Just enough bitcoing to go cryptojacking with JavaScript

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Just enough bitcoin to go cryptojacking with Javascript

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About me Privacy & Security Engineer Vice President

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Just enough bitcoin to go cryptojacking with Javascript

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2 parts to this talk • Cryptocurrency • Crypto-jacking attacks with web APIs

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Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies A Comprehensive Introduction

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Khan Acadmy: Journey into cryptography: modern cryptography https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computer-science/cryptography#modern-crypt

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This talk will actually cover cryptography

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⚠ Spoiler Alert: There’s no “encryption” in cryptocurrencies

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  This talk will not cover the crypto math

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  (maybe just a little)

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The “crypto” in cryptocurrency • Cryptographic hash functions • Hash Pointers • Blockchain • Public Key Cryptography • Digital Signatures

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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H(message) hash message We the People of the United States … until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855

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“hash” function • Maps data of arbitrary size into data of a ﬁxed size • e.g., justTheFirstLetter(string) • justTheFirstLetter(“hash”) // returns h • justTheFirstLetter(“function”) // returns f • justTheFirstLetter(“returns”) // returns r • justTheFirstLetter(“fixed-size”) // returns f

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cryptographic hash function • resists “collisions” • hides original (plaintext) message

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“hash” function • e.g., justTheFirstLetter(string) • justTheFirstLetter(“hash”) // returns h • justTheFirstLetter(“function”) // returns f • justTheFirstLetter(“returns”) // returns r • justTheFirstLetter(“fixed-size”) // returns f

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H(message) hash collision! message “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me” 51a6b3 We the People of the United States … until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. resist collisions: 2 different messages shouldn’t produce the same hash

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hiding: “1-way” function

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51a6b3 hiding: given the hash, not feasible to ﬁnd the message ? ?

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H(message) easy-to-ﬁnd hashes message tails 3e5368 heads hiding: what if there are only 2 possible messages? 22814c

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tails 3e5368 heads hiding: what if there are only 2 possible messages? 22814c 3e5368 ? heads

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H(message || nonce) hash message tails dc66ec heads hiding: add random value: “nonce” or “salt” 0f2c72 nonce a a

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H() hash message tails dc66ec heads hiding: add random value: “nonce” 0f2c72 nonce tails 3e5368 heads 22814c a a

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tails dc66ec heads hiding: add random value: “nonce” 0f2c72 tails 3e5368 heads 22814c a a tails 8d23aa heads 15db7d b b

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? message hash dc66ec hiding: given the hash, not feasible to ﬁnd the message or nonce ? ? nonce ?

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cryptographic hash function  for cryptocurrency • resists “collisions” • hides original (plaintext) message • for cryptocurrency: “puzzle friendly”

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puzzle friendliness Given hash output and part of input (i.e., the nonce), it’s “hard” (but not infeasible) to ﬁnd the input

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hiding vs. puzzle-friendly https://stackoverﬂow.com/questions/42042840/properties-of-a-cryptographic-hash-function

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“hard”/“difﬁcult”  vs.  “infeasible”

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message hash dc66ec puzzle-friendly: given the hash and nonce, hard to ﬁnd a message lots of work nonce 123456 message lots of work

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openssl to hash messages echo “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me” | openssl sha256 51a6b38fd78e5e20246bd0103668056a2a8981274e9487ea3f18158e59b690e7 echo “We the People of the United States … until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.” | openssl sha256 e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855

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sha256: Secure Hash Algorithm (with 256-bit digests)

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Note: sha256 is what bitcoin uses!

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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H( ) = e3b0c4 We the People of the United States … until an election of Representatives shall have intervened. hash pointer: where full plaintext data is stored, AND a cryptographic hash of the data

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hash pointers enable everyone else to verify the truth of the data

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so, hashes might give us conﬁdentiality - i.e., to keep something secret

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but these hash pointers give us integrity … … NOT conﬁdentiality

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Remember: there’s not necessarily “encryption” (i.e., conﬁdentiality)  in cryptocurrency

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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prev: H()  e3b0c4 block chain: linked list of hash pointers prev: H()  f4c1d5 data data prev: H()  05d2e6 data

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Now we can have a tamper-proof ledger (of digital dollars)! prev: H()  e3b0c4 prev: H()  f4c1d5 “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me” prev: H()  05d2e6 “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me” “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me”

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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Public Key Cryptography It gives us public & private keys!

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Khan Acadmy: Journey into cryptography: modern cryptography https://www.khanacademy.org/computing/computer-science/cryptography#modern-crypt

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The quick version …

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… nevermind, the quick version was still too long.

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1-way mathematical function: modular exponentiation

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Symmetric Encryption requires extra communication overhead in Difﬁe-Hellman Key Exchange

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Alice has to exchange extra messages to establish a unique key with everyone

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Alice has to manage tons of keys

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Instead, Alice needs a  public “lock” she can copy and share with anyone, and a single private “key” …

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… to do this, you need a “trap door 1-way function”

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… a “trap door 1-way function” is a 1-way function that is infeasible to reverse …

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… a “trap door 1-way function” is a 1-way function that is infeasible to reverse … unless you have a secret piece of information

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mathematical trapdoor 1-way function: modular exponentiation and phi

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math math math • Phi function of large numbers is infeasible to calculate, *except* for prime numbers • Multiplying large prime numbers is infeasible to reverse • The “Prime Factorization” problem • Euler’s Theorem shows that mphi(n) ≅1 mod n.

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math and keys!

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Most important to us: math says the public key can be public   while the secret key stays secret

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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digital signatures: required properties • Only you can sign your signature, but anyone can verify that it’s valid      • The signature is attached to a single document - it can’t be used to indicate you agree to a different document

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signature = sign(secret key, message) “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me” -with love, from Luke

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valid = verify(public key, message, signature) “The bearer of this note may redeem it for one dollar by presenting it to me” -with love, from Luke

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where do secret & public keys come from?

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from decades of “math math math” written into libraries

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openssl to create secret & public keys openssl ecparam -genkey -name secp256k1 -rand /dev/urandom -out \ /Users/lcrouch/secret_key openssl ec -in /Users/lcrouch/ secret_key -pubout -out \ /Users/lcrouch/public_key

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openssl to sign & verify openssl dgst -sign secret_key message -out luke_dollar.signed openssl dgst -verify public_key   -signature luke_dollar.signed valid

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digital signatures enable everyone else to verify the authenticity of the data

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authenticity the person writing the data

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The “crypto” in cryptocurrency gives us … • Integrity, from • Blockchain, from • Hash pointers, from • Hash functions • Authenticity,  Non-repudiation, from • Digital Signatures, from • Public Key Cryptography … not encryption for conﬁdentiality

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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Now we have enough cryptographic primitives to build a (really bad) cryptocurrency

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“Goofycoin” cryptocurrency

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Goofycoin 1. Designated entity - Goofy - can create new coins anytime and coins belong to Goofy 2. Whoever owns a coin can transfer it to someone else

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Goofy creates coins • Generates unique coin ID: 001 • Makes message: “CreateCoin 001” • Hashes and signs message as H(1) with secret key

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Goofy transfers coin to Alice • New message:  “Starting at H(1), PayCoin 001 to Alice” • Note: Alice = Alice’s public key / address • Hashes and signs message as H(2) with secret key

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Alice transfers coin to Bob • New message:  “Starting at H(2), PayCoin 001 to Bob” • Note: Bob = Bob’s public key / address • Hashes and signs message as H(3) with secret key

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Now we can have a tamper-proof ledger of transactions! CreateCoin 001 Goofy PayCoin: 001 Alice Goofy H( ) Alice H( ) PayCoin: 001 Bob

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Goofycoin 1. Designated entity - Goofy - can create new coins anytime and coins belong to Goofy 2. Whoever owns a coin can transfer it to someone else 3. Anyone can verify coin ownership by following block-chain back to Goofy

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Security problem: Double-spend

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Alice can pay the same coin to Chuck CreateCoin [12345] Goofy PayCoin: [12345] Alice Goofy H( ) Alice H( ) PayCoin: [12345] Bob Alice H( ) PayCoin: [12345] Chuck

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How do we decide which ledger is the truth?

