−1

Slide 41

Slide 41 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution . . . which expands into υ2 = αγ⊥ c + 1 · γ1c 2c + 1 υ3 = αγ⊥ c + 1 · γ1c 2c + 1 · 2γ2c 3c + 1 . . . υn = αγ⊥         n−1 ℓ=1 γℓ         cn−1 · (n − 1)! n k=1 (kc + 1) = αγ⊥ Gn−1 c · (n − 1)! n k=1 k + 1 c = αγ⊥ Gn−1 c · Γ(n)Γ 1 + 1 c Γ n + 1 + 1 c = αγ⊥ Gn−1 c · B n, 1 + 1 c

Slide 42

Slide 42 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution The solution υ1 = αγ⊥ c + 1 υn = αγ⊥ Gn−1 c B n, 1 + 1 c n→∞ → αγ⊥ G c n−(1+ 1 c ) where G = ∞ ℓ=1 γℓ > 0 follows from 1 esℓ ≤ γℓ ≤ 1 for some ∞ ℓ=1 sℓ < ∞

Slide 43

Slide 43 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution Theorem The described process of trust building leads, in the long run, to the power law distribution of the number of trusteess with the trust rating n wn ≈ αγ⊥ GJ c n−(1+ 1 c )

Slide 44

Slide 44 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution Theorem The described process of trust building leads, in the long run, to the power law distribution of the number of trusteess with the trust rating n wn ≈ αγ⊥ GJ c n−(1+ 1 c ) provided that the incidence of dishonest principals who act honestly long enough to accumulate a high trust rating — is low enough

Slide 45

Slide 45 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust distribution Theorem The described process of trust building leads, in the long run, to the power law distribution of the number of trusteess with the trust rating n wn ≈ αγ⊥ GJ c n−(1+ 1 c ) provided that the incidence of dishonest principals who act honestly long enough to accumulate a high trust rating — is low enough (so that γℓ ℓ→∞ − − − → 1 fast enough)

Slide 46

Slide 46 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion What does this mean? Some things have a fixed scale Figure: Normal distribution f(x) = ae−bx2

Slide 47

Slide 47 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion What does this mean? Many social phenomena are scale-free Figure: Power law w(x) = ax−(1+b)

Slide 48

Slide 48 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Dynamics → robustness → fragility Dynamics of scale-free distributions V. Pareto: "The rich get richer"

Slide 49

Slide 49 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Dynamics → robustness → fragility Dynamics of scale-free distributions V. Pareto: "The rich get richer" Robustness of scale free distributions The market is stabilized by the hubs of wealth.

Slide 50

Slide 50 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Dynamics → robustness → fragility Dynamics of scale-free distributions V. Pareto: "The rich get richer" Robustness of scale free distributions The market is stabilized by the hubs of wealth. Fragility of scale free distributions Theft is easier when there are very rich people.

Slide 51

Slide 51 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Policy guidance Change dynamics Modify the process of accumulation to assure a less fragile distribution of trust.

Slide 52

Slide 52 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Policy guidance Change dynamics Modify the process of accumulation to assure a less fragile distribution of trust, wealth, evolutionary fitness. . . .

Slide 53

Slide 53 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Policy guidance?? Change dynamics Modify the process of accumulation to assure a less fragile distribution of trust, wealth, evolutionary fitness. . . .

Slide 54

Slide 54 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Policy guidance?? Change dynamics Modify the process of accumulation to assure a less fragile distribution of trust, wealth, evolutionary fitness. . . . Moral Simple social processes lead to complex policy problems.

Slide 55

Slide 55 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Private vs public trust But we only talked about private trust vectors.

Slide 56

Slide 56 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Trust dynamics Trust distribution Interpretation Recommenders Policy Conclusion Private vs public trust But we only talked about private trust vectors. Why is private trust accumulation a social process?

Slide 57

Slide 57 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Recommenders and trust authority Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 58

Slide 58 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust process Using recommenders trustees trustors recommenders 3 5 1 9 2 2 1 6 2 A1 2 5 3 0 1 A2 6 1 0 9 σ τ 10 11 6 9

Slide 59

Slide 59 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust process Using recommenders trustees trustors recommenders 5 1 2 1 2 A1 2 5 3 0 1 A2 6 1 0 9 σ τ 10 11 6 9

Slide 60

Slide 60 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust process Using recommenders trustees trustors recommenders 5 1 2 1 try 2 A1 2 5 3 0 1 A2 6 1 0 9 σ τ 10 11 6 9

Slide 61

Slide 61 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust process Using recommenders trustees trustors recommenders 5 1 try feedback feedback 2 A1 2 5 3 0 1 A2 6 1 0 9 σ τ 10 11 6 9

Slide 62

Slide 62 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust process Using recommenders trustees trustors recommenders 6 2 try feedback feedback 2 A1 2 6 3 0 1 A2 6 2 0 9 σ τ 10 14 6 9

Slide 63

Slide 63 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust process Using recommenders trustees trustors recommenders 3 6 6 9 2 3 2 6 3 A1 2 6 3 0 2 A2 6 2 0 9 σ τ 18 22 9 18

Slide 64

Slide 64 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust distribution Upshot Recommenders’ public trust vectors also obey the power law distribution. Recommenders’ reputations obey the power law distribution.

