NanoSec Conference 2018 - Exploitation Era

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Exploitation Era Past, Present and Future

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About Us Nafiez @zeifan - Memory corruption hacker - Fuzzing & Vulnerability Research - Live in “paradise” Yeh @iamyeh - Threat Researcher in Carbon Black - Malware Reverse Engineering - Vulnerability Analysis

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What’s this talk about?

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Introduction ● Real world memory corruption exploitation (no XSS, SQLi, LFI, etc.) ● Mid 90’s until early 2000, introduced types of vulnerabilities and exploitation ● Vulnerability classes mostly introduced in Linux ● More Windows “in-the wild“ exploitation

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Continue… ● Since 2014, Windows leading in software security mitigations ● Exploitation techniques and vulnerability classes killed in modern OS’s ● Current exploitation techniques in Windows

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0-Day: Reported new bug last week and got this bounty this morning!

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The Past

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1988 Morris Worm 1995 - 1997 Buffer Overflow 1998 - 2000 Exploits Evolution 2001 - 2003 Protections Era 2004 - 2006 Windows Era 2007 - 2010 Evolution of Exploits

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Oct 2, 1988 1988

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Morris Worm Exploiting 10,000 Computers https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1701&context=cstech

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Oct 20, 1995 1995

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Mudge@l0pht released tutorial “How to Write Buffer Overflow” https://insecure.org/stf/mudge_buffer_overflow_tutorial.html

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Nov 8, 1996 1996

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Smashing the Stack Aleph1 Complete write-up exploiting stack overflow http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html

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Aug 10, 1997 1997

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Ret-2-libc Solar Designer Bypassing NX to inject code BUFFER Address of system() in libc Return from system() Address of string “/bin/sh” “/bin /sh\0” libc system() ret https://seclists.org/bugtraq/1997/Aug/63

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Jan 31, 1999 1999

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Heap Overflows w00w00 First tutorial of heap overflow exploitation http://www.w00w00.org/files/articles/heaptut.txt

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Sep 20, 1999 1999

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Format String proftpd First format string bug (introduced) ftp> ls aaaXXXX%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u %u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%u%653300u%n https://seclists.org/bugtraq/1999/Sep/328

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Nov 8, 2001 2001

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Malloc exploitation MaXX Malloc exploitation trick, Phrack 57 http://phrack.org/issues/57/8.html

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Nov 8, 2001 2001

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Free() Exploitation [email protected] (anonymous) free() exploitation pioneer http://phrack.org/issues/57/9.html

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Feb 7, 2002 2002

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3rd Generation Exploitation Halvar Flake 1st Generation Exploits - Simple stack smashes - Control of EIP (RET instruction) - E.g. strcpy(), gets(), sprintf() - Easy peasy 2nd Generation Exploits - off-by-one - Control of EIP (RET instruction) - E.g. strncat(), strncpy() - No EIP control, EBP manipulation - Hard-to-find in nature 3rd Generation Exploits - Format strings, Heap Structure - E.g. printf(), malloc(), free() - Sometimes trivial to spot - No registers control https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-02/halvarflake-winsec02.ppt

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July 30, 2002 2002

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Integer Overflow Mark Dowd, Chris Spencer, Neel Metha, Nishad Herath, Halvar Flake First introduced to public https://slideplayer.com/slide/9244035/

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Aug 2, 2003 2003

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Win32 Device Driver Sec-Labs METHOD_NEITHER ioctl memory overwrite targeting Symantec AntiVirus http://www.nsfocus.net/vulndb/5247 push 0 push 0 @pushsz "\\.\NAVAP" ;open the device @callx CreateFileA ;yeah - open it! mov ebx,eax ;EBX=DEVICE HANDLE cmp eax,-1 ;error ;/ jne _x00 ;if not jump to _x00 label @debug SPLOIT_TITLE,"Cannot open device ;/",IERROR jmp exit

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Sep 8, 2003 2003

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Windows Server 2003 David Litchfield Defeating Stack Overflow Protection https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-asia-03/bh-asia-03-litchfield.pdf

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Nov 2, 2004 2004

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Heap Spraying Skylined Demonstrate against Internet Explorer https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/612/

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Jan 21, 2005 2005

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Defeating Heap Protection and DEP Bypass PTSecurity Defeating heap protection and bypass DEP against Windows XP SP2. https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/download/defeating-xpsp2-heap-protection.pdf

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Feb 17, 2005 2005

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Remote Windows Kernel Exploitation Barnaby Jack (RIP) https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/BH_US_05-Jack_White_Paper.pdf

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July 20, 2005 2005

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Windows Kernel Pool Overflow Kinvis (SoBeIt) - Beihang University https://web.archive.org/web/20070221124210/http://xcon.xfocus.org/XCon2005/archives/2005/Xcon2005_SoBeIt.pdf

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Oct 2, 2005 2005

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DEP Bypass Hardware- Based Skape & skywing http://uninformed.org/index.cgi?v=all&a=11

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Dec 7, 2005 2005

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Freelist[0] Exploitation Technique Brett Moore http://www.orkspace.net/secdocs/Windows/Protection/Bypass/Exploiting%20Freelist[0]%20On%20XP%20Service%20Pack%202.pdf

