Proposal Presentation for Secure Wired & Wireless Networks Project By Maneesh & Venu Gopal 

 Hacking is the unauthorized break in into computers/networks ...  Usually done by a bad guy (a.k.a Black Hat).  Its not magic. It has a methodology.  Many different Techniques (often change over time).  New vulnerabilities are found (therefore new attacks over time). 

 Testing the security of systems and architectures by a white hat from a hacker’s (a.k.a black hats) point of view.  A “simulated attack” with a predetermined goal.  Telling too many people may invalidate the test. 

Data Application Host Network 

 Footprinting  Reconnaissance  Scanning  Enumeration  Attack  Vulnerabilities  Exploits  Wipe off Traces  Get out 

 Application Specific Scanners  Password Crackers  Disassemblers  OS Detection Tools  Sniffers  Vulnerability Scanners  Web Scanners  Wireless  Exploitation  Packet Crafters  Port Scanners 6 

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 Footprinting is the technique of gathering information  to create a complete profile of an organization’s security posture. 8 

1. Find out initial information:  Open Source  Whois  Nslookup 2. Find out address range of the network:  ARIN (American registry for internet numbers)  Traceroute 3. Find active machines:  Ping 9 

 Locations  Related companies or entities  Merger or acquisition news  Phone numbers  Contact names and email addresses  Privacy or security policies indicating the types of security mechanisms in place  Links to other web servers related to the organization 10 

 DNS queries  The registrant  The domain name  The administrative contact  When the record was created and updated  The primary and secondary DNS servers  Network Ranges & blocks 11 

 Domain Name  Network blocks  Specific IP addresses of systems reachable via the Internet  TCP and UDP services running on each system identified  System architecture (for example, SPARC vs. X86)  Access control mechanisms and related access control lists  (ACLs)  Intrusion detection systems (IDSes)  System enumeration (user- and group names, system banners,  routing tables, SNMP information) 12 

 Networking protocols in use (for example, IP, IPX, )  Internal domain names  Network blocks  Specific IP addresses of systems reachable via the intranet  TCP and UDP services running on each system identified  System architecture (for example SPARC vs. X86)  Access control mechanisms and related access control lists  (ACLs)  Intrusion detection systems  System enumeration (user- and group names, system banners,  routing tables, SNMP information) 13 

 Remote system type  Authentication mechanisms  Connection origination and destination  Type of connection  Access control mechanism 14 

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 4. Find open ports or access points:  Portscanners:  Nmap  ScanPort  War Dialers  THC-Scan  5. Figure out the operating systems:  Queso  Nmap 16 

6. Figure out which services are running on each port: Default port and OS Vulnerability scanners 7. Map out the network: Traceroute Visual ping Cheops 17 

 Hosts that are accessible  Locations of routers and firewalls  Operating systems running on key components  Ports that are open  Services that are running  Versions of applications that are running 18 

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 FIN probe A FIN packet is sent to an open port. As mentioned previously,  RFC 793 states that the correct behavior is not to respond; however, many stack  implementations (such as Windows NT) will respond with a FIN/ACK.  Bogus Flag probe An undefined TCP flag is set in the TCP header of a SYN  packet. Some operating systems, such as Linux, will respond with the flag set  in their response packet.  Initial Sequence Number (ISN) sampling The basic premise is to find a  pattern in the initial sequence chosen by the TCP implementation when  responding to a connection request.  “Don’t fragment bit” monitoring Some operating systems will set the “Don’t  fragment bit” to enhance performance. This bit can be monitored to determine  what types of operating systems exhibit this behavior.  TCP initial window size Initial window size on returned packets is tracked.  For some stack implementations, this size is unique and can greatly add to the  accuracy of the fingerprint mechanism. 20 

 ACK value IP stacks differ in the sequence value they use for the ACK field,  so some implementations will send back the sequence number you sent, and  others will send back a sequence number + 1.  ICMP error message quenching Operating systems may follow RFC 1812  (www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1812.txt) and limit the rate at which error messages  are sent. By sending UDP packets to some random high-numbered port, it is  possible to count the number of unreachable messages received within a given  amount of time.  ICMP message quoting Operating systems differ in the amount of information  that is quoted when ICMP errors are encountered. By examining the quoted  message, you may be able to make some assumptions about the target  operating system.  ICMP error message–echoing integrity Some stack implementations may  alter the IP headers when sending back ICMP error messages. By examining  the types of alterations that are made to the headers, you may be able to make  some assumptions about the target operating system. 21 

