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Rethinking  the  Trust  Chain:   Auditing  OpenSSL  and  Beyond Kenneth White June 12, 2015

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Topics •  Bootstrapping Trust •  Digging deeper •  OpenSSL audit update •  Core infrastructure work •  Emerging

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Ping  me Twitter @kennwhite Talks speakerdeck.com/kwhite OCAP https://opencryptoaudit.org/people

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Open  Crypto  Audit  Project •  OCAP originally formed to manage community- funded TrueCrypt audit •  Independent technical research public interest organization •  Technical Advisory Board: academic, industry, and legal experts in security •  Mission: Research, analysis & education around technical security in open source software •  Focus: software security, cryptography engineering, public awareness •  Current project: OpenSSL audit

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain 1 year post-Heartbleed • Most serious CVEs are rarely about the crypto • But the (most widely deployed) crypto trust chain is fragile • Key pieces of the core Internet network stack are virtually unexamined, and little understood

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain 1 year post-Heartbleed • Most serious CVEs are (rarely) about the crypto • But the (most widely deployed) crypto trust chain is fragile • Key pieces of the core Internet network stack are virtually unexamined, and little understood

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Questions How well do you know the network stack you’ve deployed? How about your technical staff? Do you/they understand your core dependencies?

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Questions How well do you know the network stack you’ve deployed? How about your technical staff? Do you/they understand your core dependencies?

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Are you sure?

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Are you sure? First question: Explain the dependencies of init/systemd.

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Mature network hardware

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A $100K commercial load balancer compromised by a browser ID string

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Questions How well do you know the network stack you’ve deployed? How about your technical staff? Do you/they understand your core dependencies?

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Are you sure?

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The  Software  Security   Trust  Chain Are you sure? First question: Explain the dependencies of init/systemd.

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Let’s really look at the whole security trust chain…

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Internet  Core  Trust  Chain For example: o  XML parsers (libxml2, Expat, SimpleXML…) o  Image generators (libpng…) o  Internationalization libraries (libIDN) o  Compression (libzma) o  ASN.1 & x509 (everywhere) o  Middleware core: BouncyCastle, Spring, Struts… o  Deeper: libBFD, libCurl, IPSec netkey, pluto, l2tp

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Internet  Core  Trust  Chain Time to look really closely, at, say: o  XML parsers (libxml2, Expat, SimpleXML…) o  Image generators (libpng…) o  Internationalization libraries (libIDN) o  Compression (libzma) o  ASN.1 & x509 (everywhere) o  Middleware core: BouncyCastle, Spring, Struts… o  Deeper: libCurl, libBFD, IPSec netkey, pluto, l2tp

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libcurl

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libbfd

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BFD  is  a  BFD

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Are you kidding me?!

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“Wait, there’s more!” Let’s look at the shell utility ‘less’

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BFD  is  a  BFD.    

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BFD  is  a  BFD.   But  most  Linux  admins  have   never  even  heard  of  it

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“All  versions  of  Windows”

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Let’s go higher up

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Basic server certificate deployment is a solved problem, yes?

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Basic server certificate deployment is a solved problem, yes?

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Don’t underestimate the impact of applied research

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Don’t underestimate the impact of applied research

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Network transport has integrity, yes?

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Network transport has integrity, yes?

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Network transport has integrity, yes? https://gist.github.com/kennwhite/1f3bc4d889b02b35d8aa

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Ad networks are trusted for arbitrary client code, yes?

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The  Komodia  case

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The  Komodia  case

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The  nuclear  option…

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But  trust  is  complicated…

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But  trust  is  complicated…

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But  trust  is  complicated…

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And  this  isn’t  helping

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The  Security  Trust  Chain   is  Broken   But  we’re  working  on  it

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PSA:  Encryption  is  rarely   the  problem

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The  Security  Trust  Chain   is  Broken   But  we’re  working  on  it

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2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide

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2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide PROTOCOL SSL v1 SSL v2 SSL v3 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 CIPHER NULL DES 3DES RC4 Twofish Blowfish AES KEYEX RSA DH DHE ECDH HMAC MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 MODE ECB CBC GCM AUTH ECDSA RSA

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2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide PROTOCOL SSL v1 SSL v2 SSL v3 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 CIPHER NULL DES 3DES RC4 Twofish Blowfish AES KEYEX RSA DH DHE ECDH HMAC MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 MODE ECB CBC GCM AUTH ECDSA RSA

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2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide PROTOCOL SSL v1 SSL v2 SSL v3 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 CIPHER NULL DES 3DES RC4 Twofish Blowfish AES KEYEX RSA DH DHE ECDH HMAC MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512 MODE ECB CBC GCM AUTH ECDSA RSA Also: HSTS (strict secure transport), HPKP (pinning), CT (cert transparency), SNI (virtual hosts)

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Just kidding. 2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide

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Just kidding. Understand your install base, interop and threat model. Then read tactical guidance by Mozilla, SSLLabs, Robert Love, Adam Langley, Thomas Ptacek 2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide

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Just kidding. Understand your install base, interop and threat model. Then read tactical guidance by Mozilla, SSLLabs, Robert Love, Adam Langley, Thomas Ptacek… 2015  Mainstream  Distro   Apache/Nginx  SSL  in  1  Easy  Slide

