Sensors
Are
Revolu0onizing
Healthcare
Instrumen0ng
the
body
means
con0nuous
real0me
monitoring…
Not
periodic
checkups
Your
phone
will
know
you’re
sick
before
you
do!
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Tradi0onal
Tools
and
Techniques
Are
Failing…
Javascript
Ajax
SOAP/REST
Serialized
Objects
Raw
Socket
Inversion
of
Control
Libraries
and
Frameworks
Aspect
Oriented
Programming
Agile
DevOps
Cloud
Mobile
The right defenses for
every application are…
! Present
! Correct
! Used Properly
! Remain Effective
Defining
“PorXolio
Scale”
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Defining
“DevOps
Speed”
Application security
happens continuously
and in real time
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Is
my
por%olio
protected
against
clickjacking?
One
Thing
at
a
Time…
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Gathering
Intelligence
Controller
Presenta0on
Business
Func0ons
Data
Layer
Third
Party
Libraries
Applica0on
Server
PlaXorm
Run0me
Framework
Opera0ng
System
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Security
Intelligence
Sources
HTTP
Traffic
Backend
Connec0ons
Configura0on
Data
Libraries
and
Frameworks
Data
Flow
Control
Flow
Vulnerability
Trace
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Designing
a
Clickjacking
Sensor
Experiment
Style
Posi0ve
Nega0ve
Environment
Dev
CI
Test
QA
Staging
Security
Analysis
Technique
Manual
SAST
DAST
IAST
Passive
Data
Sources
Code
HTTP
Configura0on
Choose
based
on:
• Speed
• Accuracy
• Feedback
• Scalability
• Ease
of
Use
• Cost
!
!
!
!
Data
Flow
Control
Flow
Libraries
Connec0ons
Sampling
Prod
Intelligence
JUnit
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Con0nuous
ClickJacking
Defense
Verifica0on
A
new
HTTP
sensor
to
verify
that
the
X-‐Frame-‐OpAons
header
is
set
to
DENY
or
SameOrigin
on
every
webpage
Dynamic
Interac0ve
JUnit
Manual
Sta0c
DEV
CI
TEST
QA
STAG
OPS
SEC
Data
Warehouse:
Applica0on
Security
Intelligence
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Run
Against
En0re
PorXolio
ApplicaAon
Name
Result
Grade
TBMarks
88%
A
RPC
0%
F
CaseyMotors
0%
F
Financials
72%
C
Interna0onal
Repor0ng
0%
F
…
“Financials”
ClickJacking
Defense
–
C
(72%)
/home
DENY
/home/error.jsp
-‐
/home/index.jsp
DENY
/account
SAME-‐ORIGIN
/account/report.jsp
-‐
…
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Check
Your
Headers
hhps://cyh.herokuapp.com/cyh
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Con0nuous
AppSec
Dashboard
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• We
transformed
clickjacking
verifica0on
to
devops
speed
and
porXolio
scale!
One
Small
Step
Towards
Con0nuous
AppSec
Before
ASer
Annual
pentest
Con0nuous
monitoring
Nega0ve
signatures
Posi0ve
verifica0on
One
app
at
a
0me
PorXolio
wide
Okay,
clickjacking.
Big
deal.
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More
Sensors…
I
want
a
sensor
to
verify…
My
business
logic
makes
access
control
checks
My
libraries
are
free
from
known
vulnerabili0es
My
forms
are
not
suscep0ble
to
CSRF
ahacks
My
interpreters
are
protected
against
injec0on
My
encryp0on
is
implemented
correctly
My
applica0on
has
no
unknown
connec0ons
And
much
more….
Known
Vulnerable
Libraries
Sensor
Libraries
SAST
Nega0ve
CI
!
!
!
!
Run
DependencyCheck
during
every
build
(and
do
a
build
once
a
month
even
if
nothing
changed)
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• Run
tests
through
ZAP
• ZEST
to
check
CSRF
Token
• Get
results
via
ZAP
REST
API
CSRF
Defense
Sensor
HTTP
Passive
Posi0ve
QA
!
!
!
!
Injec0on
Sensors
Data
Flow
IAST
Nega0ve
Dev
!
!
!
!
Use
IAST
tools
for
DFA
vulnerabili0es
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• What
would
you
like
to
gather
from
all
your
applica0ons?
• Inventory?
Architecture?
Outbound
connec0ons?
Lines
of
code?
Security
components?
• All
possible….
and
all
at
devops
speed
and
porXolio
scale
Architecture,
Inventory,
and
More…
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Slide 27 text
Building
Con0nuous
AppSec
Dynamic
Interac0ve
JUnit
Manual
Sta0c
DEV
CI
TEST
QA
STAG
OPS
SEC
Data
Warehouse:
Applica0on
Security
Intelligence
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Sensors?
How
do
you
know
what
sensors
you
need?
1) The
OWASP
Top
Ten?
2) What
your
tools
are
good
at?
3) What
your
pentester
thinks
is
important?
4) Actually
figure
out
what
mahers?
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0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Iden0fica0on
and
Authen0ca0on
Input
Valida0on
and
Encoding
Session
Management
Sensi0ve
Data
Protec0on
Access
Control/
Authoriza0on
Error
Handling
Logging
and
Intrusion
Detec0on
Cross
Site
Request
Forgery
(CSRF)
PlaXorm
Security
Database
Security
Code
Quality
System
Availability
-‐
DOS
Protec0on
Accessing
External
Services
ApplicaAons
with
at
Least
One
Vulnerability
in
Category
Higher
Risk
Lower
Risk
Aspect
2013
Global
AppSec
Risk
Report
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What’s
In
Your
Expected
Model?
Expected
Threat
Model
Abuse
Cases
Policy
Standards…
Requirements
There
is
no
security
without
a
model
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What
Are
You
Actually
Tes0ng?
Actual
Pentest
Code
Review
Tools
Arch
Review
…
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Unfortunately…
Actual
Expected
Not
being
tested
(aka
RISK)
Doesn’t
need
tes0ng
(aka
WASTE)
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Are
You
Secure?
Secure?
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Sensors
Actual
Defenses
Defense
Strategies
Business
Concerns
Data
Protec0on
Minimize
Sensi0ve
Data
Role
Based
Access
Control
Encrypt
Data
in
Storage
and
Transit
Full
Disk
Encryp0on
with
TrueCrypt
Programma0c
Encryp0on
with
ESAPI
Libraries
Present
and
Up-‐to-‐date
Encryp0on
Correctness
with
Junit
Tests
ESAPI
Used
Properly
TLS
Everywhere
with
Venafi
Logging
and
Intrusion
Detec0on
Aligning
Sensors
with
Business
Concerns
Fraud
Availability
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Con0nuous
Applica0on
Security!
Expected
Actual
Applica0on
PorXolio
Applica0on
security
dashboards
Translate
“expected”
into
sensors
New
Threats,
Business
Priori0es
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Choose
a
sensor
Build
it
with
developers
Deploy
your
sensor
Create
a
dashboard
using
Excel
How
to
Get
Started
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Transforming
AppSec
AppSec
Compliance
AppSec
Monitoring
AppSec
Strategy
AppSec
Op0miza0on
AppSec
as
Business
Driver
We
will
never
improve
if
our
only
metric
is
whether
we
are
doing
what
everyone
else
is
doing