 Type of service (TOS) For “ICMP port unreachable” messages, the TOS is  examined. Most stack implementations use 0, but this can vary.  Fragmentation handling As pointed out by Thomas Ptacek and Tim  Newsham in their landmark paper “Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of  Service: Eluding Network Intrusion Detection” (http://www.clark.net/  ~roesch/idspaper.html), different stacks handle overlapping fragments  differently. Some stacks will overwrite the old data with the new data  and vice versa when the fragments are reassembled. By noting how probe  packets are reassembled, you can make some assumptions about the target  operating system.  TCP options TCP options are defined by RFC 793 and more recently by RFC  1323 (www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1323.txt). The more advanced options provided by  RFC 1323 tend to be implemented in the most current stack implementations.  By sending a packet with multiple options set, such as no operation, maximum  segment size, window scale factor, and timestamps, it is possible to make some  assumptions about the target operating system. 22 

 TTL What does the operating system set as the time-to-live on the outbound packet?  Window Size What does the operating system set as the Window Size?  DF Does the operating system set the Don’t Fragment bit?  TOS Does the operating system set the type of service, and if so, at what? 23 

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nmap -I 192.168.1.10 Starting nmap V. 2.53 by [email protected] Port State Protocol Service Owner 22 open tcp ssh root 25 open tcp smtp root 80 open tcp http root 110 open tcp pop-3 root 113 open tcp auth root 6000 open tcp X11 root 25 

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 Network resources and shares  Users and groups  Applications and banners 28 

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Exposed Component 2004 2003 2002 2001 Operating System 124 (15%) 163 (16%) 213 (16%) 248 (16%) Network Protocol Stack 6 (1%) 6 (1%) 18 (1%) 8 (1%) Non-Server Application 364 (45%) 384 (38%) 267 (20%) 309 (21%) Server Application 324 (40%) 440 (44%) 771 (59%) 886 (59%) Hardware 14 (2%) 27 (3%) 54 (4%) 43 (3%) Communication Protocol 28 (3%) 22 (2%) 2 (0%) 9 (1%) Encryption Module 4 (0%) 5 (0%) 0 (0%) 6 (0%) Other 5 (1%) 16 (2%) 27 (2%) 5 (0%) 31 

2004 2003 2002 2001 Vulnerability Count 812 1007 1307 1506 32 

Attacker Requirements 2004 2003 2002 2001 Remote Attack 614 (76%) 755 (75%) 1051 (80%) 1056 (70%) Local Attack 191 (24%) 252 (25%) 274 (21%) 524 (35%) Target Accesses 17 (2%) 3 (0%) 12 (1%) 25 (2%) 33 

Vulnerability Type 2004 2003 2002 2001 Input Validation Error 438 (54%) 530 (53%) 662 (51%) 744 (49%) Boundary Condition Error 67 (8%) 81 (8%) 22 (2%) 51 (3%) Buffer Overflow 160 (20%) 237 (24%) 287 (22%) 316 (21%) Access Validation Error 66 (8%) 92 (9%) 123 (9%) 126 (8%) Exceptional Condition Error 114 (14%) 150 (15%) 117 (9%) 146 (10%) Environment Error 6 (1%) 3 (0%) 10 (1%) 36 (2%) Configuration Error 26 (3%) 49 (5%) 68 (5%) 74 (5%) Race Condition 8 (1%) 17 (2%) 23 (2%) 50 (3%) Design Error 177 (22%) 269 (27%) 408 (31%) 399 (26%) Other 49 (6%) 20 (2%) 1 (0%) 8 (1%) 34 

35  Memory safety violations, such as:  Buffer overflows  Dangling pointers  Input validation errors, such as:  Format string bugs  Improperly handling shell meta characters so they are interpreted  SQL injection  Code injection  E-mail injection  Directory traversal  Cross-site scripting in web applications  HTTP header injection  HTTP response splitting  Race conditions, such as:  Time-of-check-to-time-of-use bugs  Symlink races  Privilege-confusion bugs, such as:  Cross-site request forgery in web applications  Clickjacking  FTP bounce attack  Privilege escalation  User interface failures, such as:  Warning fatigue or user conditioning 

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statement = “SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = „” + userName + “‟;” John Doe SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = „John Doe‟; John Doe‟; DROP TABLE users; SELECT * FROM Users WHERE name = „John Doe'; DROP TABLE users; 

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1. Passive reconnaissance. 2. Active reconnaissance (scanning). 3. Exploiting the system: Gaining access through the following attacks: Operating system attacks Application level attacks Scripts and sample program attacks Misconfiguration attacks o Elevating of privileges o Denial of Service 4. Uploading programs. 5. Downloading Data. 6. Keeping access by using the following: o Backdoors o Trojan horses 7. Covering Tracks 41 

 Active attacks  Denial of Service  Breaking into a site ▪ Intelligence gathering ▪ Resource usage ▪ Deception  Passive attacks  Sniffing ▪ Passwords ▪ Network traffic ▪ Sensitive information  Information gathering 42 

