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Dr. Timothy M. Waring Associate Professor of Social-Ecological Systems Modeling School of Economics, Mitchell Center for Sustainability Solutions University of Maine The Evolution of Social- Ecological Systems SEANET Speaker Series November 29, 2017 354 Aubert Hall

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Where are we?

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anthropocene Waters et al., 2016. The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically distinct from the Holocene. Science 351. Crutzen, Paul J. "The “anthropocene”." Earth system science in the anthropocene. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006. 13-18.

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anthropocene

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anthropocene

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anthropocene

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planetary boundaries Rockström, Johan, et al. A safe operating space for humanity. nature 461.7263 (2009): 472-475.

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how did we get here? Oil Refinery Richmond California United States

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outline • how we got here (evolutionary history) • two superpowers (culture & cooperation) • how social-ecological systems evolve (examples) • learning to use our superpowers for good

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How did we get here?

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Going global: How humans conquered the world The New Scientist, 2007

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Going global: How humans conquered the world The New Scientist, 2007 Mathew, S. and Perreault, C. (2015) Behavioural variation in 172 small-scale societies indicates that social learning is the main mode of human adaptation, Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 282 (1810), p. 61.

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Inuit technology

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!kung technology

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industrial technology Oil Refinery Richmond California United States

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The first superpower

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The first superpower CULTURE

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Culture Evolves. behavior beliefs institutions technology

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Evolution Refresher variation + selection + inheritance

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Evolution Refresher variation + selection + inheritance = adaptation

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Genetic Evolution Cultural Evolution Variation random mutation guided innovation Transmission vertical parent -> offspring vertical, horizontal, oblique Selection environmental forcing strategic adoption of adaptive traits Types of Evolution Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A. & Laland, K.N., 2004. Perspective: is human cultural evolution Darwinian? Evidence reviewed from the perspective of the Origin of Species. Evolution, 58(1), pp.1–11.

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Cultural Evolution Faster Perreault, C. (2012) ‘The Pace of Cultural Evolution’, PLoS ONE, 7(9), p. e45150. More Group Structured Bell, A. V., Richerson, P. J. and McElreath, R. (2009) ‘Culture rather than genes provides greater scope for the evolution of large-scale human prosociality’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(42), p. 17671. Cumulative Dean, L. G. et al. (2014) ‘Human cumulative culture: a comparative perspective’. Biological Reviews, 89 (2) 284-301 Cultural Evolution is...

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Reticulate phylogenies Borgerhoff Mulder, M., Nunn, C. & Towner, M.C., 2006. Cultural macroevolution and the transmission of traits. Evolutionary Anthropology, 15, pp.52–64.

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The second superpower

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The second superpower COOPERATION

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Coordination Collective Action Cooperation Altruism

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1

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Cooperation Evolves Nowak, M. A. (2006). Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation. Science • Kin selection • Reciprocity • Group selection

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cooperative selfish time 1

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cooperative selfish time 1 individual selection time 2

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Individual selection in a social dilemma favors selfish individuals cooperative selfish time 1 individual selection time 2

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cooperative selfish time 1

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cooperative selfish time 1 group selection time 2

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Group selection in a social dilemma favors groups of cooperative individuals cooperative selfish time 1 group selection time 2

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160% increase in clutch size Muir, W., 1996. Group selection for adaptation to multiple-hen cages: selection program and direct responses. Journal of Poultry Science 75, 447– 458. Posted to Flickr by USDAgov at http://flickr.com/photos/41284017@N08/6354331371 Group Selection on Genes (very rare in nature)

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Social Dilemmas are Conflicts between Levels of Selection

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Social Dilemmas are Conflicts between Levels of Selection multilevel selection cooperative non-cooperative (‘selfish’)

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outcomes depend on the balance of selection Social Dilemmas are Conflicts between Levels of Selection multilevel selection cooperative non-cooperative (‘selfish’)

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Human cooperation is group-centric Apicella, Marlowe, Fowler & Christakis, (2012) Nature 481, 497–501. Group Selection on Genes

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The Battle of Agincourt. Choi, Bowles, 2007. The coevolution of parochial altruism and war. Science 318, 636–640.

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• docility, prosociality • specialization • language • cooperative breeding • technology • conformity • reputation • social marking • ethnocentrism • xenophobia Biological adaptations to group life

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• docility, prosociality • specialization • language • cooperative breeding • technology • conformity • reputation • social marking • ethnocentrism • xenophobia Biological adaptations to group life }negative factors

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Cooperation evolves culturally, too. [thankfully] Superpowers combined

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Molly Hayden, U.S. Army Garrison Grafenwoehr Public Affairs Group selection selects for group-functional behaviors and institutions

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Cultural Group Selection 1. Proliferation, extinction, success of groups 2. Imitation between groups 3. Migration between groups Henrich, J. (2004). Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53(1), 3–35.