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Jan 19, 2007 2007

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Double-Free Vulnerabilities Matthew Conover https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/double-free-vulnerabilities-part-1 https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/double-free-vulnerabilities-part-2 Before: freelist [n-1][0x003401b8] Flink 0x003401b8 Blink 0x003401b8 freelist [n][0x003401c0] Flink 0x00341fb0 Blink 0x00341fb0 chunk [0x00341fa8] Flink 0x003401c0 Blink 0x003401c0 After: freelist [n-1] same freelist [n] same chunk [0x00341fa8] Flink 0x003401bc Blink 0x003401c4

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Mar 27, 2007 2007

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Heap Feng Shui Alex Sotirov Heap Feng Shui using JavaScript attacking browser https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Sotirov/Whitepaper/bh-usa-07-sotirov-WP.pdf

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Feb 17, 2008 2008

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ASLR Smack Tilo Muller Complete write-up exploiting stack overflow https://ece.uwaterloo.ca/~vganesh/TEACHING/S2014/ECE458/aslr.pdf

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Aug 4, 2008 2008

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Return Oriented Programming Erik Buchanan, Ryan Roemer, Stefan Savage, Hovav Shacham https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-08/Shacham/BH_US_08_Shacham_Return_Oriented_Programming.pdf

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Case Study: Emsisoft Internet Security - IOCTL Vulnerability

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Overview ● Found in 2015 via fuzzing ● Responsible disclosure to vendor (Emsisoft) ● Vulnerable IOCTL 0x22e010 ● Trivial to exploit: ○ Lead to overflow and allow to write in memory and perform execution

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Stack Overflow Windows Kernel Exploitation Process 01 Spawn processes 02 Get handle to vulnerable device 03 Get vulnerable IOCTL function 04 Allocate buffer (shellcode) 05 Create buffer redirects execution into shellcode

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Present

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Use-After-Free Use-After-Free vulnerability found. In order to exploit the vulnerability, chain vulnerability with Adobe Flash. Full Code Execution Exploitation were trivial to gain. ROP + Info Leak Create ROP chain using UAF vulnerability in browser and chained using Adobe Flash. ASLR bypass required, using info leak method. 03 01 02 Past Exploitation Development

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What happened? Developer Developer failed to audit legacy code, do not made any changes, using old framework, etc. Vulnerability Classes Vulnerability types and classes were still exists. Patching Patch introduced new vulnerability. Exploitation Exploitation getting more complex requires chain of vulnerability.

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What has changed?

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http://gaasedelen.blogspot.com/2014/03/exploiting-icofx-26-cve-2013-4988.html

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NX / DEP SEHOP / ASLR MemGC CFG ACG / RFG Hyper-V Based Security (VBS) - Kernel level (enabling ACG, CIG, RFG, CFG), CFI Windows Memory Safety Mitigations

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Edge Attack Surface Reduction Remove whatever feature Internet Explorer has. Memory Garbage Collection (MemGC) Focusing on DOM engine and turn UAF in DOM non-exploitable. Type Confusion Protection Additional checks to eliminate recurring bad casts and wrong branching on CTreePos Vulnerability Classes Killer https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Weston-Windows-10-Mitigation-Improvements.pdf Stack corruption essentially eliminated Use-After-Free attack decreased Raise of Out-of-Bounds, DLL Planting and Type Confusion

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Use-After-Free Vulnerability found was Use-After-Free, in order to to gain info leak, it needs to turn to type confusion. For some cases it doesn’t need to do so. Type Confusion Usually used as part of vulnerability chain. Information Leak To bypass ASLR, an information leak needs to be done. This will help to make the exploit reliable. Full Code Execution Achieve full code execution (including remote) with full mitigation bypasses. Sandbox & Mitigation Bypass Current mitigations in Windows required multiple chains of bypass, including CFG, and ACG. 05 01 02 03 04 Current Exploitation Development

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Case Study: (PSIRT-8422) Adobe Flash ActiveX - NULL Pointer

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Overview ● Found via manual audit ○ Focus on Adobe Flash Player ActiveX (29.0.0.171) ● Responsible disclosure to vendor (Adobe) ● Integer Overflow in ActiveX turns NULL Pointer ○ Adobe failed to set Kill Bit in registry by default ● Exploit attempt failed ○ Due to memory safety mitigation

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Future (Past)

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● Exploitation much more harder ● Hardware based mitigations and bypasses ● Past vulnerability classes remain stay ● More chain types of exploitation ● Software mitigations improvement ● Advanced exploitation could evade security perimeter

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Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) ➢ Shadow Stack (bypass?) ○ Second stack for program that used for control transfer operations ○ Separate from data stack and can be enable for operation via user mode or supervisor mode ○ Protecting return address and defend against ROP ➢ Indirect Branch Tracking (bypass?) ○ New instruction named ENDBRANCH used to mark valid indirect CALL/JMP targets in the program ○ Protecting free branch against JOP / COP https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/managed/4d/2a/control-flow-enforcement-technology-preview.pdf

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Conclusion

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References & Thanks ● Thanks to KLKS - for reviewing our slide ● NanoSec crew ● Haroon Meer BlackHat 2010 Paper on Memory Corruption History ○ https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-10/whitepapers/Meer/BlackHat-USA-2010-Meer-History -of-Memory-Corruption-Attacks-wp.pdf ● ...and many paper that we used as references :) ● Ping us on Telegram (OWASP Malaysia) if you want to talk about exploitation and reverse engineering.