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Consciousness #1

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New directions in the study of the mind

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New directions in the study of the mind • A project based in Cambridge, supported by the John Templeton Foundation

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New directions in the study of the mind • A project based in Cambridge, supported by the John Templeton Foundation • Investigating non-physicalist, non-reductionist approaches to the mind

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New directions in the study of the mind • A project based in Cambridge, supported by the John Templeton Foundation • Investigating non-physicalist, non-reductionist approaches to the mind • In particular: consciousness and intentionality

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This seminar

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This seminar • 2015-16: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on consciousness

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This seminar • 2015-16: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on consciousness • 2016-17: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on intentionality

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This seminar • 2015-16: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on consciousness • 2016-17: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on intentionality • For part II philosophy students, philosophy graduate students (MPhil & PhD) and any member of the University

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Prospectus 2015-16

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Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes

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Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism

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Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism 2. Conceptions of consciousness

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Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism 2. Conceptions of consciousness 3. The history of phenomenal consciousness: sense-data, the given, qualia etc.

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Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism 2. Conceptions of consciousness 3. The history of phenomenal consciousness: sense-data, the given, qualia etc. 4. Phenomenal consciousness without qualia

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Physicalism etc.

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism • Reductionism

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Materialism

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Materialism • Everything is material/matter

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Materialism • Everything is material/matter • Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius

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Materialism • Everything is material/matter • Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius • Gassendi, Hobbes

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Physicalism: origins

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Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism

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Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism • Otto Neurath ‘Physicalism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle’ (1931)

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Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism • Otto Neurath ‘Physicalism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle’ (1931) • Rudolf Carnap ‘Psychology in physical language’ (1932)

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Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism • Otto Neurath ‘Physicalism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle’ (1931) • Rudolf Carnap ‘Psychology in physical language’ (1932) • Thesis about the language of science

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Physicalism as an ontological thesis • ‘Everything is physical’?

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Rutherford “There is physics; and there is stamp-collecting”

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Two questions

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Two questions 1. What does ‘everything’ mean?

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Two questions 1. What does ‘everything’ mean? 2. What does ‘physical’ mean?

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‘Everything’ • Every object/particular/substance? • Everything whatsover (including every property, relation, fact etc.)

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Stoljar’s two conceptions of the physical • The theory conception: subject-matter of physics • The object conception: paradigm physical objects
 Daniel Stoljar, ‘Physicalism’ SEP

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Hempel’s dilemma (1969) • Suppose physicalism = the doctrine that everything is physical • Either ‘physical’ refers to current physics, and so physicalism is false • Or ‘physical’ refers to some as-yet-undescribed future physics, and so physicalism is virtually trivial

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Rutherford “There is physics; and there is stamp-collecting”

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What about the stamp-collecting?

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What about the stamp-collecting? • Weaker forms of physicalism

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What about the stamp-collecting? • Weaker forms of physicalism • Supervenience versions of physicalism

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What about the stamp-collecting? • Weaker forms of physicalism • Supervenience versions of physicalism • David Lewis, ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’ (1983); Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998)

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Physicalism as a contingent thesis

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Physicalism as a contingent thesis • Worlds, duplicates, physical duplicates

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Physicalism as a contingent thesis • Worlds, duplicates, physical duplicates • Not: any two two worlds which are physical duplicates are duplicates

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Physicalism as a contingent thesis • Worlds, duplicates, physical duplicates • Not: any two two worlds which are physical duplicates are duplicates • Physicalism is a contingent thesis

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What would God have to do to create this world?

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Lewis & Jackson

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Lewis & Jackson • Any world which is a (minimal) physical duplicate of this world is a duplicate simpliciter

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Lewis & Jackson • Any world which is a (minimal) physical duplicate of this world is a duplicate simpliciter • This is the thesis of supervenience physicalism

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The definition of physicalism • Doesn’t appeal to what is fundamental, or to essence, or to explanation • Does appeal to the idea of ‘the physical’

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Physicalism etc.

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism

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Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism • Reductionism

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What about the mind?

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What about the mind? • The traditional mind-body question

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What about the mind? • The traditional mind-body question • Mental and material ‘substances’

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Substance • Subjects of predication • Natural unities • Capable of independent existence

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Substance

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Substance Cartesian substances are capable of independent existence

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Substance Cartesian substances are capable of independent existence (NB Cartesian souls are not ‘made of mental stuff’)

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Substance Cartesian substances are capable of independent existence (NB Cartesian souls are not ‘made of mental stuff’)

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Hence today’s formulation of the mind- body problem • A zombie is a physical duplicate of one of us who is not conscious • Physicalism implies zombies are impossible • Dualism implies zombies are possible