Broken Links - Emergence and Future of Software Supply-Chain Compromises

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Broken Links:   Emergence and Future of Software Supply Chain Compromises Ryan Kazanciyan - Chief Product Officer, Tanium Black Hat Europe 2018  December 6, 2018

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Alexandria, VA

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2004 - 2009 2009 - 2015 2015 - Present

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Technical Consultant, S2 & S3

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Software supply-chain attacks a brief timeline

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MeDoc 2018 2017 2016 2019 HandBrake 2015 2016 2013

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MeDoc UltraEdit  “Wily   Supply” Ask.com   Partner Network Classic Shell  & Audacity Transmission 2018 2017 2016 2019 HandBrake 2015 Mint  Linux Altair  EvLog GOM Media  Player SimDisk 2016 2013

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Elmedia  Player 2015 CCleaner MeDoc UltraEdit  “Wily   Supply” Ask.com   Partner Network Classic Shell  & Audacity Transmission Mint  Linux Altair  EvLog GOM Media  Player SimDisk 2018 2017 2016 2013 2019 Net-  Sarang Web Developer  +8 Chrome   extensions HandBrake PyPi  10 pkgs npm   38 pkgs

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Elmedia  Player 2015 CCleaner MeDoc UltraEdit  “Wily   Supply” Ask.com   Partner Network Classic Shell  & Audacity Transmission Mint  Linux Altair  EvLog GOM Media  Player SimDisk PDFescape Gentoo  Linux Vesta-  PC MEGA  Chrome  extension StatCounter phpBB Arch   Linux  AUR ESLint npm   event-  stream npm  getcookies 2018 2017 2016 2013 2019 MediaGet Net-  Sarang Docker   Hub Docker   Hub Web Developer  +8 Chrome   extensions HandBrake PyPi  10 pkgs PyPi  12 pkgs npm   38 pkgs

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Timeframe: < 1 day Exposure: (?) 25 companies Objective: Targeted compromise

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Timeframe: < 3 days   Exposure: ~4.8 million users Objective: Mass adware

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Timeframe: One month  Exposure: > 2M downloads Objective: Targeted compromise of 18 tech firms

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…and these are just a subset of supply-chain attacks…

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End-user Software Development Toolchain Hardware and Firmware Enterprise Software SaaS and Service Providers Data   Providers

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End-user Software Development Toolchain Hardware and Firmware Enterprise Software SaaS and Service Data   Providers

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What’s driving these attacks? (despite their relative difficulty)

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https://www.w3counter.com/trends

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https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/02/threat-brief-declining-rig-exploit-kit-hops-coinmining-bandwagon/

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https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/cta-2018-0327.pdf

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How have attackers adapted?

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https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/10/24/bad-rabbit-not-petya-back/

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https://enigma0x3.net/2018/01/29/reviving-dde-using-onenote-and-excel-for-code-execution/

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Why we’re vulnerable challenges with prevention & detection

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Subverting our trust mechanisms

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Elmedia  Player* 2015 CCleaner MeDoc UltraEdit  “Wily   Supply” Ask.com   Partner Network Classic Shell  & Audacity Transmission* Mint  Linux Altair  EvLog GOM Media  Player SimDisk PDFescape Gentoo  Linux Vesta-  PC MEGA  Chrome  extension StatCounter phpBB Arch   Linux  AUR ESLint npm   event-  stream npm  getcookies 2018 2017 2016 2013 2019 MediaGet* Net-  Sarang Docker   Hub Docker   Hub HandBrake* PyPi  10 pkgs PyPi  12 pkgs npm   38 pkgs Attacks that delivered signed malware Web Developer  +8 Chrome   extensions * Signed with a different certificate than the original developer

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189 signed malware samples 111 certificates 72 compromised certs 80% not revoked http://signedmalware.org/

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https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.02931.pdf

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Software diversity   == risk https://twitter.com/halvarflake/status/909864760853884928

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How many endpoint agents are deployed in a typical enterprise?

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32%six to ten endpoint agents Ponemon Institute, “2017 State of the Endpoint Report” 27%ten or more endpoint agents

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What is the ratio of endpoints to unique versions of installed user applications?

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5-7 x # of endpoints 1-3 x # of endpoints Large networks (>100k endpoints) Small networks (<100k endpoints) * Measured by total unique instances of installed application versions

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230,000 systems 400,000 unique  application + version pairs

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How do security teams cope?