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For example Adam Langley: Matching primitive strengths www.imperialviolet.org/2014/05/25/strengthmatching.html Ivan Ristic Introducing TLS Maturity Model community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2015/06/08/introducing-tls-maturity- model Bulletproof SSL and TLS www.feistyduck.com/books/bulletproof-ssl-and-tls Thomas Ptacek: Cryptographic Right Answers gist.github.com/tqbf/be58d2d39690c3b366ad Mozilla: Security/Sever Side TLS wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS

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The  OpenSSL  Audit

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The  OpenSSL  Audit •  Commissioned by Linux Foundation’s Core Infrastructure Initiative (CII) •  Ambitious Scope o Independent review o Coordinating closely with OpenSSL core team o Delayed for v. 1.1 maturity (significant refactor) o Diverse, complex codebase o Linux, BSDs, Windows, OSX, SRV5 (AIX, HP-UX, Solaris) o Intel x86 (incl. AES-NI), ARMv7, MIPS, PowerPC, Alpha… o FIPS module

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OpenSSL  Audit •  Goals •  Thorough public security analysis of the core code in the next major release of OpenSSL •  Demonstrate viability of a reusable open source test harness framework •  Foster web-scale peer-reviewed public tools & data sets for protocol & negotiation analysis

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OpenSSL  Audit Rough metrics: 412-494K total SLOC OpenSSL v. 1.1 master (2015-03-14)

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OpenSSL  Audit •  Phase 1 •  BigNum: multiprecision ints, constant time, blinding •  BIO (focus on composition & file functions) •  ASN.1 & x509 (cert & key parsing, DER/PEM decoding, structs, subordinate chains) •  93M cert corpus, “Frankencert” fuzzing •  Phase 2 •  TLS state machine •  EVP (PKI constructions, H/MACs, envelopes) •  Protocol flows, core engine implementation •  Memory management •  Crypto core (RSA, SHA-2, DH/ECDH, CBC, GGM…)

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OpenSSL  Audit Caveats •  Schedule, funding, or quality: Pick 2 •  High Priority •  Major architectures •  Modern (TLS 1.3) protocols & primitives •  DH, ECC, signatures, ASN.1 & x509 •  Non-crypto constructions (data structures, memory management, core API/ABI hooks) •  Lower Priority •  AES implementation (finite field tables, matrix transformations, etc. TBD, possibly in phase 3 formal academic analysis) •  RC4 •  S/MIME •  OpenSSL s_server (smtp-aware web server!)

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Emerging

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Better primitives and core crypto •  HTTP/2 & TLS 1.3 •  NaCl/LibSodium, ChaCha20/Poly1305 (OpenSSL soon) •  Marlinspike et al’s work on OTR, axolotl ratchet •  Trevor Perrin’s work on public key pinning & TLS core Containers smaller surface (Docker, Rocket, LXC) Let’s Encrypt (Mozilla, Akamai, Cisco, EFF) USG: All fed websites & services HTTPS-only Open threat feeds (AlienVault Open Threat Exchange v2) Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report model Emerging

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Dan Bernstein: NaCL networking and cryptography library http://nacl.cr.yp.to Frank Denis: Sodium crypto library https://www.gitbook.com/book/jedisct1/libsodium/details Moxie Marlinspike and Trevor Perrin: Advanced cryptographic ratcheting https://whispersystems.org/blog/advanced-ratcheting Andrew Gerrand: The State of Go http://talks.golang.org/2015/state-of-go-may.slide Daniel Stenberg: TLS in HTTP/2 http://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2015/03/06/tls-in-http2 GoLang team: Go crypto library https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto

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Docker: The tutorial www.docker.com/tryit CoreOS is building a container runtime, rkt coreos.com/blog/rocket Let's Encrypt: A public open certificate authority letsencrypt.org US CIO: HTTPS-Everywhere for Government cio.gov/https-everywhere-for-government Open Threat Exchange: OTX v. 2.0 www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/otx-20-beta-finally-a-way- beyond-the-rhetoric-of-threat-intelligence Verizon DBIR 2015 www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-investigation- report-2015_en_xg.pdf

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Parting  Thoughts o  Encryption is rarely the problem o  Understand your threat model o  VZ DBIR: 99.9% of successful exploits last year relied on a CVE more than a year old o  Intelligence & defense collaboration & sharing is critical o  Stronger security chain will require better cooperation, more open exchanges, and trust

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Parting  Thoughts We are very much in the golden age of web security.

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Parting  Thoughts We are very much in the golden age of web security. We are beginning a serious re-examination of the core stack and fundamental trust chains.

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The  Security  Trust  Chain   is  Broken  

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The  Security  Trust  Chain   is  Broken   But  we’re  working  on  it

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Special  thanks Paul Wouters (@letoams) Marsh Ray (@marshray) Chris Hoff (@Beaker) Wendy Nather (@451wendy) Thomas Ptacek (@tqbf) Filippo Valsorda(@FiloSottile) Scot Terban (@krypt3ia) Jeff Jarmoc (@jjarmoc)

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Be  careful  out  there,  folks

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Ping  me OCAP admin @ opencryptoaudit . org OCAP https://opencryptoaudit.org/people Twitter @kennwhite Talks speakerdeck.com/kwhite