https://speakerdeck.com/qrino 2026-09-21 10:45:58 -0400 Slides presented at the 10th European Communication Conference (ECC), in Ljubljana (Slovenia), 27 September 2024. This slide deck combines two separate conference submissions presented together, both drawing on the same underlying dataset but analyzing different dependent variables. Conference paper I: "Telling or Told? The role of implicit and explicit media cues in the formation of perceived affective polarization in the debate about climate change mitigation" (Quirin Ryffel, Thomas Zerback, Alina Jakob, Nayla Fawzi) In this study, we investigated whether exposure to implicit (i.e., conflict coverage or mentions of extremity) and explicit polarization cues (e.g., explicit mentions of polarization/divides) in climate change media coverage shapes perceptions of affective polarization, both in media coverage and in society. We conducted a linkage study, combining a quantitative content analysis of N = 652 articles from 13 German news media outlets (TV, newspapers, online magazines, alternative) with a representative two-wave panel survey (N = 2051) conducted immediately before and after the content analysis in June and August 2023. The content analysis covered the period between the two panel waves and identified implicit and explicit polarization cues at the article level. For each outlet, a slant score was calculated by subtracting the number of articles containing polarization cues from those with de-polarization cues. We then multiplied the outlet-specific scores with respondents’ self-reported frequency of outlet use (our independent dosage variables). Perceptions of affective polarization in media coverage[2] and society[3] were both measured with three items on a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., "In the climate debate, the media portray two camps that are increasingly hostile towards each other"). Age, gender, education level, political orientation, issue-specific interest and knowledge, attitude extremity, social media use and interpersonal discussion (all issue-specific), as well as the levels of perceived affective polarization in wave 1 served as controls. Results of a path analysis show neither a direct effect of the dosage of explicit nor implicit polarization on perceived affective media polarization. Rather, issue-specific attitude extremity as well as interpersonal discussion about climate change increase perceived affective media polarization. As predicted, however, perceived affective polarization of media coverage on climate change mitigation has a substantial effect on perceived affective polarization of society regarding the issue, underlining the importance of perceptions of media coverage on climate change mitigation as well as the role of interpersonal communication in shaping such perceptions. [1] Reliability scores of the content-analytic variables (Brennan Prediger’s Kappa) ranged between .71 and 1.00. [2] αW1 = .85, MW1 = 4.77, SDW1 = 1.39; αW2 = .86, MW2 = 4.87, SDW2 = 1.36 [3] αW1 = .73, MW1 = 5.24, SDW1 = 1.21; αW2 = .77, MW2 = 5.28, SDW2 = 1.22 Conference paper II: "Between Headlines and Reality? News Media's Impact on False Polarization in the Debate about Climate Change Measures in Germany" (Alina Jakob, Nayla Fawzi, Quirin Ryffel, Thomas Zerback) In this study, we tested whether media coverage of the German climate policy debate produces false polarization, meaning a perceived opinion gap between supporters and opponents that is larger than the actual gap using the same study design and data. For our independent variables, we then calculated an exposure variable that captures the prevalence of exposure to implicit and explicit (de)polarization cues on an affective and ideological level in the media coverage, weighted by the respective media use. Our dependent measures include actual ideological polarization (= difference between mean positions of opponents and supporters), perceived ideological polarization (= difference between individually assessed positions of “a typical opponent” and “a typical supporter”) and false polarization (= difference between perceived and actual polarization) regarding four measures. Results show a pattern of false polarization and a tendency to overestimate the gap between opinion camps. This is evident for four out of five climate change-related measures, such as banning the installation of new gas and oil heating systems or restricting consumption for future generations. The only exception is the degree of polarization regarding the reactivation of nuclear power plants, which is almost correctly assessed. Controlling for false polarization perceptions in the first wave, sociodemographics and political attitudes, linear regression results indicate that particularly the dose of polarization that private, tabloid or alternative media evoke in their reporting have a significant impact on their audience’ misperceptions. Results underline news media's responsibility when presenting polarized issues as this can indeed make ideological polarization appear greater than it actually is which, in turn, might hinder the possibility of reaching an agreement within society on how to address climate change. Slides presented at the 10th European Communication Conference (ECC), in Ljubljana (Slovenia), 27 September 2024. This slide deck combines two separate conference submissions presented together, both drawing on the same underlying dataset but analyzing different dependent variables. Conference paper I: "Telling or Told? The role of implicit and explicit media cues in the formation of perceived affective polarization in the debate about climate change mitigation" (Quirin Ryffel, Thomas Zerback, Alina Jakob, Nayla Fawzi) In this study, we investigated whether exposure to implicit (i.e., conflict coverage or mentions of extremity) and explicit polarization cues (e.g., explicit mentions of polarization/divides) in climate change media coverage shapes perceptions of affective polarization, both in media coverage and in society. We conducted a linkage study, combining a quantitative content analysis of N = 652 articles from 13 German news media outlets (TV, newspapers, online