Slide 65

Slide 65 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Recommender dynamics Public trust distribution Policy Conclusion Public trust distribution Upshot Recommenders’ public trust vectors also obey the power law distribution. Recommenders’ reputations obey the power law distribution. Consequence Adverse selection

Slide 66

Slide 66 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Recommenders and trust authority Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 67

Slide 67 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Fragility of trust networks Corollary The hubs attract attacks as soon as the trust is (a) public (b) uniform (c) abstract

Slide 68

Slide 68 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Fragility of trust networks Corollary The hubs attract attacks as soon as the trust is (a) public ◮ ratings available to all (b) uniform ◮ all certificates equally secure (c) abstract ◮ "trust laundering" ("Non olet.")

Slide 69

Slide 69 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Defending trust networks Policy Possible defense strategies are: (a) non-public: private trust vectors ◮ recommendations must be public (b) non-uniform: higher security for higher trust ◮ complicated; contradicts (a). (c) non-abstract: retain trust concepts ◮ "trust unlaundering": A Φ −→ r B

Slide 70

Slide 70 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Defending trust networks Policy Possible defense strategies are: (a) non-public: private trust vectors ◮ recommendations must be public (b) non-uniform: higher security for higher trust ◮ complicated; contradicts (a). (c) non-abstract: retain trust concepts ◮ "trust unlaundering": A Φ −→ r B ◮ record feedback (∼ "marked money")

Slide 71

Slide 71 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Defending trust networks Policy Possible defense strategies are: (a) non-public: private trust vectors ◮ recommendations must be public (b) non-uniform: higher security for higher trust ◮ complicated; contradicts (a). (c) non-abstract: retain trust concepts ◮ "trust unlaundering": A Φ −→ r B ◮ record feedback (∼ "marked money") ◮ credit rating

Slide 72

Slide 72 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Defending trust networks Policy Possible defense strategies are: (a) non-public: private trust vectors ◮ recommendations must be public (b) non-uniform: higher security for higher trust ◮ complicated; contradicts (a). (c) non-abstract: retain trust concepts ◮ "trust unlaundering": A Φ −→ r B ◮ record feedback (∼ "marked money") ◮ credit rating ◮ trust concept mining

Slide 73

Slide 73 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Find the spy J S 1.05 .83 1.13 .35 1.25 M =           1.25 1.05 1.12 1.57 .83 1.13 1.02 .35 0 .35 .21 −.56          

Slide 74

Slide 74 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Spectral decomposition           1.25 1.05 1.12 1.57 .83 1.13 1.02 .35 0 .35 .21 −.56           =           .83 −.4 .55 .6 0 .7           · 3 0 0 1 · .5 .5 .5 .5 0 .5 .3 −.8

Slide 75

Slide 75 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust concepts J S E .5 .5 .5 .3 .5 .5 −.8 .83

Slide 76

Slide 76 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust concepts J S E .5 .5 .5 .3 .5 .5 −.8 .83 ◮ traitor: 2Φ2 ≤ −Φ1 ≤ 0

Slide 77

Slide 77 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust concepts J S E .5 .3 .5 .5 .83 I II III a b c d −.8 .5 .5 .55 −.4 .6 .7 3 1 Φ1 Φ2 ◮ traitor: 2Φ2 ≤ −Φ1 ≤ 0

Slide 78

Slide 78 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust concepts J S E .5 .3 .5 .5 .83 I II III a b c d −.8 .5 .5 .55 −.4 .6 .7 3 1 Φ1 Φ2 ◮ traitor: 2Φ2 ≤ −Φ1 ≤ 0 ◮ disident: Φ2 ≥ 2Φ1 ≥ 0

Slide 79

Slide 79 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust concepts Comment The trust concepts are genuinely new information, generated by the network.

Slide 80

Slide 80 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust concepts Comment The trust concepts are genuinely new information, generated by the network. A traitor is not recognized from a previously learned profile, but extracted from network dynamics as an intrinsic singularity.

Slide 81

Slide 81 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Outline Introduction: Adverse selection of trust Notion of trust Individual trust dynamics Recommenders and trust authority Trust policy Conclusion: Security is an elephant

Slide 82

Slide 82 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Security is an adversarial process The life cycle of security Protocol Attack model incomplete complete model

Slide 83

Slide 83 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Trust is an adversarial process The life cycle of trust Trust Transaction use Trust build Trust

Slide 84

Slide 84 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Security is a collaborative process cryptography protocols pervasive, embedded, economics of security trust and risk, social choice (voting, market) physical security security information systems, search, learning

Slide 85

Slide 85 text

ICS 355: Introduction Dusko Pavlovic Introduction Trust Dynamics Recommenders Policy Conclusion Security and Trust Engineering Six Blind Men and the Elephant