What's New with OAuth and OpenID Connect? Aaron Parecki Oktane20 • April 2020 

Where does this work happen? openid.net/wg ietf.org / oauth.net 

Who can participate? The IETF has no formal membership, no membership fee, and nothing to sign. You do not need to be a member of the OpenID Foundation to participate in working groups openid.net/wg/about ietf.org/about/participate 

so... what's new? 

RFC6749 RFC6750 CLIENT TYPE AUTH METHOD GRANT TYPE RFC6819 RFC7009 RFC7592 RFC7662 RFC7636 RFC7591 RFC7519 BUILDING YOUR APPLICATION RFC8252 OIDC RFC8414 STATE PARAM TLS CSRF UMA 2 FAPI RFC7515 RFC7516 RFC7517 RFC7518 TOKEN BINDING POP SECURITY BCP CIBA HTTP SIGNING MUTUAL TLS SPA BCP JARM JAR TOKEN EXCHANGE DPOP 

Recently Published RFCs • RFC8705 - Mutual TLS • RFC8707 - Resource Indicators 

RFC8705: Mutual TLS • A form of "Proof of Possession" • Associating a TLS certificate with an access token • Prevents access tokens from being used if stolen tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8705 

RFC8707: Resource Indicators • Adds a parameter "resource" for the client to indicate what server it intends to use the access token at • Improves security when an authorization server issues tokens that are redeemed at multiple resource servers tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8707 

In-Progress Work • OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice • OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps 

OAuth 2.0 Security BCP • All clients MUST use PKCE with the authorization code flow • Password grant MUST NOT be used • Use Authorization Code instead of Implicit flow • Use exact string matching for redirect URIs • No access tokens in query strings • Refresh tokens must be sender-constrained or one-time use oauth.net/2/oauth-best-practice 

OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps • Describes various architectural patterns for SPAs • MUST use PKCE with the authorization code flow • Password grant MUST NOT be used • MUST NOT use the Implicit flow • Refresh tokens must be one-time use with a maximum lifetime oauth.net/2/browser-based-apps 

OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps 

OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps 

New OAuth Extensions • JWT Profile for Access Tokens • Rich Authorization Requests (RAR) • Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR) • JWT Authorization Requests (JAR) • Proof of Possession (DPoP) very much still in progress! 

JWT Profile for Access Tokens • Many existing implementations use JWTs for access tokens • This standard captures best practices and defines consistent properties oauth.net/2/jwt-access-tokens 

Rich Authorization Requests (RAR) • OAuth "scope" is limited to fixed lists of scopes • Need a way to authorize fine-grained transactions or resources • and present that to the user in the authorization interface oauth.net/2/rich-authorization-requests 

Rich Authorization Requests (RAR) oauth.net/2/rich-authorization-requests 

Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR) • Currently, the authorization request is sent in the front-channel • Susceptible to inspection and modification • PAR initiates the OAuth flow from the back-channel oauth.net/2/pushed-authorization-requests 

Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR) GET /authorize?response_type=code &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=af0ifjsldkj &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com POST /as/par HTTP/1.1 Host: as.example.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3 response_type=code &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=af0ifjsldkj &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb Instead of: Push the request to the AS: oauth.net/2/pushed-authorization-requests 

Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR) { "request_uri": "urn:example:bwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2", "expires_in": 90 } GET /authorize?request_uri= urn%3Aexample%3Abwc4JK-ESC0w8acc191e-Y1LTC2 HTTP/1.1 AS responds with a URL: User visits that URL, authorization request details are hidden! oauth.net/2/pushed-authorization-requests 

JWT Authorization Requests (JAR) • Create a signed JWT with the authorization request details • Prevents front-channel tampering with the request, similar to PAR • Authenticates the request so the AS knows the client really did initiate it tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq 