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“Scroogecoin” cryptocurrency

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Scroogecoin • Goofycoin + • Designated entity - Scrooge - publishes the canonical public ledger of all transactions • Everyone broadcasts coin transactions to Scrooge • Only accept coins in Scrooge’s public ledger

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Scroogecoin • Scrooge builds block chain to digitally sign • Each block has a transaction in it • ID • contents • hash point to previous block • Scrooge signs ﬁnal hash pointer • Scrooge publishes signature and block chain

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Scroogecoin Transactions • CreateCoins • PayCoins

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CreateCoins number value recipient 1 3.2 Scrooge 2 1.4 Goofy 3 7.1 Alice CreateCoins transID: 1

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PayCoins number value recipient 1 1 Bob 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3) transID: 2 Which coins are being consumed?

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number value recipient 1 1 Bob 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3) transID: 2 number value recipient 1 3.2 Scrooge 2 1.4 Goofy 3 7.1 Alice transID: 1 CreateCoins 1(3)

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Scrooge signs off on everything prev: H()  e3b0c4 transID: 1 prev: H()  f4c1d5 transID: 2 H()  05d2e6 Scrooge number value recipient 1 3.2 Scrooge 2 1.4 Goofy 3 7.1 Alice number value recipient 1 1 Bob 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3) CreateCoins

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Now, when Alice tries to double-spend …

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Alice tries to re-spend coin from Block 1 after Scrooge signs Block 2 prev: H()  e3b0c4 transID: 1 prev: H()  f4c1d5 transID: 2 H()  05d2e6 Scrooge number value recipient 1 3.2 Scrooge 2 1.4 Goofy 3 7.1 Alice number value recipient 1 1 Bob 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3) CreateCoins prev: H()  f4c1d5 transID: 2 number value recipient 1 1 Chuck 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3)

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Scrooge catches her

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Scrooge rejects Alice’s double-spend transaction prev: H()  e3b0c4 transID: 1 prev: H()  f4c1d5 transID: 2 H()  05d2e6 Scrooge number value recipient 1 3.2 Scrooge 2 1.4 Goofy 3 7.1 Alice number value recipient 1 1 Bob 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3) CreateCoins prev: H()  f4c1d5 transID: 2 number value recipient 1 1 Chuck 2 6.1 Alice PayCoins coins: 1(3)

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So, we’ve got a cryptocurrency …

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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but Scrooge … • maintains the ledger of transactions • has authority over which transactions are valid • creates new coins

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How do we get rid of Scrooge?

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Without Scrooge … • Who maintains the ledger of transactions? • Who has authority over which transactions are valid? • Who creates new coins?

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Coin miners!

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Coin miners • maintain the ledger of transactions • have authority over which transactions are valid • create new coins

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Who are coin miners?

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Let’s look at Bitcoin speciﬁcally

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Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer network

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You can participate!

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No content

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It will take up all your disk space

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To pay Bob, Alice broadcasts a transaction to all Bitcoin nodes

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Alice Bitcoin Node Bitcoin Node Bitcoin Node Bitcoin Node Bitcoin Node

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Bitcoin nodes (maybe) include Alice’s transaction in the next block

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A block is just a large grouping of transactions

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Bitcoin nodes are governed by a Distributed Consensus Protocol

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Skipping: Distributed Consensus Protocol tl;dr: it needs a majority of nodes to behave honestly, and to pick a random node from the network for each block

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How do you make a majority of nodes behave honestly?

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NOT crypto … incentives!

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“… Bitcoin works better in practice than in theory.”

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“… Bitcoin works better in practice than in theory.” • Consensus over time • Incentives

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Can we give nodes an incentive to behave honestly over the long term?

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No real identities, so we can’t exactly mail them cash

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If only there were a digital currency we could give them without having to know their real identities …

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Block reward: CreateCoins transaction

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Alice mines a block, and gets to create new coins to herself number value recipient CreateCoins 0 25 Alice (dc3c6e) PayCoins from 1(1) 1 1.1 Bob (e5ceb5) 2 6.1 Alice (dc3c6e) transID: 2

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Financial incentive to be honest: miners only include valid transactions, because they want their own CreateCoins transaction included in the long-term consensus block-chain

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A distributed consensus protocol 1. New transactions are broadcast to all nodes 2. Each node collects new transactions into a block 3. In each round, a random node adds its block to the end of the block-chain 4. Other nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid - i.e., unspent coins with valid signatures

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In each round, how do you pick a random node?

