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Fix What Matters Michael Roytman SIRAcon October 21, 2013

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Why You Should(n’t) Listen • Naive Grad Student Not Too Long Ago • Still Plays With Legos • Barely Passed Regression Analysis • MS Operations Research, Georgia Tech Michael Roytman • Data Scientist, Risk I/O • Fraud Detection, Large Bank

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Roadmap • The Struggle • What’s Good? • Data Driven Insights • Framework • Decision-Making • What’s Bad?

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Starting From Scratch “It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.” -Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, 1887

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Starting From Scratch

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Starting From Scratch Academia! • GScholar! • JSTOR! • IEEE! • ProQuest! InfoSec Blogs! • CSIOs! • Pen Testers! • Threat Reports! • SOTI/DBIR! ! Twitter! • Thought Leaders (you know who you are)! • BlackHats! • Vuln Researchers! Primary Sources! • MITRE! • OSVDB! • NIST CVSS Committee(s)! • Internal Message Boards for ^! Text CISOs

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Data Fundamentalism Don’t Ignore What a Vulnerability Is: Creation Bias ! (http://blog.risk.io/2013/04/data-fundamentalism/) ! Jerico/Sushidude @ BlackHat ! (https://www.blackhat.com/us-13/briefings.html#Martin)! Luca Allodi - CVSS DDOS ! (http://disi.unitn.it/~allodi/allodi-12-badgers.pdf):!

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Data Fundamentalism - What’s The Big Deal? ! ”Since 2006 Vulnerabilities have declined by 26 percent.” ! (http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/documents/vulnerability-trends10.pdf)! ! ! “The total number of vulnerabilities in 2013 is up 16 percent so far when compared to what we saw in the same time period in 2012. ”! (http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-intelligence_report_06-2013.en-us.pdf)! ! !

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What’s Good? Bad For Vulnerability Statistics:! ! NVD, OSVDB, ExploitDB, CVSS, Patches, Microsoft Reports, etc, et al, and so on. ! Good For Vulnerability Statistics:! ! Vulnerabilities. !

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Data Is Everything And Everything Is Data.

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What’s Good?

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What’s Good?

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What’s Good?

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What’s Good?

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What’s Good?

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What’s Good?

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Counterterrorism Known Groups Surveillance Threat Intel, Analysts Targets, Layouts Past Incidents, Close Calls

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What’s Good?

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Uh, Sports? Opposing Teams, Specific Players Gameplay Scouting Reports, Gametape Roster, Player Skills Learning from Losing

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InfoSec?

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Defend Like You’ve Done It Before Groups, Motivations Exploits Vulnerability Definitions Asset Topology, Actual Vulns on System Learning from Breaches

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Work With What You’ve Got: Akamai, Safenet ExploitDB, Metasploit NVD, MITRE

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Add Some Spice

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Show Me The Money 23,000,000 Vulnerabilities! Across 1,000,000 Assets! Representing 9,500 Companies! Using 22 Unique Scanners!

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Whatchu Know About Dat?(a) ! Duplication Vulnerability Density Remediation

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Duplication 0 225,000 450,000 675,000 900,000 1,125,000 1,350,000 1,575,000 1,800,000 2,025,000 2,250,000 2 or more scanners 3 or more 4 or more 5 or more 6 or more

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Duplication We Have: F(Number of Scanners) => Number of Duplicate Vulnerabilities We Want: F(Number of Scanners) => Vulnerability Coverage Make Decisions At The Margins! <---------Good Luck! 0.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

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Density Type of Asset ~Count Hostname 20,000 Netbios 1000 IP Address 200,000 File 10,000 Url 5,000 Hostname Netbios IP File Url 0.0 22.5 45.0 67.5 90.0

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CVSS And Remediation Metrics 0.0 350.0 700.0 1050.0 1400.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average Time To Close By Severity Oldest Vulnerability By Severity

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CVSS And Remediation - Lessons From A CISO Remediation/Lack Thereof, by CVSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 NVD Distribution by CVSS

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The Kicker - Live Breach Data 1,500,000 ! Vulnerabilities Related to Live Breaches Recorded! June, July 2013 !

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CVSS And Remediation - Nope 0.0 1750.0 3500.0 5250.0 7000.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Oldest Breached Vulnerability By Severity

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CVSS - A VERY General Guide For Remediation - Yep 0.0 40000.0 80000.0 120000.0 160000.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Open Vulns With Breaches Occuring By Severity

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The One Billion Dollar Question Probability(You Will Be Breached On A Particular Open Vulnerability)? 1.98% =(Open Vulnerabilities | Breaches Occurred On Their CVE)/(Total Open Vulnerabilities)

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I Love It When You Call Me Big Data Probability A Vulnerability Having Property X Has Observed Breaches RANDOM VULN CVSS 10 CVSS 9 CVSS 8 CVSS 6 CVSS 7 CVSS 5 CVSS 4 Has Patch 0.00000 0.01000 0.02000 0.03000 0.04000

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What’s the Alternative?

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I Love It When You Call Me Big Data Probability A Vulnerability Having Property X Has Observed Breaches Random Vuln CVSS 10 Exploit DB Metasploit MSP+EDB 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3

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Data Is Everything And Everything Is Data.

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Be Better Than The Gap

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I Love It When You Call Me Big Data Spray and Pray => 2% ! CVSS 10 => 4% ! Metasploit + ExploitDB => 30% ! A Good Model That’s Not Built By One Kid Without Hadoop => ???!

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Thank You Don’t Be A Stranger Blog: http://blog.risk.io Twitter: @mroytman