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How to run your code on the dark web (and why you should)

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Me. I’m Luke. I’m a web dev. I work on Privacy & Security. I click thru slides really fast. Twitter: @groovecoder speakerdeck.com/groovecoder 2

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How to run your code on the dark web (and why you should)

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How to run your code on the dark web (in 15 minutes)

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How to run your code on the dark web and why you should

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How to write your code for the dark web and why you should

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How to write your code for and why you should

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is a browser

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is a browser mostly

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is a browser patched

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is a browser patched with The Onion Router

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patched with The Onion Router Why is ?

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https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https

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IP, DNS, & HTTP threats • Hackers-in-the-middle • ISPs snooping on customers’ online activity • Governments censoring sites • Corporations scanning web logs for their competitors’ IP addresses • Criminal sites scanning web logs for law enforcement IP address

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https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https Location = IP Address

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protects the user/pw & data from the intermediaries

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https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https

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IP, DNS, & HTTP threats • Hackers-in-the-middle • ISPs snooping on customers’ online activity • Governments censoring sites • Corporations scanning web logs for their competitors’ IP addresses • Criminal sites scanning web logs for law enforcement IP address

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How do we protect
 location + destination from intermediaries?

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is a browser patched with The Onion Router

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The Onion Router?

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https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

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https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

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Tor protection from DNS + HTTP internet threats • Hackers-in-the-middle • ISPs snooping on customers’ online activity • Governments censoring sites • Corporations scanning web logs for their competitors’ IP addresses • Criminal sites scanning web logs for law enforcement IP address

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How to write your code for

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Since Tor routes thru 3 networks …

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Optimize for latency (You should do this anyway)

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Minimize number of requests (You should do this anyway)

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Help the browser with Resource hints (You should do this anyway) https://w3c.github.io/resource-hints

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Good caching

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Make CDN work with exit nodes

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Come to to learn more!

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Yay! Your site is faster for users

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Oh noes! All your users are hacked!

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Remember these?

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https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en

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Tor Encryption https://jordan-wright.com/blog/2015/02/28/how-tor-works-part-one/

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Tor Encryption https://jordan-wright.com/blog/2015/02/28/how-tor-works-part-one/ Note: exit nodes can see the Original Data

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hacked

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hacked hacked hacked hacked

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exit node threats = Man-in-the-Middle threats • exit node snooping on unencrypted data:
 user/password, PII, etc. • Hook browsers with BeEF • Backdoor binaries

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protects the location, destination, user/pw, & data from the intermediaries

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Use HTTPS (OMG you should do this anyway!)

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https://speakerdeck.com/groovecoder/top-5-security-errors-we-see-from-firefox-and-how-to-fix-them

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+

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Yay! Your code is faster and more secure for users

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Oh noes! Your code is broken in

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is a browser patched

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is a browser patched ESR

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Firefox ESR

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Make your code work in Firefox ESR (You should do this anyway)

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Make your code work in all browsers! (You should do this anyway)

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Download ESR

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Firefox Dev Tools!

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Come to to learn more!

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Oh noes! Some of your code is still broken in

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Why is patched ESR

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Adversary Model guides Implementations

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Fingerprint

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Tor Implementation: Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability

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https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/tree/browser/app/profile/000-tor-browser.js?h=tor-browser-52.2.0esr-7.5-1&id=dda0385cc49240f8bd115476c870d61863741f4c Minimal WebGL No Gamepads Popups open into new tabs UTC timezone No device sensors No WebAudio Windows 7

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To really debug everything …

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Download Tor !

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Tor Dev Tools!

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Oh noes! Some of your code is STILL broken in

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Come to to learn more!

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Summary • Optimize for latency • Make it work in Firefox (ESR) • (Optional) WITHOUT:
 JavaScript, MathML, SVG, Web Fonts

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Writing code for makes your code better for everyone!

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Yay! Your code works* fast* and secure* for users * for some definition of “works|fast|secure”

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Oh noes! YOU are pwned

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Oh noes! YOU are pwned if YOU were trying to stay anonymous

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Now we’re (finally) to the dark web

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https://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_internet214.htm

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https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-deep-dark-web-and-how-do-you-access-it

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https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https Location = IP Address

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https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https Location = IP Address

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How do you set up ? Site.com

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https://domain.me/how-domain-names-work/

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https://domain.me/how-domain-names-work/

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https://whois.icann.org/en/domain-name-registration-process

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Not Anonymous

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Not Anonymous

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How do you set up anonymously? Site.com

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You set up Site.onion

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is a Tor Hidden Service Site.onion

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a Tor Hidden Service uses a “rendezvous protocol” instead of DNS

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https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

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https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

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https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

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https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

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https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

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https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en

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Rendezvous Point

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But since
 Tor hidden services hop thru 6 nodes …

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… really, Optimize for latency (You should do this anyway)

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Optimize for latency • Minimize Requests • Prefer fewer, larger asset bundles • Use CSS Sprites for images • Use Data URIs for small images • Use Icon Fonts • Use Resource Hints • Good caching • Allow CDN access from Tor nodes

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is easy to set up! Site.onion

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1. Run a web server 2. Edit your torrc file 3. Run tor Site.onion

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torrc

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Yay! Your .onion is working!

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Oh noes! You are still hacked identified!

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Come to to learn more! • OnionScan • Anonymous Email • EXIF data in images • Server fingerprinting • “Rotten Onions” attacks • (maybe: hacking nazis on the dark web?)

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Why you should write code for the dark web

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Writing code for the dark web is fun

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Writing code for the dark web makes your code better

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Writing code for the dark web makes your code better faster more secure more compatible

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Writing code for the dark web makes your code better think

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Writing code for the dark web makes your code better about your privacy think

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Writing code for the dark web makes your code better about your privacy think others’

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http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/07/women_young_people_experience_the_chilling_effects_of_surveillance_at_higher.html

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–Trisha Salas @ Thunder Plains 2016 “I want to try Tor … but I heard it puts you on some kind of list … and I plan to travel soon.”

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–me “I have done many weird things with/on Tor and I’ve had no problems traveling.”

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Download Tor !

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Set up a hidden service

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“Privacy by Design” https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2017/07/privacy-by-design-framework/

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Privacy Guidelines for Designing Personalization https://www.smashingmagazine.com/2016/03/privacy-for-personalization/

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Come to to learn more! speakerdeck.com/groovecoder Twitter: @groovecoder