End-to-End Encryption in Elixir with Ockam

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End-to-End Encryption in Elixir with Ockam Mrinal Wadhwa CTO, Ockam mrinal

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Verb Subject Object Allow / Deny

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Action Subject Resource Allow / Deny

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The operating environment of a typical application looks like this. Internet Infra Network Machine Application

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The operating environment of a typical application looks like this. Internet Application Cloud / Data Center / Home / Hospital / Factory … VPC / Kubernetes / NAT / Edge / No-IP wireless / Industrial VM / Container / K8s Pod / Rack Server / IoT   Industrial / Embedded / Edge Device

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Distributed applications work by sending each other messages across networks, over the Internet. Internet Infra Network Machine Application Internet Infra Network Machine Application Data, Commands, Acknowledgments, Configuration & Software Updates

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To be secure both sides must check incoming messages for integrity and authenticity. Internet Infra Network Machine Application Internet Infra Network Machine Application Message Integrity & Authenticity Sender Identi fi cation & Authentication Authorization There is a complex set of cryptographic protocol guarantees that go into delivering those checkmarks.

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To ensure user privacy and to protect business data both sides must have control of data con fi dentiality and access. Internet Infra Network Machine Application Internet Infra Network Machine Application Message Integrity & Authenticity Sender Identi fi cation & Authentication Authorization Con fi dentiality There is a complex set of cryptographic protocol guarantees that go into delivering those checkmarks.

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Internet Infra Firewalls / VPN / TLS termination Machine Application Internet Infra Machine Application Traditional approach is to check our message guarantees at network boundaries. Firewalls / VPN / TLS termination

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Internet Infra VPN Internet Infra VPN But network boundaries typically have hundreds of machines and thousands of applications within them.

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Internet Infra VPN Internet Infra VPN All code in both networks must have no weaknesses for an application developer’s work to be secure.

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Lab 1 Lab 2 Lab 500 Cloud AZ 1 Cloud AZ 2 Data Center 1 Data Center 2 All code in all deployment networks must have no weaknesses for an application developer’s work to be secure.

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Lab 1 Lab 2 Lab 500 Cloud AZ 1 Cloud AZ 2 Data Center 1 Data Center 2 Gateways Event Streams Pub/Sub Queues All code in all deployment networks and all service provider networks must have no weaknesses for an application developer’s work to be secure. This also violates the principle of least privilege

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Goal: Dependable, Trustworthy, Reliable applications To build a secure and private application that can be trusted by users and customers - we need to minimize the chances (vulnerability surface) of someone tricking our application into doing something undesirable. Big vulnerability surface is bad. Tiny vulnerability surface is good.

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End-to-End Encrypted, Mutually Authenticated, Secure Channels enable granular authorization decisions at the application layer.

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Sender: • Needs to know the route to a destination, makes that route the onward_route of a new message • Makes its own address the the return_route of the new message Replier: • Makes return_route of incoming message, onward_route of outgoing message • Makes its own address the the return_route of the new message

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Sender: • Needs to know the route to a destination, makes that route the onward_route of a new message • Makes its own address the the return_route of the new message Hop: • Removes its own address from beginning of onward_route • Adds its own address to beginning of return_route Replier: • Makes return_route of incoming message, onward_route of outgoing message • Makes its own address the the return_route of the new message

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Initiator Responder app echoer 4000

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Initiator Responder app echoer 4000

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Middle Responder h1 echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Middle Responder h1 echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Initiator Responder Shared Secret Shared Secret M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 The shared secret is then used as a key in Symmetric Key Cryptography to maintain con fi dentiality and integrity of application data. Application Data - Authenticated Encryption The entities involved use Public Key Cryptography to authenticate each other and agree on a shared secret. Authenticated Key Exchange

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Middle Responder h1 echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Middle Responder h1 echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Middle Responder h1 echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Middle Responder Forwarder echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Middle Responder Forwarder echoer 4000 Initiator app 3000

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Mrinal Wadhwa CTO, Ockam mrinal github.com/ockam-network/ockam github.com/ockam-network/ockam/tree/develop/examples/elixir/get_started All code examples from this talk: