Cooperation Science Workshop

by Tim Waring

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Blueberry Research in Maine

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Hanes, S. P. and Waring, T. M. (2017) ‘Cultural evolution and US agricultural institutions: a historical case study of Maine’s blueberry industry’, Sustainability Science, pp. 1–10. Sam Hanes

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How Coopera6on Works

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Coopera'on beneﬁts others o/en at personal cost

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Coordina6on Organized ac,on. Collec6ve Ac6on Ac,on organized toward a common goal. Coopera6on Ac,on that beneﬁts others. Altruism Ac,on that beneﬁts others at a cost to oneself.

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B )

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B ) 2 , 2 0 , 3 3 , 0 1 , 1

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Coopera'on is ephemeral

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C C C C C C C C C D C C C C C D D D D D D D D D C = Cooperator D = Defector (free-rider) individual and group condi,ons decline free-riding spreads free-riding spreads free-riding enters

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C C C C C C C C C D C C C C C D D D D D D D D D C = Cooperator D = Defector (free-rider) individual and group condi,ons decline free-riding spreads free-riding spreads free-riding enters Coopera'on is a puzzle!!

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Coopera'on inﬂuences outcomes

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Teams of cooperators win

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Case Studies

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Humans are excellent cooperators (and free-riders)

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2018 Dorling Kindersley Human Prosociality

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Going global: How humans conquered the world. The New Scientist, 2007 Coopera6on allowed us to colonize the earth. (That's good and bad)

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Food Co-ops (AFon Hupper)

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Blue Hill Food Co-op average donation: 68% Blue Hill Tradewinds Grocery average donation: 44%

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peak Orono Local T = 84 0 10 20 30 0 20 40 60 80 Time Value Type Isolates Splitters Number of Isolates out of Total Network Size of oronolocal Over Time ## Picking joint bandwidth of 1.33 Individual Shared ('splits') Purchase Type Purchases the death of a food club

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10 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 Avg.Degree Siz 0 5 10 15 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Date Degree Distribution Degree Distribution over Time the death of a food club peak death Sharing Relationships

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How Coopera6on Grows

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Coopera'on can be cul'vated.

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Those who give must also receive.

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Coopera,on grows: in any species.

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1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness Coopera,on grows: in any species.

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1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness 2. Among Reciprocators (Trivers, 1971) - repeat interac,ons Coopera,on grows: in any species.

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1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness 2. Among Reciprocators (Trivers, 1971) - repeat interac,ons 3. Within Compe6ng Groups (Sober & Wilson, 1994) - compe,,on Coopera,on grows: in any species.

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Coopera,on among individual humans

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KraS-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., Rand, D., 2015. Promo6ng coopera6on in the ﬁeld. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, Social behavior 3, 96–101. h]ps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006

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Coopera,on grows best in groups

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1. Generous and reciprocal individuals 2. Frequent interac,ons 3. Chosen members 4. Shared iden,ty, abili,es, interests 5. Good leadership Coopera6on grows best in groups ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺

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Ins6tu6onal Design Principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collec,ve-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanc,ons 6. Conﬂict resolu,on 7. Self determina,on 8. Nested governance Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolu,on of Ins,tu,ons for Collec,ve Ac,on. Cambridge University Press. Elinor Ostrom

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B )

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Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Change the game Payoffs to ( A , B ) Coordina6on Game Stag Hunt Player B Stag Hare Player A Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1

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Coopera,on spreads between groups

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coopera,on spreads if coopera,ve groups mul,ply C C C D C C D D D D D D C C C D C C C C D C C D D D D D D D

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• Via compe66on with other groups • Peaceful group compe,,on can increase public goods (Tan and Bolle, 2007) • WARNING: Resource compe''on breeds extrac've ins'tu'ons • Via between-group migra6on • People migrate to be]er ins,tu,ons when they can (Gürerk et al., 2006) • Via between-group learning • Between-group learning for eﬀec,ve resource use breeds sustainability (Waring et al., 2017) • Environmental Policy Diﬀusion (Tews, 2005)

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Coopera6on isn't: 1. always needed. 2. a panacea.

