Scary JavaScript (and other Tech) that Tracks You Online

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Scary JavaScript (and other Tech) That Tracks You Online Luke Crouch, Mozilla @groovecoder

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Luke Crouch • Web Developer at Mozilla • Not an expert in privacy tech (yet?) • Working on privacy & security experiments, prototypes, and studies for Firefox • Has 10 seconds per slide

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Data and Goliath Bruce Schneier

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Data that’s a by-product of online activity Browsing History Cookies Fingerprints

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Browser History

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Browser History Vulnerabilities

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CSS History Snifﬁng

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CSS History Snifﬁng getComputedStyle

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CSS History Snifﬁng 2010

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requestAnimationFrame History Snifﬁng

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https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/window/ requestAnimationFrame requestAnimationFrame History Snifﬁng

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requestAnimationFrame History Snifﬁng

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requestAnimationFrame History Snifﬁng

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Resource Access Snifﬁng

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https://robinlinus.github.io/socialmedia-leak/

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Resource Access Social Media Leak

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Cache Timing History Snifﬁng

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Network timing noise

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More reliable timing attacks https://tom.vg/2016/08/browser-based-timing-attacks/

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Video Parsing Timing Attack

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Video Parsing Timing Attack

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HSTS History Snifﬁng yan/@bcrypt https://diracdeltas.github.io/blog/snifﬂy/

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Set CSP on server

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Time CSP violations on client

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developer.mozilla.org/login

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http://clearcode.cc/2015/12/cookie-syncing/

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http://clearcode.cc/2015/12/cookie-syncing/

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Clear your cookies

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Cookie Re-spawning

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Re-spawning/“Supercookies”

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Using Flash

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Also Silverlight Isolated Storage

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HTML localStorage

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ETag

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Get/Set/Re-spawn on client

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Check ETag on Server

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Cookie Re-spawning is “Illegal” Or, at least, companies have been sued for it

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Cookie Syncing

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http://clearcode.cc/2015/12/cookie-syncing/

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http://clearcode.cc/2015/12/cookie-syncing/

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https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/englehardt/the-hidden- perils-of-cookie-syncing/

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http://clearcode.cc/2015/12/cookie-syncing/

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Cookie Syncing defeats No-respawn

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https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/englehardt/the-hidden- perils-of-cookie-syncing/

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Cookie Syncing = Giant Cookie Databases

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Without cookies

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Passive Fingerprints Don’t require code execution

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User-Agent, IP, Accept-Language, etc.

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HTTP Header Injection

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turn.com Re-spawn http://webpolicy.org/2015/01/14/turn-verizon-zombie-cookie/

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Active Fingerprints JavaScript code executes on your device

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Plugin Enumeration

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Okay but … … enumeration is still possible via snifﬁng, like …

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Font Enumeration http://www.lalit.org/lab/javascript-css-font-detect/

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Measure default fonts

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Measure dictionary of fonts

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Canvas Fingerprint

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WebGL Fingerprinting http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~hovav/dist/canvas.pdf

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AudioContext

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https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/#audio-fp

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WebRTC

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WebRTC Local Addressing

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WebVR “eyeprinting”

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Device Fingerprints ~= Cookies

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Cross-Device Matching

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Probabilistic “Householding” FTC Cross-Device Tracking Workshop https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-video/video/cross-device-tracking-part-1

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Probabilistic “Tethering” cookie=4qasr4sdf1 cookie=f52dh64dhq Android Advertising Id=0436732361

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Probabilistic “Tethering” IP address: 23.64.176.179 (early mornings, evenings, weekends) IP address: 164.62.9.0 (9am-6pm weekdays) IP address: 164.62.9.0 (9am-6pm weekdays) Cellular network 23.64.176.179 (early mornings, evenings, weekends)

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Probabilistic “Tethering” Work?? Cell?? Home?? 80% 80% IP address: 164.62.9.0 (9am-6pm weekdays) IP address: 164.62.9.0 (9am-6pm weekdays) Cellular network 23.64.176.179 (early mornings, evenings, weekends) IP address: 23.64.176.179 (early mornings, evenings, weekends)

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Probabilistic Matching Work? Cell? Home? Location: 38.883914, -77.020997 Weekday location: 38.883914, -77.020997 Evening location: 38.897634, -77.036544 Location: 38.897634, -77.036544 95% 95%

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Probabilistic Matching Work Cell Home Technology news UVa sports Capitol Hill Arsenal football Technology news UVa sports Capitol Hill Arsenal football Technology news UVa sports Capitol Hill Arsenal football 98% 98% cookie=4qasr4sdf1 Android Advertising Id=0436732361 cookie=f52dh64dhq

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Device Graph id=4qasr4sdf1 Android Advertising Id=0436732361 id=f52dh64dhq

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First-Party Deterministic You are signed in to their service

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First-Party Deterministic Matching Login: JustinBrookman Login: JustinBrookman Login: JustinBrookman Third-party sites/ apps that embed first-party Third-party sites/ apps that embed first-party Third-party sites/ apps that embed first-party

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–Mark Zuckerberg “Over 1 billion people use Facebook on their phones every month and more than 80% of the top apps on iOS and Android now use Facebook logins.”

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“One industry source that spoke with AdExchanger estimated Google’s logged-in cross-device user count as somewhere between 600 million and 1.2 billion, a conclusion based on the numerical intersection between Android users, iOS users, the Google login rate of iOS users and the number of logged-in desktop users for Google products.”