JWT Authorization Requests (JAR) { "iss": "s6BhdRkqt3", "aud": "https://server.example.com", "response_type": "code id_token", "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3", "redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb", "scope": "openid", "state": "af0ifjsldkj", "nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "max_age": 86400 } eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ewogICAgImlzcyI6ICJzNkJoZF JrcXQzIiwKICAgICJhdWQiOiAiaHR0cHM6Ly9zZXJ2ZXIuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20iLAog ICAgInJlc3BvbnNlX3R5cGUiOiAiY29kZSBpZF90b2tlbiIsCiAgICAiY2xpZW50X2 lkIjogInM2QmhkUmtxdDMiLAogICAgInJlZGlyZWN0X3VyaSI6ICJodHRwczovL2Ns aWVudC5leGFtcGxlLm9yZy9jYiIsCiAgICAic2NvcGUiOiAib3BlbmlkIiwKICAgIC JzdGF0ZSI6ICJhZjBpZmpzbGRraiIsCiAgICAibm9uY2UiOiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1q IiwKICAgICJtYXhfYWdlIjogODY0MDAKfQ.Nsxa_18VUElVaPjqW_ToI1yrEJ67BgK b5xsuZRVqzGkfKrOIX7BCx0biSxYGmjK9KJPctH1OC0iQJwXu5YVY-vnW0_PLJb1C2 HG-ztVzcnKZC2gE4i0vgQcpkUOCpW3SEYXnyWnKzuKzqSb1wAZALo5f89B_p6QA6j6 JwBSRvdVsDPdulW8lKxGTbH82czCaQ50rLAg3EYLYaCb4ik4I1zGXE4fvim9FIMs8O CMmzwIB5S-ujFfzwFjoyuPEV4hJnoVUmXR_W9typPf846lGwA8h9G9oNTIuX8Ft2jf pnZdFmLg3_wr3Wa5q3a-lfbgF3S9H_8nN3j1i7tLR_5Nz-g tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq 

JWT Authorization Requests (JAR) https://server.example.com/authorize?request=eyJhbGciOiJS... Either passed by value in the URL: https://server.example.com/authorize?request_uri=https://example.org/r... ...by reference in the URL: POST https://server.example.com/authorize request=eyJhbGciOiJS... ...or pushed using PAR: tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq 

OAuth 2.1 

Current State of OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 OAuth Core Authorization Code Implicit Password Client Credentials RFC6750 Bearer Tokens HTTP Header POST Form Body GET Query String 

Current State of OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 OAuth Core Authorization Code Implicit Password Client Credentials RFC6750 Bearer Tokens HTTP Header POST Form Body GET Query String RFC7636 PKCE 

Current State of OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 OAuth Core Authorization Code Implicit Password Client Credentials RFC6750 Bearer Tokens HTTP Header POST Form Body GET Query String RFC7636 PKCE RFC8252 PKCE for mobile 

Current State of OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 OAuth Core Authorization Code Implicit Password Client Credentials RFC6750 Bearer Tokens HTTP Header POST Form Body GET Query String RFC7636 PKCE RFC8252 PKCE for mobile Browser App BCP PKCE for SPAs 

Current State of OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 OAuth Core Authorization Code Implicit Password Client Credentials RFC6750 Bearer Tokens Tokens in HTTP Header Tokens in POST Form Body Tokens in GET Query String RFC7636 +PKCE RFC8252 PKCE for mobile Browser App BCP PKCE for SPAs PKCE for confidential clients Security BCP 

OAuth 2.1 Authorization Code Client Credentials +PKCE Tokens in HTTP Header Tokens in POST Form Body 

OAuth 2.1 Consolidate the OAuth 2.0 specs,
 adding best practices, 
 removing deprecated features Capture current best practices in OAuth 2.0 under a single name 

OAuth 2.1 No new behavior defined by OAuth 2.1 Non-Goals: Don't include anything experimental, 
 in progress or not widely implemented 

OAuth 2.1 RFC6749 - OAuth 2.0 Core RFC6750 - Bearer Token Usage RFC7636 - PKCE Native App & Browser-Based App BCPs Security BCP • MUST support PKCE for all client types • No password grant • No implicit flow • Exact string matching for redirect URIs • No access tokens in query strings • Refresh tokens must be sender-constrained or one-time use 

OAuth 2.1 oauth.net/2.1 tools.ietf.org/html/draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1 

OAuth 3 aka XYZ aka TXAuth aka XAuth 

OAuth 3 • In development under a new IETF working group • Re-thinking OAuth from the ground up • Not backwards compatible • Consolidate all the various use cases in OAuth into a new framework 

OAuth 3 very much in progress! 

Thank you! @aaronpk aaronpk.com oauth2simplified.com