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Whose Day is It?
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Odin’s Day Thor’s Day Frigg’s Day
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Whose Day is It?
Odin’s Day Thor’s Day Freya’s Day
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Whose Day is It
on Tuesday?
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Whose Day is It
on Tuesday?
Tyr
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Beyond
SBOMs
Mohammad-Ali A’râbi
WAD, Berlin, Switzerland
v1.1.0
The Future of Container
Supply Chain Security
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Mohammad-Ali A’râbi
Software Engineer @ JobRad
Docker Captain
Author of “Docker and Kubernetes Security”
Books: DockerSecurity.io
LinkedIn, Twitter, Medium: @aerabi
BlueSky, website: aerabi.com
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Let’s fight
CVEs
together
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CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
They lurk in the shadows, awaiting an opportunity to
attack!
Which CVEs do you know?
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CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
They lurk in the shadows, awaiting an opportunity to
attack!
Meet:
- React2Shell CVE-2025-55182
- Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
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Log4Shell
Log4Shell was a zero-day vulnerability discovered
in November 2021.
In early 2022, everyone was talking about SBOMs .
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SBOM
Software Bill of Material is a list of all of the
packages on a Docker image.
It became more popular after the Log4Shell incident.
Docker added the SBOM CLI plugin in mid 2022.
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September 1st, 2022
Docker announced the SBOM CLI
plugin
Docker Community All Hands
September 29th, 2022
Docker Meetup Black Forest
SBOM: What’s the Hype About?
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$ docker sbom ![]()
This command is available on Docker Desktop.
For Docker CE, you need to install sbom-cli-plugin.
The SBOM CLI plugin basically runs Syft.
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$ docker scout sbom ![]()
Just to see: --format list
To save it:
docker scout sbom ![]()
--format spdx --output <file>
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Docker
Scout
1
Send a squad to scout the region
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$ docker scout cves
![]()
Checks the Docker image for CVEs.
Will use SBOM attestations if available.
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SBOM
Attestations
2
What are attestations?
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$ docker buildx build
--sbom=true -t ![]()
.
This command builds the image and generate SBOM.
The SBOM attestation is pushed with the image by
setting the --push flag.
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FROM ubuntu:latest AS build
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y
build-essential
WORKDIR /app
COPY hello.cpp .
RUN g++ -o hello hello.cpp -static
# --------------------
FROM scratch
COPY --from=build /app/hello /hello
CMD ["/hello"]
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FROM ubuntu:latest AS build
ARG BUILDKIT_SBOM_SCAN_STAGE=true
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y
build-essential
WORKDIR /app
COPY hello.cpp .
RUN g++ -o hello hello.cpp -static
# --------------------
FROM scratch
COPY --from=build /app/hello /hello
CMD ["/hello"]
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- name: Build and push
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
context: .
push: true
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
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- name: Build and push
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
with:
context: .
push: true
tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
cache-from: type=gha
cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
provenance: mode=max
sbom: true
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Selfie
Say CVE!
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Norse runes
A B C D E F G H I J K L
M N O P R S T U TH Y Z EE
U
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Hardened
Images
3
How hard can it be?
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DHI
Docker Hardened Images are a set of near-zero-CVE
that were open-sourced in December 2025.
These images are available for dev (installation
stages) and production (final stage of a production
image).
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# Not hardened
FROM node:24 AS build
# For build stage
FROM dhi.io/node:24-dev AS build
# For production stage
FROM dhi.io/node:24
Guess what’s the CVE difference?
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# Not hardened
FROM node:24 AS build
# For build stage
FROM dhi.io/node:24-dev AS build
# For production stage
FROM dhi.io/node:24
Node 24 has 9 high CVEs,
17 medium, and 169 low.
DHI Node has 8 low CVEs.