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•Email Address,  Personally-Identiﬁable Information (PII) •Email Address,  PII,  “Google Advertising ID” •Email Address,  PII •Email Address,  PII,  iOS IDFA

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Note: Trusted Parties

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First-Party Deterministic You click their links

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Email for First Party Cross-Device Tracking Purchase item at a shopping site as justin@domain.com

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Purchase item at a shopping site as justin@domain.com Click on email from shopping site Open email from shopping site Android Advertising Id=0436732361 cookie=4qasr4sdf1 cookie=a035fs35fm Email for First Party Cross-Device Tracking

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Third-Party Probabilistic Device Matching

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Machine Learning Model 1. Acquire device activity data set    IP addresses, WiFi networks, GPS coordinates, websites browsed, ads displayed, device type, operating system, browser cookies, mobile device IDs, time of day, etc. 2. Acquire “truth set” of deterministic matching data    “training set” and “test set” 3. Train ML models on the training set, evaluating accuracy, precision, and recall against the test set 4. Point ML model at entire device activity data set

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https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/#nosharing, Sep 5 2016

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Untrusted Third-Party Deterministic

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PII Leaking https://www3.cs.stonybrook.edu/~phillipa/papers/ contactus_pets2016.pdf

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Audio Beaconing for Cross-Device Matching

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ec25d046746de3be33779256f6957d8f

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Other device privacy vulnerabilities • Visual/IR beaconing for cross-device matching? • Recognizing speech from gyroscope signals  (crypto.stanford.edu/gyrophone) • Recognizing gait patterns with accelerometers  (vtt.ﬁ/inf/julkaisut/muut/2005/ICASSP05.pdf)

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Purchase item at a shopping site as justin@domain.com Click on email from shopping site Open email from shopping site Advertising Network md5=b16f55bbe0ff554fb40003f8e5f96b99 Hashed Email for Third-Party Tracking

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Does Hashing Make Data Anonymous? https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2012/04/does-hashing-make-data-anonymous

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Hash Functions https://blog.varonis.com/the-deﬁnitive-guide-to-cryptographic-hash-functions-part-1/

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How much tracking is going on?

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Web Privacy Census Dec 12, 2015 http://techscience.org/a/2015121502/

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Web Privacy Census Dec 12, 2015 http://techscience.org/a/2015121502/

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Web Privacy Census Dec 12, 2015 http://techscience.org/a/2015121502/

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https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

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https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

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https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

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Canvas Fingerprinting https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

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Audio Fingerprinting https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

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WebRTC Local Addressing https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/webcensus/

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Re-spawning https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/

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Cookie Syncing https://securehomes.esat.kuleuven.be/~gacar/persistent/

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–Steven Englehardt, Princeton WebTAP “in our measurements we found only two trackers (doubleclick.net and googleanalytics.com) that are present on 40% or more of websites. But if we assumed a moderate amount of back-end data sharing (deﬁned in Section 5.3 of our paper), the number of trackers that can observe 40% of users’ browsing history would jump to 161”

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What are the good implications?

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Analytics

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Personalized Services

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Relevant Advertising

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Advertising Attribution

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Prevent Fraud

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Prevent Criminal Activity

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National Security

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What are the bad implications?

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Over-Personalized Services

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Creepy Advertising https://blogs.harvard.edu/doc/2014/12/12/is-perfectly- personalized-advertising-perfectly-creepy/

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Targeting options for Facebook advertisers https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/19/98- personal-data-points-that-facebook-uses-to-target-ads-to-you/

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Commit Fraud

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Enable Criminal Activity

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Enable Criminal Activity

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Enable Criminal Activity

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National Insecurity from Mass Surveillance

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False Positive Paradox https://www.crosswise.com/cross-device-learning-center/ device-map-accuracy-precision-and-recall/

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www.wired.com/2016/08/shadow-brokers-mess-happens-nsa-hoards-zero-days/

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(Why?) Aren’t we doing anything?

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Privacy Paradox • consumers are concerned about ways marketers access and use their data • people still release data about themselves that suggest much less concern The Tradeoff Fallacy Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy, University of Pennsylvania Nora Draper, University of New Hampshire

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“Notice and Choice” People are expected to negotiate for privacy protection by reading privacy policies and selecting services consistent with their preferences. Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economics Chris Hoofnagle & Jennifer Urban, UC Berkeley

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The Tradeoff Fallacy Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy, University of Pennsylvania Nora Draper, University of New Hampshire 2015 Survey

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What are the options?

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As a user

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Encrypt your drive Windows BitLocker™ Mac FileVault™ LinuxGPL

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Check your data-breach status

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Use temporary email addresses

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As a power user

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As a developer

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HTTPS all the things

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Secure cookies http://blog.teamtreehouse.com/how-to-create-totally- secure-cookies

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Prevent Account enumeration https://www.troyhunt.com/website-enumeration-insanity- how-our-personal-data-is-leaked/

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AshleyMadison.com

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Don’t leak PII https://www.troyhunt.com/website-enumeration-insanity- how-our-personal-data-is-leaked/

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strawberrynet.com Please be advised that in surveys we have completed, a huge majority of customers like our system with no password. Using your e-mail address as your password is sufﬁcient security, and in addition we never keep your payment details on our website or in our computers.

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As an advocate

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reddit.com/r/privacy Note: use tracking protection on reddit.com

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Deepen Your Understanding http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998565&

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