magazines, alternative) with a representative two-wave panel survey (N = 2051) conducted immediately before and after the content analysis in June and August 2023. The content analysis covered the period between the two panel waves and identified implicit and explicit polarization cues at the article level. For each outlet, a slant score was calculated by subtracting the number of articles containing polarization cues from those with de-polarization cues. We then multiplied the outlet-specific scores with respondents’ self-reported frequency of outlet use (our independent dosage variables). Perceptions of affective polarization in media coverage[2] and society[3] were both measured with three items on a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., "In the climate debate, the media portray two camps that are increasingly hostile towards each other"). Age, gender, education level, political orientation, issue-specific interest and knowledge, attitude extremity, social media use and interpersonal discussion (all issue-specific), as well as the levels of perceived affective polarization in wave 1 served as controls. Results of a path analysis show neither a direct effect of the dosage of explicit nor implicit polarization on perceived affective media polarization. Rather, issue-specific attitude extremity as well as interpersonal discussion about climate change increase perceived affective media polarization. As predicted, however, perceived affective polarization of media coverage on climate change mitigation has a substantial effect on perceived affective polarization of society regarding the issue, underlining the importance of perceptions of media coverage on climate change mitigation as well as the role of interpersonal communication in shaping such perceptions. [1] Reliability scores of the content-analytic variables (Brennan Prediger’s Kappa) ranged between .71 and 1.00. [2] αW1 = .85, MW1 = 4.77, SDW1 = 1.39; αW2 = .86, MW2 = 4.87, SDW2 = 1.36 [3] αW1 = .73, MW1 = 5.24, SDW1 = 1.21; αW2 = .77, MW2 = 5.28, SDW2 = 1.22 Conference paper II: "Between Headlines and Reality? News Media's Impact on False Polarization in the Debate about Climate Change Measures in Germany" (Alina Jakob, Nayla Fawzi, Quirin Ryffel, Thomas Zerback) In this study, we tested whether media coverage of the German climate policy debate produces false polarization, meaning a perceived opinion gap between supporters and opponents that is larger than the actual gap using the same study design and data. For our independent variables, we then calculated an exposure variable that captures the prevalence of exposure to implicit and explicit (de)polarization cues on an affective and ideological level in the media coverage, weighted by the respective media use. Our dependent measures include actual ideological polarization (= difference between mean positions of opponents and supporters), perceived ideological polarization (= difference between individually assessed positions of “a typical opponent” and “a typical supporter”) and false polarization (= difference between perceived and actual polarization) regarding four measures. Results show a pattern of false polarization and a tendency to overestimate the gap between opinion camps. This is evident for four out of five climate change-related measures, such as banning the installation of new gas and oil heating systems or restricting consumption for future generations. The only exception is the degree of polarization regarding the reactivation of nuclear power plants, which is almost correctly assessed. Controlling for false polarization perceptions in the first wave, sociodemographics and political attitudes, linear regression results indicate that particularly the dose of polarization that private, tabloid or alternative media evoke in their reporting have a significant impact on their audience’ misperceptions. Results underline news media's responsibility when presenting polarized issues as this can indeed make ideological polarization appear greater than it actually is which, in turn, might hinder the possibility of reaching an agreement within society on how to address climate change. Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:00:00 -0400 https://speakerdeck.com/qrino/telling-or-told-the-role-of-implicit-and-explicit-media-cues-in-the-formation-of-perceived-affective-polarization-in-the-debate-about-climate-change-mitigation-in-germany https://speakerdeck.com/qrino/telling-or-told-the-role-of-implicit-and-explicit-media-cues-in-the-formation-of-perceived-affective-polarization-in-the-debate-about-climate-change-mitigation-in-germany Slides presented at the 76th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), in Cape Town (South Africa), 6 June 2026. In this study, we examined how citizens' news use patterns relate to the size and thematic composition of their climate action argument repertoires (i.e., their ability to spontaneously provide reasons for and against climate action). Data collection took place through an online survey in the United States, Germany, and Spain in June 2024, quota-sampled by age, gender, region, and education level to resemble the adult populations of each country. We then conducted a manual content analysis of open-ended statements (n = 15,612) with two trained coders to identify 12,250 justifications for and against climate action, which were then coded for thematic references (e.g., social/moral reasons, negative economic consequences, feasibility issues, conspiracies, denialism). We used latent profile analysis (LPA) to exploratorily identify distinct news user profiles based on the self-reported frequency of use of 11 news sources (public service media, tabloids, podcasts on news and politics, email newsletters, news magazines, national and regional news media, political actors' websites & socials, news aggregators, corporate TV and radio, search engines, and alternative media). Using zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) and logistic regression models, we tested how these profiles relate to argument repertoire size and thematic composition, respectively. The results showed that citizens