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Proof of Work

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Proof of work • Approximate random selection in proportion to a scarce resource • In Bitcoin, it’s computing power • Nodes compete with each other on computing power

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Hash puzzles

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puzzle friendliness Given hash output and part of input (i.e., the nonce), it’s “hard” (but not infeasible) to ﬁnd the input

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message hash dc66ec puzzle-friendly: given the hash and nonce, hard to ﬁnd a message lots of work nonce 123456 message lots of work

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Hash puzzles in bitcoin mining • To create a block, a node is required to ﬁnd a nonce such that when you combine … • nonce • previous block’s hash • list of transactions • … the hash output should be a string that falls into a certain range

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H(nonce || prev_hash || tx || tx || … || tx) < target

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In Bitcoin the target is a string that starts with some number of 0’s

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sha256 is “puzzle-friendly”, so the only way to solve this puzzle is to just try random nonces

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In Bitcoin the target is a string that starts with some number of 0’s

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blockchain.com

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No content

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Yay! We made it to Bitcoin!

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Public Key Cryptography Digital Signatures Hash Pointers Blockchain Cryptocurrency Bitcoin Cryptographic Hash Functions

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So, to mine cryptocurrency you need: • Lots of eﬃcient processing to complete the proof-of-work hashing • Lots of eﬃcient networking to communicate with the distributed peer-to-peer nodes

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Efﬁcient processing Are CPUs good enough?

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https://www.slideshare.net/AmazonWebServices/aws-reinvent-2016-deep-learning-3d-content-rendering-and-massively-parallel-compute-intensive-workloads-in-the-cloud-cmp317

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CPU mining Bitcoin ~20M h/s = several hundred thousand years to get a block https://99bitcoins.com/20-insane-bitcoin-mining-rigs/

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GPU mining Bitcoin ~200M h/s = hundreds of years http://blog.whitesites.com/GPU-miners-vs-USB-ASIC-Miners-for-Bitcoin__635096680766259765_blog.htm

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ASIC mining Bitcoin 2,100,000M h/s and 0.43 watts/Gigahashes http://blog.whitesites.com/GPU-miners-vs-USB-ASIC-Miners-for-Bitcoin__635096680766259765_blog.htm

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ASIC mining Bitcoin 2,100,000M h/s and 0.43 watts/Gigahashes https://99bitcoins.com/7-awesome-asic-bitcoin-miners/

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ASIC mining Bitcoin 2,100,000M h/s and 0.43 watts/Gigahashes https://seekingalpha.com/article/4140062-bitcoin-transaction-fee-issue-going-get-worse

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So how could a victim’s computer ever mine cryptocurrency?

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You would need to “infect” 105K CPUs or 10.5K GPUs to compete with a single ASIC

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ASIC-resistant puzzle hashing algorithms Since ASICs include very little memory, use a memory-intensive hashing algorithm

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scrypt http://www.pointsoftware.ch/en/the-importance-of-hashing-passwords-part-4-the-hardware-threat/

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scrypt & Litecoin • scrypt hashing function • Fill a large buﬀer of RAM • Mutate the memory in pseudo-random order • O(N2) function • Choose N large enough to make memory faster • Litecoin • ASICs already out for Litecoin param of N=128KB • 504M h/s at 1.58 w/MH • (Remember Bitcoin was 2,100,000M h/s and 0.43 watts/Gigahashes) https://www.hashespersecond.com/asic/

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CryptoNight https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-NJddW0tx9j0/U_6C2wgXSAI/AAAAAAAAkDk/nyKkOESWgwI/s1600/cryptonight.png

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Memory-hard hashes • CryptoNight hashing function • Monero • 2MB memory buﬀer • Uses AES-NI found on most modern x86_64 CPUs • ASICs: 0.2M h/s @ 2.27 w/KH • Litecoin ASIC: 504M h/s @ 1.58 w/MH • Bitcoin ASIC: 2,100,000M h/s and 0.043 w/MH • Also, Monero adjusted PoW algo. so these devices don’t work for Monero anymore https://www.hashespersecond.com/asic/

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So, a victim’s computer could feasibly mine Monero

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Oh yeah, Javascript

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With Web APIs you get: • Eﬃcient processing to complete the proof-of-work hashing • Web Workers & WebAssembly • Eﬃcient networking to communicate with the distributed peer-to-peer nodes • Web Sockets

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Cryptojacking!