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Trends and patterns  attacks in the past year

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Emergence of cryptocurrency payloads

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5 million downloads of 17 infected images 12,000 users infected 400,000 users infected event-stream ~8 million downloads 1.2 million extension users exposed 700,000 web sites exposed

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5 million downloads of 17 infected images ~$90,000 (545 Monero coins) https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/15/tainted-crypto-mining-containers-pulled-from-docker-hub/

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What about more “targeted”, strategic compromises?

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Elmedia  Player 2015 CCleaner MeDoc UltraEdit  “Wily  Supply” Classic Shell  & Audacity Transmission Mint  Linux Altair  EvLog GOM Media  Player SimDisk PDFescape Gentoo  Linux Vesta-  PC MEGA  Chrome  extension StatCounter PyPi  (10 pkgs) phpBB Arch   Linux  AUR ESLint npm   event-  stream npm  getcookies 2018 2017 2016 2013 2019 MediaGet PyPi  (12 pkgs) Net-  Sarang Docker   Hub Docker   Hub npm   (38 pkgs) Ask.com   Partner Network HandBrake Web Developer  +8 Chrome   extensions

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Challenges with timely detection and response

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phpBB (2018) UltraEdit (2017) Mega Extension (2018) ESLint (2018) Gentoo Linux (2018) Web Developer Extension (2017) Elmedia Player (2017) Transmission (2016) Arch Linux AUR (2018) StatCounter (2018) Handbrake (2017) npm - 38 pkgs (2017) PyPi 10 pkgs (2017) VestaPC (2018) NetSarang (2017) MediaGet (2018) npm - getcookies (2018) MeDoc (2017) CCleaner (2017) Ask.com Partner Network (2016) PDFEscape (2018) PyPi - 12 pkgs (2018) Docker Hub (2017) 0 100 200 300 Approximate # of days Initial compromise to resolution < 1 day > 1 month

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Dodging Bullets

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https://github.com/ChALkeR/notes/blob/master/Gathering-weak-npm-credentials.md 15,495 accounts  (July 2017)

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https://medium.com/@vesirin/how-i-gained-commit-access-to-homebrew-in-30-minutes-2ae314df03ab

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https://medium.com/@vesirin/how-i-gained-commit-access-to-homebrew-in-30-minutes-2ae314df03ab

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How to respond practical mitigations for enterprises

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End-user Software Development Toolchain Hardware and Firmware Enterprise Software SaaS and Service Data   Providers

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Assessing your visibility

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What • EDR telemetry • On-disk program files & dependencies • Normalized application inventory

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What • EDR telemetry • On-disk program files & dependencies • Normalized application inventory Where • Endpoint coverage (device types, operating systems, organizational units) • Which teams have access to which data? When • How current is the data? • How far back does the data go? • How quickly can you search it?

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Managing endpoint software

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Trending and minimizing application sprawl over time

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Controlling end-user software distribution

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https://medium.com/@rootsecdev/controlling-google-chrome-web- extensions-for-the-enterprise-7414bf8cc326 Establishing inventory and control over browser extensions https://specopssoft.com/blog/using-firefox-enterprise-gpos-enable-windows- integrated-authentication-specops-websites/

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Catching post-compromise activity

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• Second-stage malware  • Persistence mechanisms  • Credential theft  • Lateral movement  • Data gathering Attackers still need to expand beyond an initial compromise

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Testing your processes

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Future attacks and wild speculation

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End-user Software Development Toolchain Hardware and Firmware Enterprise Software SaaS and Service Providers Data   Providers

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https://news.crunchbase.com/news/venture-funding-ai-machine-learning-levels-off-tech-matures/

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Where will these startups get their training data or learning models? How will they be protected? www.logicalfallacytarot.com

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https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.06809.pdf

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https://arxiv.org/pdf/1808.06809.pdf

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Closing thoughts putting things in perspective

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https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/managing-supply-chain-risk-cloud-enabled-products --Ian Levy, Technical Director, NCSC

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• Software supply-chain attacks are just another means of initial compromise - the same foundational principles for detection, containment, and response still apply

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• Software supply-chain attacks are just another means of initial compromise - the same foundational principles for detection, containment, and response still apply • Ensure you have a complete, timely, and accurate record of all software on all your computing devices - then drive towards stronger governance over it