combining a variety of news sources, and especially those relying on high-quality journalistic sources, reported larger argument repertoires than other user profiles. However, quality outweighed quantity: quality-oriented users showed richer repertoires than heavy users who consumed many sources indiscriminately. This suggests that "the more, the better" does not hold when it comes to news use: it is not the sheer amount or absolute frequency of news use, but rather the quality of news sources consumed, that matters most for citizens' argumentative knowledge. Slides presented at the 76th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), in Cape Town (South Africa), 6 June 2026. In this study, we examined how citizens' news use patterns relate to the size and thematic composition of their climate action argument repertoires (i.e., their ability to spontaneously provide reasons for and against climate action). Data collection took place through an online survey in the United States, Germany, and Spain in June 2024, quota-sampled by age, gender, region, and education level to resemble the adult populations of each country. We then conducted a manual content analysis of open-ended statements (n = 15,612) with two trained coders to identify 12,250 justifications for and against climate action, which were then coded for thematic references (e.g., social/moral reasons, negative economic consequences, feasibility issues, conspiracies, denialism). We used latent profile analysis (LPA) to exploratorily identify distinct news user profiles based on the self-reported frequency of use of 11 news sources (public service media, tabloids, podcasts on news and politics, email newsletters, news magazines, national and regional news media, political actors' websites & socials, news aggregators, corporate TV and radio, search engines, and alternative media). Using zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) and logistic regression models, we tested how these profiles relate to argument repertoire size and thematic composition, respectively. The results showed that citizens combining a variety of news sources, and especially those relying on high-quality journalistic sources, reported larger argument repertoires than other user profiles. However, quality outweighed quantity: quality-oriented users showed richer repertoires than heavy users who consumed many sources indiscriminately. This suggests that "the more, the better" does not hold when it comes to news use: it is not the sheer amount or absolute frequency of news use, but rather the quality of news sources consumed, that matters most for citizens' argumentative knowledge. Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:00:00 -0400 https://speakerdeck.com/qrino/justifying-climate-in-action-the-relationship-between-news-use-patterns-and-climate-action-argument-repertoires-in-the-united-states-spain-and-germany https://speakerdeck.com/qrino/justifying-climate-in-action-the-relationship-between-news-use-patterns-and-climate-action-argument-repertoires-in-the-united-states-spain-and-germany Slides presented at the 11th European Communication Conference (ECC), in Brno (Czech Republic), 9 September 2026. In this study, we examined how experienced exposure to pro- and counter-attitudinal climate action arguments and their perceived strength affect affective (de)polarization between climate-action supporters and opponents over time. Data collection took place through a three-wave online panel survey in the United States, Germany, and Spain between June and August 2024, quota-sampled by age, gender, region, and education level to resemble the adult populations of each country. We used fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects-within-between (REWB) regression models for data analyses. The results showed that pro-attitudinal exposure and strength increase polarization, while counter-attitudinal exposure and strength decrease it (within-person effects). However, perceived argument strength, rather than mere exposure, proved to be the stronger driver, with depolarizing effects notably larger among opponents than among supporters. The REWB models showed the same pattern of effects at the between-person level: individuals who, on average, experienced more pro-attitudinal (counter-attitudinal) exposure and perceived pro- (counter-)attitudinal arguments as stronger were also more (less) affectively polarized than others, with strength again outweighing exposure once both were modeled together. Slides presented at the 11th European Communication Conference (ECC), in Brno (Czech Republic), 9 September 2026. In this study, we examined how experienced exposure to pro- and counter-attitudinal climate action arguments and their perceived strength affect affective (de)polarization between climate-action supporters and opponents over time. Data collection took place through a three-wave online panel survey in the United States, Germany, and Spain between June and August 2024, quota-sampled by age, gender, region, and education level to resemble the adult populations of each country. We used fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects-within-between (REWB) regression models for data analyses. The results showed that pro-attitudinal exposure and strength increase polarization, while counter-attitudinal exposure and strength decrease it (within-person effects). However, perceived argument strength, rather than mere exposure, proved to be the stronger driver, with depolarizing effects notably larger among opponents than among supporters. The REWB models showed the same pattern of effects at the between-person level: individuals who, on average, experienced more pro-attitudinal (counter-attitudinal) exposure and perceived pro- (counter-)attitudinal arguments as stronger were also more (less) affectively polarized than others, with strength again outweighing exposure once both were modeled together. Mon, 21 Sep 2026 00:00:00 -0400 https://speakerdeck.com/qrino/ecrea-2026-zerback-ryffel-argument-exposure-strength-affective-polarization https://speakerdeck.com/qrino/ecrea-2026-zerback-ryffel-argument-exposure-strength-affective-polarization