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Laura Bell Founder  and  Lead  Consultant  -­‐  SafeStack @lady_nerd    [email protected]   h6p:/ /safestack.io   Automated human vulnerabillity scanning with AVA

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#BHUSA #protectyourpeople To  join  the  discussion  (but  play  nicely  please)

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This  talk  might  make  you  feel   uncomfortable. Sorry.

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…I  want  you  to  feel  uncomfortable

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I  like  people

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Border  Security ApplicaEon  Security Threat  Intelligence    

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people  are  the  path  of   least  resistance    

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In  this  talk The  Problem   The  need  for  and  lack  of  human  defense   The  Tool   We  built  AVA…  and  we  think  you  might  like  it   The  Challenges   Building  human  security  systems  is  hard…      

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we  are  comfortable  when  we  talk   about  technical  vulnerability

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we  do  not  empathise  or  sympathise  with   machines They  are  inanimate  objects.

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technology  is  only  part  of  the  security  picture technology people process

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technical  systems  are:     reviewed   scanned   penetraEon  tested

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processes  are  audited

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what  about  people?

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The problem  with  people

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human vulnerability is natural

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fear  of  rejecEon fear  of  exposure fear  of  physical  harm fear  of  loss

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love

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humans  are  sufficiently  predictable   to  make  it  suitably  annoying     when  we  fail  to     predict  their  behaviour.

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The  modern  approaches

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compliance  has  us  racing  to  the  boKom

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we  watch  video  training  or  e-­‐learning we  make  posters we  Eck  boxes

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Security   Awareness   EducaEon   really  sucks

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      Posters  don’t  work     Stop  it  already.

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this  is  not  how  people  learn go  ask  the  educaEon  and  psychology  communiEes

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No content

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we  shame  the  human  vicEms  of   human  security  aKacks* *while  secretly  doing  the  exact  same  things

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we  forget  that  we  are  a  connected  species

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why  don't  we  acEvely  assess   and  test  our  human  security   risk?

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we  don't  test  because  it’s  too  easy

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people  can’t  be  taught people  are  lazy people  are  stupid

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s/people/we/g

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we  don't  test       because  it  makes  us  feel  uncomfortable because we don't want people to get hurt because it’s hard because  we  don’t  know  how  to  fix  it because we don't want people to get fired

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border  devices  are  not  enough

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AVA

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A first generation proof of concept 3- phase automated human vulnerability scanner

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Know PHASE 1

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We don’t know what our organisations look like

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Human security risk is magnified by connection

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Active Directory Twitter LinkedIn Facebook Email providers People Identifiers Groups Relationships Data

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Location Time stamps Sender Receiver User agent friends contacts frequency aliases profiles Last login Pw Expires? Disabled? Influence Admin?

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test PHASE 2

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Threat injection and behaviour monitoring

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Attack vectors that mean something Email Social Networks Removable Media Files and honeypots SMS

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Email attacks that go beyond phishing Email phishing Internal request social panic Direct request External request favour authoritative

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  The  URL  may  be  different  on  different  messages.   Subject:  Security  Alert:  Update  Java  (*See  Kronos  Note)   Date:  February  22,  2013   *********************************************************** *************   This  is  an  automaNcally  generated  message.  Please  DO  NOT  REPLY.     If  you  require  assistance,  please  contact  the  Help  Center.   *********************************************************** *************   Oracle  has  released  an  update  for  Java  that  fixes  50  security  holes,   including  a     criNcal  hole  currently  being  exploited  in  the  wild.   The  IT  Security  Office  strongly  recommends  that  you  update  Java  as   User generated and publicly sourced attacks

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Removing the boundaries between business and personal

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Instant, scheduled and recurring Security fails when it is treated like a special event

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Give the option of succeeding and reinforce good behaviours

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analyse PHASE 3

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Behaviour Vs. time

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Measuring impact of training

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And now for something a little bit different

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Bridges, weak links and targeting

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Pivoting and propagation

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You know what would be fun? Predictive risk behaviour analysis

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Technologies • Django • Postgresql • Celery • Redis • Bootstrap • Open source • GPL • docker • Integrates with exchange, ad and google apps for business

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The  inevitable  demo

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No content

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Case  studies

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The  process • Candidate  and  volunteer  requests  submiKed  to  social   media  and  contacts • Volunteers  briefed • Removed  volunteers  including  children,  students  or   health  data • AcEve  directory  users  and  groups  collected  from  acEve   directory  server  and  stored  in  json  files • Json  files  processed  to  remove  personal  informaEon • Ava  know  used  to  parse  and  idenEfy  paKerns

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You  want  to  show  this  at  BlackHat?   LOL   Wait,  you’re  serious?   Nope.  Nope.  Nope.  Nope.  Nope.  Nope.  Nope.  Nope.   Yes!   …  please?   …  yes?  

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540  people  and  idenEEes   3  organisaEons   public  and  private  sector   educaEon  and  commerce  

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19  adminstrator  accounts   400  non-­‐expiring   4  groups  per  account   35  never  logged  in   oldest  password  =  11  years   newest  password  =  3  months

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In  2015,  why  is  this     sEll  an  issue?

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The  challenges

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a  public  interest  security  tool

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….from  everyone success  requires  engagement

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is  this  even  legal?

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The  law  in  this  space  is  immature

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publically  available previously  known already  published

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can  we  assess  human   vulnerability  on  this  scale   compromising  the  privacy  the   people  we  assess?

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Privacy  is  about  protecEng  people Know Update Delete Ask    

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AVA  Ethics  and  Privacy  Board ObjecEve,  RepresentaEve,  Independent,  CollaboraEve new  members  welcome  to  apply

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Open.  Honest.  Plain  English

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Providing  people  with  the   informaEon  they  need  to  protect   themselves  and  their  privacy

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Is  this  technically  possible?

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Building  new  things  is  hard

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Scale  that  has  to  be  visible

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There  is  a   reason  why   compromised   email  accounts   have  value Can  we  simulate   aKack  aliases  in  a   manageable  way?

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Nobody  has  Eme  for  more  appliances

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Where  next?

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From  research  project  to  real  life   TesEng ConEnuous  IntegraEon Roadmap  development Feature  development

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Security  culture  change  as  a  service?

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IntegraEon Google Facebook TwiKer Linkedin Microsom Slack GitHub If  you  are  reading  this  and   work  for  these  places,  we   should  probably  talk.

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Ethics  board Developers Testers ContribuEon DocumentaEon Sociologists UX  and  design

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volunteers  wanted Safe   consensual   human  security   science

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TL;DR We  have  a  people  problem   Anuous  human  vulnerability  assessment   The  road  ahead  is  hard   Privacy,  ethics,  momentum,  security,  scaling  and  much  more    

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Learn more or get involved hKps:/ /github.com/SafeStack/ava   now  with  docker  build       @avasecure   hKp:/ /avasecure.com   hKp:/ /ava.rqd.org/   [email protected]  

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Laura Bell Founder  and  Lead  Consultant  -­‐  SafeStack @lady_nerd    [email protected]   h6p:/ /safestack.io   Questions? #protectyourpeople