 Log files  File information  Additional files  Network traffic 43 

 • Chusr.c— Can be used to clear an entry from the UTMP file.  • Cloak.c— Wipes away all presence of a user on a UNIX system.  • Cloak2.c— Newer version of cloak that performs a better job of  cleaning up WTMP and UTMP files.  • Displant.c— Cleans up and removes all traces from a UTMP file.  • Hide.c— Cleans up and removes all traces from a UTMP file.  • Invisible.c— Hides the attacker’s traces as root on a system.  • Lastlogin.c— Removes the last log on for a particular user.  • Logcloak.c— Another rewrite of cloak.  • Logutmpeditor.c— Edits entries in the UTMP file.  • Logwedit.c— Cleans up and removes all traces from the WTMP  file.  • Marry.c— Removes entries and cleans up log files.  • Mme.c— Enables you to make changes and remove entries from  the UTMP file.  • Remove.c— Removes entries from UTMP, WTMP, and lastlog files.  • Stealth.c— Cleans up and removes entries from UTMP files.  • Ucloak.c— Another version of cloak that removes all presence of a  user.  • Utmp— Removes UTMP entries by name or number.  • Wtmped.c— Enables you to overwrite the WTMP file with one of  your choosing.  • Zap.c— Remove entries from WTMP and UTMP file.  • Zap2.c— An updated version of zap. 44 

 Backdoors  Trojans  Rootkits 45 

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Operating System Network Protocol Stack Non-Server Application Server Application Hardware Communicati on Protocol Encryption Module Other 2001 248 8 309 886 43 9 6 5 2002 213 18 267 771 54 2 0 27 2003 163 6 384 440 27 22 5 16 2004 124 6 364 324 14 28 4 5 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 

Defensive Techs 

 Server is: -  Host offering services  Application, Authentication, etc 

 Knowledge of threat levels gives head start  ID all reducible threats  Data, Resources are potential targets due to bugs  Bugs become exploits  Assessment, mitigation aid understanding shield strength  Assumption: - Network servers in an enterprise 

 Plan the installation and deployment of the operating system and other components for the server  Install, configure, and secure the underlying operating system as well as the server software  For web servers, database servers, and directory servers which host content, ensure that the content is properly secured. 

 Planning, Installation & Deployment  Cautious Planning, more security  Deficient Planning management controls  Fixing security later won’t help ▪ Cumbersome, expensive  Detailed Plan should be made and followed  Suspicious behavior, deviation from the plan. 

 Parameters considered  Purpose, Information categories, security requirements, retrieval  Privileges, management, user authentication, protection of data  Enforced appropriate access to Information  Application meets requirements  Vulnerability history, functionality 

 Application chooses OS  OS restrict activities to authorized users  Data access control  Disable unnecessary services  Public facing  Sensitive  Secure environment, physical security 

 Post Planning  Patching  Hardening ▪ Remove disable unwanted services ▪ User Authentication configuration ▪ Configure server resource requirements  Configure Additional Security 

 Periodic testing, help ID breaches, measure effectiveness present security  Vulnerability scanning, penetration testing  Test identically configured test server  Possibility for inconsistencies 

 Read, Understand the Software Documentation, see options coming with software  Check vulnerabilities and related patches  Never place partially patched server on the Network  Such a server will be compromised easily 

 Very similar OS installation  Install only required services  Anything not necessary should be removed  First install software on a dedicated host/guest OS  Apply patches and upgrades  Create separate partition for server data  Remove unnecessary service and unwanted default accounts 

 OS provides option to set access rights for files, resources, devices  Distribute access rights to users  Sever software has the same option  Set Identical permissions for both OS and server software  Optimal Access controls  Limit server applications access to resources  Limit user access through additional controls 

 Proper access controls help protect sensitive data.  Limit resource usage  Ensure integrity of server logs  Distinctive files need access control ▪ Logs, audit files, security mechanisms  Individual User or User Groups Identity, restricted access  OS should  Limit file access by server software processes  Enforce service processes, run as user, write to sever content whenever required. 