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coinhive.min.js

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CoinHive Malware Analysis • Creates WebWorker with number of threads == number of CPU cores available (up to 8 max) • Loads WebAssembly program into worker for mining (default throttle to 100% CPU usage!) • Creates WebSocket connection between server and browser • Server notiﬁes browser if new blocks are found and sends new transactions to browser

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• threads - number of WebWorkers to use; defaults to using as many cores as possible • throttle - fraction of time threads should be idle; defaults to “0” https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https://coinhive.com/documentation/miner

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Check if already loaded; if not, download; _startNow() when ready

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Don’t run in multiple tabs (how nice of them!)

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we’re not maxing out the cores?! spawn more worker jobs! Note: this._threads for later

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Finally! new Worker()

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https://www.slideshare.net/enriqueoriol7/boost-your-angular-app-with-web-workers

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https://www.slideshare.net/enriqueoriol7/boost-your-angular-app-with-web-workers

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https://www.slideshare.net/enriqueoriol7/boost-your-angular-app-with-web-workers

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https://www.slideshare.net/enriqueoriol7/boost-your-angular-app-with-web-workers

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Finally! new Worker()

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lots of js, including WebAssembly, as an object URL Note: WEBSOCKET_SHARDS for later …

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No content

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back in startNow, _connect to servers for block updates

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new WebSocket to a random server from WEBSOCKET_SHARDS Note: remember WEBSOCKET_SHARDS from before?

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new WebSocket()

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Traditional HTTP “polling” adds repeated request + response overhead https://www.pubnub.com/blog/2014-10-01-websockets-and-long-polling-in-javascript-ruby-and-python/

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WebSocket allows bidirectional messaging

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1K messages over time WebSocket vs. REST (HTTP) http://blog.arungupta.me/rest-vs-websocket-comparison-benchmarks/

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new WebSocket to a random server from WEBSOCKET_SHARDS

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Note: remember this._threads from before?

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No content

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How to get this into browsers?

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Ask websites to include it

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Mozilla research • Crawl Alexa Top 10k looking for tags to one of the 212 crypto-jacking hosts in adblock-nocoin-list • Of 6M <script> calls, 945 (0.015%) use crypto-jacking script • number of crypto-jacking hosts used: 11 (5.2% of known hosts) • number of CoinHive scripts: 507 (54%) • Majority of domains detected with crypto-jacking were streaming sites https://github.com/mozilla/UCOSP-winter-2018_TrackingTechnologies/blob/master/analyses/cryptojacking/cryptojacking_analysis.ipynb

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Note: coinhive.com is now gone; only authedmine.com remains

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malvertising

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Malvertising research

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Man-in-the-middle injection bettercap.org

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mitm crypto-miner.js caplet from bettercap

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What to do about it?

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First: Add known  crypto-miners to our block-list

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Done • Go to about:conﬁg • Search for urlclassifier.trackingTable • add tracking-protection-base-cryptomining and tracking-protection-content-cryptomining

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As of Tuesday, it’s even easier!

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No content

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Use Machine-Learning and other heuristics to detect crypto-mining JS

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“Towards Seamless Tracking-Free Web: Improved Detection of Trackers via One- class learning” • Summary:  Training a classiﬁer to detect JS tracking code • Conducted by:  • Data Source:  Web crawl of Alexa top 50  45 random sites from Alexa 5,000-45,000 • Machine Learning Algorithms/Methods:  Support Vector Machine, Positive & Unlabeled • Data features:  JavaScript semantic & syntactic tokens and n-grams • Results • 99% true positives for one-class Support Vector Machine https://www.degruyter.com/downloadpdf/j/popets.2017.2017.issue-1/popets-2017-0006/popets-2017-0006.pdf

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Questions? • Crypto -> Blockchain • Bitcoin • Web Workers, Web Assembly • Web Sockets • Preventing • Luke Crouch • @groovecoder • speakerdeck.com/groovecoder • github.com/groovecoder