Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts David Pitt California State University, Los Angeles Conference: Non-physicalist Views of Consciousness, Cambridge University May 24, 2016 

concepts are not percepts transfinite ordinals concepts are not images myriagons 

conceptual contents are thinkable percepts are not thinkable images are not thinkable external objects are not thinkable these things are not conceptual contents 

thinking is a kind of experience “cognitive” (conceptual, propositional) phenomenology to be hearable is to be auditory-phenomenological to be smellable is to be olfactory-phenomenological to be thinkable is to be cognitive-phenomenological 

smells can’t be heard sounds can’t be tasted sights can’t be smelled none of these can be thought they can only be thought about 

conceptual content cannot be individuated by non- cognitive phenomenology there can be no “phenomenal concepts” concepts whose contents are non-cognitively- phenomenologically individuated 

concepts can no more contain percepts or images than smells can contain sounds, or itches can contain feelings of remorse conceptual contents (including those of indexical concepts) are not referentially individuated there can only be concepts whose referents are non-cognitively-phenomenal states 

Mary acquires no new concepts when she leaves the greyscale room there are no new thoughts she can think in the room, she can think (falsely) this is puce of a grey patch 

this is puce thought of a grey patch this is puce thought of a puce patch the same thought (same content) thought of different things 

when she leaves she can think this is puce (truly) about a puce patch she sees this is knowledge by acquaintance 

a sense in which this is new knowledge: her thought this is puce is true, and justified but there is no new thought her belief is justified by her experience 

Marianna in the technicolor vestibule can she know what puce looks like? 

yes she can come to know what puce looks like without knowing it’s puce that looks like that without applying the concept PUCE without thinking at all without knowing that this is puce 

without knowing that she knows what puce looks like acquaintance per se is a form of knowledge (Conee, “phenomenal knowledge”) 

1. knowledge by description 2. knowledge by acquaintance 3. acquaintance-knowledge 1 and 2 are conceptual 3 is non-conceptual 

being acquainted with puce experiencing puce is knowing what it’s like to see puce 

knowing that this is puce is knowledge by acquaintance it is knowledge about an instance of puce- experience ‘this’ refers to an instance of puce-experience 

as long as puce can be imaginatively re- experienced, the knowledge persists (this needn’t be something you can do at will) you can forget what puce looks like if you can’t imaginatively experience it 

an experience of puce can recur even if it is not identified as such acquaintance-knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance have different persistence conditions acquaintance-knowledge just is experience knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge that 

Swamp Mary could be equipped with a puce detector, which causes her to believe that puce things are puce when she encounters them but reliably believing that something puce is puce is not knowing what puce looks like it is not recognizing puce knowing what puce looks like requires experiencing or having experienced puce 

acquaintance-knowing is the basic mode of knowing for phenomenal properties knowledge by acquaintance depends upon it you can’t have it without acquaintance 

Mary does not have knowledge by acquaintance of the Taj Mahal she’s never seen it (pictures of the Taj Mahal are not the Taj Mahal) she is not acquainted with it 

nothing metaphysically significant about acquisition of knowledge by acquaintance per se in the room Mary cannot have knowledge by acquaintance knowledge of the Taj Mahal she hasn’t seen it she can’t know that this is the Taj Mahal 

if she leaves the room and travels to Agra, she may come to have knowledge by acquaintance of it it doesn’t follow that the Taj Mahal is not a physical object the question of physicalism is independent 

it depends upon the nature of what one is acquainted with the question is why Mary can’t have knowledge by acquaintance acquaintance-knowledge is immediate knowledge of experience