95% fewer CVEs
95%
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Learn more: ContainerSecurity.dev/blog
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Exempted
CVEs
4
Some CVEs are harmless
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VEX
Attestations
5
The attestations of being useless
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vexctl create \
--author="[email protected]" \
--product="pkg:docker/$IMAGE" \
--subcomponents="pkg:deb/debian/openssl@x"\
--vuln="CVE-2026-28390" \
--status="not_affected" \
--justification="vulnerable_code_not_in_
execute_path" \
--file="CVE-2026-28390.vex.json"
docker scout attestation add \
--file CVE-2026-28390.vex.json \
--predicate-type
https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0 \
$IMAGE
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The
Signature
6
Here is Evie
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OCI
Referrers
7
You need a referral letter for the MRI
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docker buildx build \
--sbom=true \
--output type=local,dest=out .
cosign attest \
--type spdxjson \
--predicate out/sbom-build.spdx.json \
--key cosign.key \
$IMAGE
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oras discover dhi.io/node:25 \
--platform linux/amd64
To check hardened images using Oras, first you need to
log into Docker Hub account.
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The
Zero-Day
0
Count from zero
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Let’s
Dance!
II.0
Zumba, rumba, or salsa?
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SLSA v1.2 Build Track
L1.
Provenance exists
Builds don’t influence
each other. Sign key is not
accessible in build steps.
Provenance is generated Build is done on a hosted
environment, provenance
is generated and signed
L2.
Hosted build platform
L3.
Hardened build
slsa.dev
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docker buildx build \
--sbom=true \
--attest
type=provenance,mode=min,version=v1 .
On min:
● Build timestamps
● Build materials
● Source repository and revision
● Build platform
On max:
● The Dockerfile
● Exact steps taken to build the image
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If sorrow gathers to overwhelm the hearts of lovers,
The cupbearer and I will unite to dismantle its very foundations.
—Hafez, the Lissan al-Ghayb (1315–1390)
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Shai Hulud
There are 1.0, 2.0, and Mini Shai Hulud.
Self-propagating worm compromising pre-install and
post-install script.
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November 2025
Uses preinstall instead of
postinstall
September 2025
Autonomous, harvests PATs
and API keys
Shai Hulud 2.0
Shai Hulud 1.0
$ npm ci
--ignore-scripts
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Mini Shai Hulud
So cute and tiny! 29th of April.
Compromised SAP Cloud Application Programming.
Targets coding agents and IDE lifecycles.
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How to Kill a
Shai Hulud?
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$ sbx run claude
Docker Sandbox puts your AI agent in a microVM and
doesn’t give it access to the tokens.
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TanStack Poisoning
CI cache poisoning! May 11th, 2026.
The worm is blocking sunshine, you can’t get tanned.
Rendered SLSA level 3 insufficient.
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Miasma Wave 1
June 1st
The worm of Shai Hulud family compromised 32
packages in @redhat-cloud-services namespace.
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Miasma Wave 2:
Phantom Gyp
June 3rd
Exploits the gyp binding.
Bypasses --ignore-scripts.
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Checklist
Put your AI coding
agents into a Sandbox
Implement SLSA L3 to
protect your keys
Use pinned
dependencies
Use keyless signing to
avoid stolen keys
Have a cool-down
period before installing
Disable lifecycle scripts
by default
Harden Build Pin Your Version Cool Down
Don’t Trust AI Short-Lived Key Disable Scripts
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Checklist
When the next
React2Shell happens,
you need to delete
caches, rebuild,
redistribute, and act
fast
Have an Incident
Playbook
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Outro
#
Get out!
—Arnold Schwarzenegger
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REDDUCK2026
at: ContainerSecurity.dev
50%
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buy.DockerSecurity.io
Slides DKS
BFS Comic
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CREDITS: This presentation template was created by
Slidesgo , and includes icons by Flaticon , and
infographics & images by Freepik
Thanks!
Do you have any questions?
[email protected]
aerabi.com
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The duality between Thor and Loki
His hand can hold swords
or big jars of beer
Bravery Attribute
Effective against giant
serpents, but not CVEs
Hammer, Mjolnir
Jfokus organizer also gave
me horns
Cunning and malice
Green cloak is also very
useful in dark forests
Defender of Asgard
Loki can shapeshift and
turn into Jfokus speaker
Ability to transform
The gods is with small G,
so lesser gods like Baldur.
Deceiver of gods