Adam Pautz: A Dilemma for Russellian Monists About Consciousness

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A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness Adam Pautz Paper available at https://brown.academia.edu/AdamPautz

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•Chalmers: RM – combines virtues of dualism and physicalism while avoiding their problems. Best of both!! “Hegelian Synthesis”!! •My talk: raise a problem – not combination problem. Take form of dilemma.

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First, explain Russellian Monism and “Hegelian Synthesis”

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•Russell: physics gives a big Ramsey-sentence telling (EP)(EQ)(P nomic role X in laws & Q nomic role Y) •RMs: Every property – mass, charge - each has its own “substantial nature”, going beyond nomic role. Different properties could’ve played same role. “Quiddities”.

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•Example: maybe, in actual, phenomenal redness plays mass role, and phenomenal yellowness plays charge role. •There are facts like this – but we’ll never know them. Not colors. But pretend.

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The main idea of Russellian monism “Quiddities fill gap”. “No explanatory gap for God”, even if us. If quids. physical, weird form of a priori physicalism.

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Strange, but “Hegelian Synthesis” •Broadly speaking, non-standard physicalism – simple and uniform, with distribution of quids. and nomic entailing. •Also, like dualists, RMists can use “conceivability argument” to support their view, while avoiding dualism.

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Like Dualists, conceivability against *standard* physicalism “accessible Zombie” Don’t Jump to Dualism. Another way: Quiddity-‐switching

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A Dilemma “Reductive” RM “Primitivist” RM Not a possibility! Similar to dualism

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1st: “Reductive” Russellian Monism and Its Problems

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To illustrate, simple “Reductive Russellian monism” Let B be neural correlate - pattern Let “B+” be B plus quiddities. Block, Papineau -‐ but with quiddity-‐ requirement added.

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•All non-f concrete things just = sums built from fundamental physical things. •All non-f properties = complex properties built from fundamental quiddities and “structural” properties.

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•RRM: a beautiful picture of the world – virtues of physicalism. A small handful of general “building principles” for things and properties is enough to explain the whole of the manifest image. •But: I think Russellian monists just can’t accept it. RRM faces three problems.

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1st: “The Problem of Simple Subjects” Remember RM use conceivability against SP. But double edged sword. Simple subject

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2nd problem: “meta-semantic problem” Consider rock. Duplicate. Weird view. Problem: “is a rock”

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Go Back. “This type of experience is great!” If quiddities, 2 candidates: 12 1st: B 2nd: B+ RUSSELL

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“This” 1. Commitment of RM that Russell’s use of “This experience” DOESN’T refer to B (share), Rather, B+ - that only Russell has. “I’m having this but my poor twin isn’t” 2. But then, if RRM, must also reductive account, in physical terms, of how “This” homes in on B+ and not B, tho’ differ minutely. 3. But it can be argued there is no such account. Why believe this???

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“This type of experience” 12 B B+ Causation “Naturalness” In general, if you look at physical facts, insufficient. WHAT’S THE “SEMATNIC GLUE”?? MARTIAN OBSERVER

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“This type of experience” 12 B B+ Causation “Naturalness” Use Descriptive Fit ACQUAINTANCE TO THE RESCUE??? Zoink!

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3rd and final problem: “phenomenal representation”. •If RRM, not enough to say “experience is grounded in the quiddities” and go home. •Must work: gesture at quiddity- involving reductions of puzzling mental facts.

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One puzzling mental fact: experience representational Given rep, RRM faces a new problem. What’s reductive account of dyadic ph. rep relation? Redness and roundness

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Standard reductive (Dretske and Tye): “tracking theory” •Sensible properties = physical properties instantiated in our environment. • Phenomenally relation btw subjects & sensible properties = “tracking relation” = Subject X is in a physical state that is cognitively accessible and that Normally tracks the instantiation of property Y in external environment.

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Two Reasons RRM can’t accept 1st reason. This tracking theory just a “standard” physicalist account - “accessible physical properties and relations”. Since into CA, can’t accept. 2nd problem. Standard tracking – phenomenal externalism. RMs: Phenomenal internalism.

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Super non-standard: subject X phenomenally represents property Y iff X ……..Y We just have no idea! Redness and roundness “If you can’t gesture at toy reduction, probably doesn’t exist” “problem of phenomenal representation ”

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2nd Horn: “Primitivist” Russellian Monism

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Analogy: Moorean view of normativity ought-to-do-it-ness OUGHT ≠ IS Non-normative property – saving the life of a baby Grounding!!!!

