Reticle: Dropping an Intelligent F-BOMB

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RETICLE: DROPPING AN INTELLIGENT F-BOMB Brendan O’Connor, CTO/DSS Malice Afterthought, Inc. Think again. a decentralized botnet for disposable computing

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BRENDAN O'CONNOR • CTO/DSS, Malice Afterthought, Inc • Rising 2L at the University of Wisconsin School of Law - IANAL,Y • I've done DARPA stuff, security research, and even Network Warfare teaching for DoD (want to hire me? I'm always looking, so ping me!) • BTW, No One Authorized Me To Say ANYTHING! I speak for nobody.

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DARPA CYBER FAST TRACK

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ROADMAP • Scenarios (The Problem) • F-BOMB (The Hardware) • Reticle (The Software) • Missions (What It Does) • Next

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SCENARIO 1: ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH

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SCENARIO 2: BAD MEN WITH GUNS

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SCENARIO 3: OCCUPY

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WHAT WE WANT • A system for cheap, disposable computers • Deployable by untrained personnel • Reconﬁgurable post-deployment • Capable of independent or coordinated action • With sufﬁcient processing power to take on high-level tasks • @Dakami - “Ever deployed hardware? It’s not fun.” I disagree!

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ROADMAP • Scenarios (The Problem) • F-BOMB (The Hardware) • Reticle (The Software) • Missions (What It Does) • Next

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FALLING/BALLISTICALLY-LAUNCHED OBJECT THAT MAKES BACKDOORS • Design Goals • Cheap -- < $75, < $50 if possible • Reconﬁgurable Hardware for Different Sensors • Ultimately, this will require USB for cheapest sensors • Light enough to be ﬂown on a UAV, or thrown, hard • Durable enough to land poorly (we’ll come back to this) • Ubiquitous enough to be deniable-- no bespoke PCBs

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WHY NOT THE PWNIE PLUG?

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WHY NOT THE MINIPWNER?

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WHY NOT THE WASP?

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F-BOMB, VERSION 1 PogoPlug (v2/v3) Core Flash Drive 2x RTL8188 PogoPlug POGO-B01 Mainboard

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BRIGHT PINK INFILTRATION

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RECONFIGURABLE

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EXCESSIVELY REAL-WORLD TESTING

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WHOOPS

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ROADMAP • Scenarios (The Problem) • F-BOMB (The Hardware) • Reticle (The Software) • Missions (What It Does) • Next

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RETICLE

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RETICLE DESIGN GOALS • Minimum Viable Hardware - exploit local WiFi for comms • Deniable Deployment • Encrypted storage, with no local key storage! • Encrypted communications • No Central C&C Server - fully peer-to-peer, no SPOF • Resistance to Central Compromise / Node Compromise • As easy to deploy as a life jacket, but still with crypto.

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NOT DESIGN GOALS • Mesh Network • Really great research, but hard for untrained users in the ﬁeld to deploy in an efﬁcient way • Instead we’ll use “the Cloud” as our mesh! • Synchronous Communication / Simultaneous Command

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PROBLEMS TO SOLVE • Enough hardware to test performance on embedded systems

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SOLUTION: A CLONE ARMY

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PROBLEMS TO SOLVE • Enough hardware to test performance on embedded systems DARPA • How do we have encrypted storage without storing the key on-disk but still easy to use?

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GRENADE-STYLE KEY MANAGEMENT

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SOLUTION: TOR

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SOLUTION: COUCHDB

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PROBLEMS TO SOLVE • Enough hardware to test performance on embedded systems DARPA • How do we have encrypted storage without storing the key on-disk but still easy to use? USB Drive • Obfuscating Trafﬁc Tor • Easy Local Storage Couch • Peer-to-Peer Replication

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SOLUTION: COUCHDB

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SOLUTION: COUCHDB?

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STEP 3.5: FILE A BUG REPORT

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SOLUTION: NGINX

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EXPLANATION: I WISH I HAD FRIENDS

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STEP 6.1: REMEMBER USENET?

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STEP 6.2: THE SASSAMAN MEMORIAL HACK

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PROFIT!

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ROADMAP • Scenarios (The Problem) • F-BOMB (The Hardware) • Reticle (The Software) • Missions (What It Does) • Next

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TESTING MISSIONS

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MISSIONS SO FAR • Blinkenlights • Stalkr • OKCreepy • Private Web Browsing (Auto-Tor) • Note that we get wireless bridging / area extension for free!

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OTHER EASY MISSIONS • P25 listeners (SDRs are now $25!) • A shout-out to Matt Blaze / Travis Goodspeed • “Why (Special Agent) Johnny (Still) Can’t Encrypt” • ...a thousand other things (and reconﬁgurable on the ﬂy) • Also missions aren’t exclusive, though Reticle doesn’t attempt to negotiate sharing of devices; this isn’t designed as a public resource network

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ROADMAP • Scenarios (The Problem) • F-BOMB (The Hardware) • Reticle (The Software) • Missions (What It Does) • Next -- and how you can help!

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NEXT STEPS FOR RETICLE • Opportunistic Replication • Change the scan+connect script to run continuously, and replicate whenever we ﬁnd a connection • MIT did this, but won’t release the source code :-( • Data Visualization for hordes of data • New hardware (F-BOMB v2) - mmm, Raspberry Pi!

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NEW PROJECT: SPOTLIGHT

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SPOTLIGHT • Hide and Seek • No trained “seekers” • We’ll use bicycle couriers and bored students • 20 Reticle Nodes • 12 Hours • 10 Targets (5 mobile, 5 static)

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SPOTLIGHT Anyone want to come play with us? We’d love to partner. [email protected]