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The “Co-op Principles” (Taylor Lange)

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Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers Toad lane coop Rochdale

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organiza6onal inheritance 1844 - Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers 1863 - North of England Co-opera,ve Wholesale Industrial and Provident Society 1872 - Co-opera,ve Wholesale Society 2001 - The Co-opera,ve Group The Co-opera6ve Group One Angel Square, CCBY2.0, wikimedia commons

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Co-op principles ukscs.coop Ins6tu6onal design principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collec,ve-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanc,ons 6. Conﬂict resolu,on 7. Self determina,on 8. Nested governance Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolu,on of Ins,tu,ons for Collec,ve Ac,on. Cambridge University Press.

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Why Study Coopera6on?

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Hard sustainability challenges contain social dilemmas

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Coopera6on is important at all social scales

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1. Psychology - Coopera,on is rooted in intui,on, not delibera,on (Rand, 2016) 2. Anthropology - Coopera,on is bolstered by culture and ins,tu,ons (Sosis and Ruﬄe, 2003) 3. Economics - Coopera,on responds to costs and beneﬁts (material and social) (Bowles, 2004; Gin,s et al., 2003) 4. Biology – Coopera,on is a central human adapta,on (Bowles, 2004; Gin,s et al., 2003) Coopera6on unites disciplines

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Sustainability Theory Gap "Finally, we need to understand at a more generalizable level which features of coupled human-environment systems enhance and which constrain their adaptability." Levin and Clark 2010

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Cellular ‘Cheaters’ Give Rise to Cancer. George Johnson, July 27, 2015 How Can We Promote Coopera6on in an Uncoopera6ve Society? Naghmeh Momeni, August 8, 2018

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Web of Science

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Coopera6on is fundable see grant list

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The Oyster Navy (Sam Hanes)

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Tools for Studying Coopera6on

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Coopera6on within groups

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• Interviews – semi-structured interviews • Is collec,ve contribu,on necessary? • Is it provided? By whom? How is it shared? • Surveys – psychology scales, others • Trust, Social Capital, Prosociality constructs • Extensivity, self iden,ﬁca,on (Einolf, 2010) • Team cohesion survey in sports • Experiments - coopera,on experiments such as the Dictator Game, and the Public Goods Game measure coopera,on and prosocial behaviors. • In the laboratory • In the ﬁeld (Ne]le et al., 2011; Waring, 2011)

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The Dictator Game a measure of coopera,on

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Public Goods Game a measure of coopera,on

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Spread between groups

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• Catalog groups - successes, status, diﬀerences • Historical analysis - build ,melines of change • Search for coopera6on factors - rules, endowments, leadership, reciprocity, similarity • Measure between-group processes - learning, migra,on, economic compe,,on, warfare, etc.

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1.Diﬀusion of ins,tu,ons 2.Coopera,on wars 3.Coopera,on cascades Look for:

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Tribou, A., Collins, K., 2015. This Is How Fast America Changes Its Mind. Bloomberg.com. Women's Suﬀrage (19th amendment)

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Jänicke, M., Jacob, K., 2006. Environmental Governance in Global Perspective. New Approaches to Ecological and Political Modernisation. Berlin: Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik. Freie Universität Berlin.

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Group-level Cultural Selection via and or and or Natural Selection Cultural Transmission Trait-based Migration No group-level cultural selection Indicators of Group Adaptation . . . 1 if none if not both if none Group Structure and Selection Mechanism and or and or 3 if any if both if any Trait affects group survival or expansion. Trait variation is group-structured. Trait outcomes are group-structured. Trait is transmitted between groups. Trait-based selective migration between groups. Group-level Cultural Adaptation if stronger than other evolutionary forces Cooperative Behaviors Enforcement Behaviors Reinforcing Institutions 4 5 2 Kline et al., 2018. Designing cultural mul'level selec'on research for sustainability science. Sustainability Science 13, 9–19. h]ps://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0509-2 How to design mul,-group coopera,on research for sustainability science

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Coopera6on in Social- Ecological Systems Models NOTE: Be wary of any model of coopera'on that does not include the perpetual free-riding problem

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empty world full world resource crash 90% die rare surviving society long run sustainability

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Core Conceptual Tool

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☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ the balance of coopera6on Conserva'on behaviors and ins'tu'ons can emerge and spread if the pressure on groups for resource conserva3on is greater than the pressure on individuals for resource exploita3on.