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Things that accelerate the evolution of cooperation • small group size • punishment • reciprocity • homogeneity • competition between groups • learning between groups • supporting institutions (via cultural group selection)

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Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Elinor Ostrom Courtesy of Indiana University Institutional Design Principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collective-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanctions 6. Conflict resolution 7. Self determination 8. Nested governance

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Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. Elinor Ostrom Courtesy of Indiana University Institutional Design Principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collective-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanctions 6. Conflict resolution 7. Self determination 8. Nested governance Evolution

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How social-ecological systems evolve.

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Research Questions 1. (theory) When does cultural group selection accelerate the emergence of behaviors and institutions of sustainable resource management? 2. (empirics) Can we find evidence in case studies? 3. (application) Can we design interventions for an applied science?

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Research Questions 1. (theory) When does cultural group selection accelerate the emergence of behaviors and institutions of sustainable resource management? 2. (empirics) Can we find evidence in case studies? 3. (application) Can we design interventions for an applied science?

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Manavanur, Tamil Nadu, India

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How does environmental cooperation evolve? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

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How does environmental cooperation evolve? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

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How does environmental cooperation evolve? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

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How does environmental cooperation evolve? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System

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How does environmental cooperation evolve? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System

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How does environmental cooperation evolve? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System

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Lobster gangs learn from each other: • territorial defense • harvest limits • legal strategies • conservation practices Jim Acheson Waring, T., Acheson, J., 2017. Evidence of cultural group selection in territorial lobstering in Maine. Sustainability Science 1–14.

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rice irrigation in Bali Brooks, Jeremy, Victoria Reyes-García, and William Burnside. Re-examining balinese subaks through the lens of cultural multilevel selection. Sustainability Science: 1-13.

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rice irrigation in Bali Brooks, Jeremy, Victoria Reyes-García, and William Burnside. Re-examining balinese subaks through the lens of cultural multilevel selection. Sustainability Science: 1-13.

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blueberry industry Sam Hanes Producers cooperated: • voluntary research tax • inspection system (But only after statewide industry crises) Hanes, S. P. and Waring, T. M. (2017) ‘Cultural evolution and US agricultural institutions: a historical case study of Maine’s blueberry industry’, Sustainability Science, pp. 1–10.

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Bhutan

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Ethnic diversity within Bhutan

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or How to harness cooperation for sustainability. Learning to use our superpowers for good.

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Research Questions 1. (theory) When does cultural group selection accelerate the emergence of behaviors and institutions of sustainable resource management? 2. (empirics) Can we find evidence in case studies? 3. (application) Can we design interventions for an applied science?

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a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups 4.1.High stakes for successful management a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups 4.1.High stakes for successful management 4.2.Strong group culture & institutions (Ostrom’s rules) a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups 4.1.High stakes for successful management 4.2.Strong group culture & institutions (Ostrom’s rules) 4.3.Reward cooperation, punish exploitation. a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups 4.1.High stakes for successful management 4.2.Strong group culture & institutions (Ostrom’s rules) 4.3.Reward cooperation, punish exploitation. 5. Between groups a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups 4.1.High stakes for successful management 4.2.Strong group culture & institutions (Ostrom’s rules) 4.3.Reward cooperation, punish exploitation. 5. Between groups 5.1.Peaceful competition to protect & enhance resources a recipe to grow sustainability

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1. A social dilemma for environmental resources. 2. A type of group that can solve the dilemma locally. 3. A population of those groups. 4. Within groups 4.1.High stakes for successful management 4.2.Strong group culture & institutions (Ostrom’s rules) 4.3.Reward cooperation, punish exploitation. 5. Between groups 5.1.Peaceful competition to protect & enhance resources 5.2.Strategy imitation a recipe to grow sustainability

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problems

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1. global commons (climate change) problems

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1. global commons (climate change) 2. ethnocentric “solutions” too easy problems

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nimbios.org/workinggroups/WG_sustainability Tim Waring, University of Maine Karolina Safarzyńska, Warsaw University Marco Janssen, Arizona State University

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Jeremy Brooks, Ohio State University Tim Waring, University of Maine sesync.org/project/ventures/evolution-of-sustainability

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THEORY Waring et al. (2015) A multilevel evolutionary framework for sustainability analysis. Ecology and Society, 20 (2): 34 MODEL Waring, Goff, & Smaldino (2017) The coevolution of economic institutions and sustainable consumption via cultural group selection. Ecological Economics, 131 524–532 SPECIAL ISSUE, CASE STUDIES Sustainability Science, Special Feature: Applying Cultural Evolution to Sustainability Challenges, ISSN: 1862-4065 (Print) 1862-4057 (Online) DOWNLOAD: timwaring.wordpress.com

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THEORY Waring et al. (2015) A multilevel evolutionary framework for sustainability analysis. Ecology and Society, 20 (2): 34 MODEL Waring, Goff, & Smaldino (2017) The coevolution of economic institutions and sustainable consumption via cultural group selection. Ecological Economics, 131 524–532 SPECIAL ISSUE, CASE STUDIES Sustainability Science, Special Feature: Applying Cultural Evolution to Sustainability Challenges, ISSN: 1862-4065 (Print) 1862-4057 (Online) With Examples, Strategies !!! DOWNLOAD: timwaring.wordpress.com

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Thank You!

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Thank You! Questions?