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Primitivist Russellian monism (1)Unlike RRM, no “interesting” reductive account. Primitive. (2)Retain RM idea: no “Gap for God”. If God looked into Russell’s brain…

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First, accommodates “Simple subjects” B+ Since T-‐like ≠ complex physical ground, no problem! Occurrence grounded in @, Not in SS world. ≠

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Second, solve MS. “This type of experience” is great. 12 B B+ Recall, RRM, 2 candidates: B+, B. IN ADDITION, primitive experience. Very different from ground. Glows 100% naturalness, even if ground B+ is complex. Given a Lewisian, this 100% has more reference magnetism In turned, grounded in B+

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3rd: “The problem of phenomenal representation” “Nothing forbidden”. Relation primitive – just like Russell said ACQUAINTANCE is. Still, retain RM… Redness and roundness

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BTW: Chalmers favors “primitivist Russellian monism” “The nature [essence] of a phenomenal property is revealed by introspection although the grounds of a specific instance are not.”

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In what follows, “Primitivist RM” “Quite different” (1) Relational/non-‐ relational (2) 100% natural (3) Epistemically different. Redness and roundness

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•PRM solves problems. Remains RM. What’s wrong with it? •Not false, not well motivated. Remember “HS” argument. “Combines virtues of physicalism and dualism while avoiding problems.” But not PRM!!!

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Indeed, PRM similar to dualism – in fact: REDNESS REDNESS Having a tomato-‐like involves standing in a primitive ph rep relation. Retains wholesale this Dualist ontology PRIMITIVIST RUSSELLIAN MONISM CHALMERS’S PROPERTY DUALISM.

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Agree form “Psychophysical laws” Some f , necessarily, if some one has brain state B, then, because of this, they are in distinct state of standing in the primitive PR relation to f(B). --Only Difference, Property Dualist: a posteriori and contingent. --PRM: speculative, if knew quiddities of brain states, see a priori that this law records systematic, metaphysically necessary con. between brain states and quite different experiential conditions.

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•Since so similar, PRM shares the same traditional problems as dualism. •So Chalmers’s “Hegelian synthesis” argument for RM fails. It’s NOT the case that RM combines the virtues of physicalism and dualism while avoiding their problems.

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(1) BOTH FACE NON-UNIFORM REDNESS REDNESS Ontological novelty in connection with brains

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•Non-uniform in stock of principles. •Property dualists: “nomological danglers”, contingent psychophysical laws that are anomalous, totally different from contingent laws of physics in the rest of nature.

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•P-Russellian Monsist: “a priori danglers”. After all, same psychophysical laws as the dualist, connecting brain states with quite different experiences, but speculates that they’re a priori. •Where else in nature: functional laws that systematically connect QUITE DIFFERENT ranges of properties THAT ARE A PRIORI?

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Answer: Nowhere! •Rest of nature, a priori principles: logical truths, determinates-determinable, maybe composition. •PRM: speculates occurrence of experiences is explained by a priori connections of TOTALLY DIFFERENT, AND WHOLLY NOVEL SORT. On one hand laws, on other a priori.

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EQUALLY NON-UNIFORM VIEWS OF NATURE REDNESS REDNESS Something special, anomalous in connection with brains

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ALSO, COMPLEX -- SAME SYSTEM OF PSY LAWS connecting ≠ REDNESS REDNESS

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•Analogy: Suppose empiricist like D. Lewis fundamental physical laws. Now suppose Leibniz comes along. •Do we, right now, have a simplicity- based reason to prefer Leibniz’s view that laws of physics are a priori & necessary, over Lewis’s view?

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ALSO FACE EQUALLY PROBLEM OF MENTAL CAUSATION REDNESS REDNESS Reaching Reaching

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REDNESS REDNESS Reaching Reaching

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FINALLY, BOTH FACE A PROFOUND IGNORED PROBLEM ABOUT “LUCK” •Dualist: lucky that laws fine-tuned yield “congruent experiences”. •PRM: Dull-pain scenario: same in all accessible physical respects, but dull-pain. Conceivable!! •How possible? Sucky quiddities. Why not actual? Quiddistic fine-tuning.

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Conclusion •If you use CA reject standard physicalism . . . . . •NOT- reductive RM. •Primitivist RM or Dualism. But on a par.

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THANKS