 Sever software uses minimum OS resources  Install sever software different partition  Scan upload files before the server reads  Limit size of Upload files  Store logging information logging server  Store locally if feasible  Connection timeout configuration 

 Additional Authentication and Encryption  Maintaining server security  Maintain a test server 

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66  • Achilles. Used to edit http sessions: http://www.digizensecurity.com  • Adore. Kernel level rootkit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/UNIX/penetration/roo tkits  • Back Orifice 2000. Back-door program for Windows:  http://www.bo2k.com  • Cheops. Network mapping tool: http://www.marko.net/cheops/  • Covert TCP. Hides data in the TCP protocol:  http://packetstorm.securify.com  • CPU Hog. DOS attack:  http://206.170.197.5/hacking/DENIALOFSERVICE/  • Crack. Password cracker for UNIX:  ftp://cerias.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/crack  • Dsniff. Advanced sniffer program:  http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff  • Dumpsec. Extracts information from NT null sessions:  http://www.systemtools.com/somarsoft  • Enum. Extracts information from NT null sessions:  http://razor.bindview.com  • Firewalk. Determines a firewall ruleset: http://  packetstorm.securify.com/UNIX/audit/firewalk  • Fragrouter. Used to fragment packets:  http://www.anzen.com/research/nidsbench  • Getadmin. Privilege escalation for NT:  http://www.infowar.co.uk/mnemonix/utils.htm  • Hunt. Session hijacking tool: http://www.cri.cz/kra/index.html  • IIS Unicode Exploit. Exploits an IIS server:  http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/p/doc.asp?id=57&face=2  • Imap Buffer Overflow. Buffer overflow for UNIX:  http://packetstorm.securify.com  • IP Watcher. Commercial session hijacking tool:  http://www.engarde.com  • ITS4. Security reviewer: http://www.cigital.com/its4/  • Jizz. DNS cache poisoning tool: http://www.rootshell.com  • John the Ripper. Password cracker:  http://www.openwall.com/john  • Jolt2. Denial of Service tool: http://razor.bindview.com  • Juggernaut. Session hijacking tool: http://www.rootshell.com  • Knark. Kernel level rootkit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/UNIX/penetration/roo tkits  • Land. Denial of Service attack:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/9901- exploits/eugenics.pl  • Loki. Covert channel for creating a back door:  http://www.phrack.com/Archives/phrack51.tgz  • L0phtcrack. Password cracker: http://www.l0pht.com  • Lrk5. Rootkit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/UNIX/penetration/roo tkits 

67  Nessus. Free vulnerability scanner: http://www.nessus.org  • NetBus. Back-door program for Windows: http://www.netbus.org  • Netcat. Swiss army knife of security tools: http://www.l0pht.com/  • NetMeeting Buffer Overflow. Buffer overflow:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/9905-  exploits/microsoft.netmeeting.txt  • Nmap. Port scanner: http://www.insecure.org/nmap  • NT Rootkit. Rootkit for NT: http://www.rootkit.com  • Ping of Death. Denial of Service attack:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/9901-exploits/eugenics.pl  • Queso. Operating system fingerprinting tool:  http://www.apostols.org/projectz/queso  • RDS Exploit. IIS exploit:  http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/p/doc.asp?id=1&iface=2  • RedButton. NT exploit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/NT/audit/redbutton.nt.we akness.sh  ower.zip  • Redir. Packet redirector: http://oh.verio.com/~sammy/hacks  • Reverse WWW shell. Back-door program: http://r3wt.base.org  • Rstatd exploit. Buffer overflow:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/0008- exploits/rpc.statd.x86.c  • Rootkits. Rootkits for UNIX:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/UNIX/penetration/rootkits  • Sam Spade. General tool for Windows: http://www.samspade.org  • Sechole. Privilege escalation exploit: http://www.ntshop.net  • Smurf. Denial of Service exploit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/new-exploits/papasmurf.c  • Sniffit. Sniffer: http://reptile.rug.ac.be/~coder/sniffit/sniffit.html  • Snort. Sniffer IDS: http://www.clark.net/~roesch/security.html  • Solaris LKM Rootkit. Back-door program:  http://thc.inferno.tusculum.edu/files/thc/slkm-1.0.html  • SSPing. Denial of Service exploit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/9901-exploits/eugenics.pl  • SYN Flood. Denial of Service exploit:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/spoof/unix-spoof- code/synk4.zip  • Targa. Tool for running multiple Denial of Service exploits:  http://packetstorm.securify.com  • TBA. War dialer for Palm Pilots:  http://www.l0pht.com/~kingpin/pilot.html  • THC Scan. War dialer: http://thc.inferno.tusculum.edu  • Tini. Backdoor for NT: http://ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/tini  • ToolTalk Buffer Overflow. Buffer overflow:  http://www.securityfocus.com  • TFN2K. Distributed Denial of Service attack tool:  http://packetstorm.securify.com/distributed/  • Trinoo. Distributed denial of service attack tool:  Http://packetstorm.securify.com/distributed/  • TTY Watcher. Session hijacking tool:  ftp://coast.cs.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/ttywatcher  • Whisker. CGI vulnerability scanner: http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp  • WinDump. Sniffer for Windows: http://netgroupserv.  polito.it/windump/  • WinNuke. Denial of Service exploit: http://www.anticode.com  • WinZapper. Log cleaner for NT:  http://ntsecurity.nu/toolbox/winzapper 

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