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Gefahren der Cloud Philipp Krenn̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴@xeraa

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ViennaDB Papers We Love Vienna

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Wer verwendet AWS, Azure,...?

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Löst die Cloud alle Security-Probleme?

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"We can operate more securely on AWS than we can in our own data centers" Rob Alexander of CapitalOne #reinvent — Adrian Cockcroft, https://twitter.com/adrianco/status/ 651788241557942272

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AWS Security Bulletins https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/ Xen, Heartbleed,...

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Infrastruktur

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VPC Virtual Private Cloud

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EC2 Classic Private und öffentliche IPs für jede Instanz

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Netzwerk /16 Produktion 10.0.*.* Entwicklung 10.1.*.*

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Verfügbarkeitszonen /18 A 10.*.0.0/18 B 10.*.64.0/18 Reserve 10.*.128.0/18 10.*.192.0/18

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Subnetze /20 A öffentlich 10.*.0.0/20 A privat 10.*.16.0/20 A Reserve 10.*.32.0/20 10.*.48.0/20

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PS: Netzwerk Keine Broadcasts oder Multicasts Noch kein IPv6

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Sicherheitsgruppen Pro Instanz

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Netzwerk ACL Pro Subnetz (optional)

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Verschlüsselung At Rest

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S3, EBS, RDS,... Transparentes Key Management

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Microservices Technologie & AWS Konto pro Team OAuth für interne & externe Kommunikation

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Konten

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Aber das Hauptproblem sind...

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[...] our data, backups, machine configurations and offsite backups were either partially or completely deleted. — http://www.codespaces.com

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Code Spaces has a full recovery plan that has been proven to work and is, in fact, practiced.

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The person(s) used our account to order hundreds of expensive servers, likely to mine Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies. — http://blog.drawquest.com

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This outage was the result of an attack on our systems using a compromised API key. — http://status.bonsai.io/incidents/qt70mqtjbf0s

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1001 einfache Schritte für mehr Sicherheit

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0000 root Konto wegsperren

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0001 Immer IAM verwenden Identity and Access Management

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0010 Nur notwendige Rechte

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{ "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Deny", "Action": [ "ec2:ReleaseAddress", "route53:DeleteHostedZone" ], "Resource": "*" } ] }

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0011 Starke Passworte

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0100 Multi Factor Authentication (MFA)

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Hardware Token Sicherheitsfragen merken (und verteilen)

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0101 Niemals Zugangsdaten commiten

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Nur wohin?

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1. Umgebungsvariablen

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2. Verschlüsselte Dateien in SCM

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http://ejohn.org /blog/keeping-passwords-in-source-control/

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#!/bin/sh FILE=$1 FILENAME=$(basename "$FILE") EXTENSION="${FILENAME##*.}" NAME="${FILENAME%.*}" if [[ "$EXTENSION" != "aes256" ]] then echo "Encrypting $FILENAME and removing the plaintext file" openssl aes-256-cbc -e -a -in $FILENAME -out ${FILENAME}.aes256 rm $FILENAME else then echo "Decrypting $FILENAME" openssl aes-256-cbc -d -a -in $FILENAME -out $NAME fi

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$ ls truststore.jks.aes256 $ encrypt-decrypt.sh truststore.jks.aes256 Contact [email protected] for the password Decrypting truststore.jks.aes256 enter aes-256-cbc decryption password: $ ls truststore.jks truststore.jks.aes256

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3. Spezielle Tools

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Ansible Vault HashiCorp Vault Friedlander Secrets Pit

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Eigenen Code prüfen https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob

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0110 IP Restriktionen

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{ "Statement": [ { "Effect": "Allow", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*" }, { "Effect": "Deny", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "NotIpAddress": { "aws:SourceIp": ["1.2.3.4/24", "5.6.7.8/28"] } } } ] }

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0111 Billing Alerts

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1000 CloudTrail

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{ "Records": [ { "eventVersion": "1.0", "userIdentity": { "type": "IAMUser", "principalId": "EX_PRINCIPAL_ID", "arn": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:user/Alice", "accountId": "123456789012", "accessKeyId": "EXAMPLE_KEY_ID", "userName": "Alice" }, "eventTime": "2015-09-09T19:01:59Z", "eventSource": "ec2.amazonaws.com", "eventName": "StopInstances", "awsRegion": "eu-west-1", "sourceIPAddress": "205.251.233.176", "userAgent": "ec2-api-tools 1.6.12.2", "requestParameters": { "instancesSet": { "items": [ { "instanceId": "i-ebeaf9e2" } ] }, "force": false }, ...

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1001 Security Status

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Abschluss

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Es gibt keine ✨

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140 servers running on my AWS account. What? How? I only had S3 keys on my GitHub and they where gone within 5 minutes! — http://www.devfactor.net/2014/12/30/2375-amazon- mistake/

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Kompromittierte Keys rotieren

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How a bug in Visual Studio 2015 exposed my source code on GitHub and cost me $6,500 in a few hours — https://www.humankode.com/security/how-a-bug-in- visual-studio-2015-exposed-my-source-code-on-github-and- cost-me-6500-in-a-few-hours

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Keine Zugangsdaten commiten

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Danke! Fragen? Philipp Krenn̴̴̴̴̴̴̴̴@xeraa