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Manavanur, Tamil Nadu, India

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How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation

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How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation

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How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation

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How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation

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Worksheet

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Gross Na6onal Happiness in Bhutan

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Bhutan

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Ethnic diversity within Bhutan

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BEWARE ethnocentric solu6ons!

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Why Apply Coopera6on?

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Scoping 1. Is coopera,on necessary? Do you have a social dilemma?

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1. Conserva,on poses a coopera,ve dilemma (Smith and Wishnie, 2000) 2. Policies that target self-interest may backﬁre (Bowles, 2008) 3. Coopera,on typically precedes durable ins,tu,onal or policy solu,ons 4. Coopera,on is not always good, and some,mes must be stopped. (Muthukrishna, 2017) 5. Coopera,on-based interven,ons can be self-suppor,ng and cheaper 6. Good for Collabora,on: (e.g. UMA Mexico, Mexico City; Konrad Lorenz Ins,tute, Vienna) Why Apply Coopera6on Science?

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Carbon Credits in Pemba Island, Tanzania

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Forest dependent communities • Cultivation, cloves • Firewood, huts, boats • Outside demand (Zanzibar & mainland) • Government officials

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Forest dependent communities • Cultivation, cloves • Firewood, huts, boats • Outside demand (Zanzibar & mainland) • Government officials

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REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation & Forest Degradation • Reduce greenhouse gas emissions • Global initiative offering financial incentives (public sources, carbon market finance, private sector) to reduce carbon emissions • UN-Framework Convention on Climate Change (voluntary/ Norway/Paris) • Developing countries • Two routes: national or local

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Community forests under REDD+ (CoFMAs)

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Forest management practices CoFMA (18) versus village (10) Patrols Fines

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Woodland (21 sites) Mangrove (22 sites)

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Woodland (21 sites) Mangrove (22 sites) REDD readiness worked!

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Celebration of REDD Readiness (26th August 2015), presided over by the President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar

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Poaching: Kisiwa Panza wants Chokocho to join REDD+ to stop Chokocho stealing Kisiwa Panza trees Leakage: Wambaa wants to join REDD+ to stop their neighbouring CoFMAs conduct leakage Will there be a cooperation cascade of REDD+ behaviour?

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Tools for Growing Coopera6on

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Coopera6on Science can't: • Get single en,,es to “cooperate.” • Help when coopera,on isn't necessary.

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Scoping 1. Iden,fy sustainability ac,on or ins,tu,on 2. Iden,fy coopera,ve costs and beneﬁts 3. Iden,fy actors and groups 4. Iden,fy appropriate placement rela,ve to problem 5. Es,mate balance of coopera,on

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Growing Coopera6on within groups People are not en'ced to cooperate, they are rallied!

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Features of the ac6on • Increase salience of contribu,ng ac,on • Enhance observability of contribu,on • Make contribu,on intui,ve, reflexive instead of delibera,ve • Improve the benefits to cost ra,o (make it cheaper to contribute) • Kickstart reciprocity, reputa,on, shame Features of the group • Highlight similarity, shared history • Build shared iden,ty • Secure group autonomy • Find effec,ve leadership • Strengthen suppor,ng ins,tu,ons (Ostrom’s Principles)

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PROSOCIAL method (www.prosocial.world) 1.Core Design Principles of Ostrom 2.Group Flexibility Training (ACT)

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally.

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups.

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups.

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons

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Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources

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Air Quality Regula6ons in California

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Port of Long Beach

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Cold Ironing (shore power)

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Port of Los Angeles

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Coopera6on Cascade

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Small Group Discussion Session • Topic: • Coopera,on in sustainability research and solu,ons • Springboard ques,ons: • What relevance for your work? • What connec,ons do you see? • What problems do you foresee? • What more do you need?

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Puong it Together: Group Discussion • Topic: • Coopera,on in sustainability research and solu,ons • Ques,ons: • Can you use coopera,on in research or solu,ons? • Where would you start? • What do you need?

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Handout Images

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Coordina6on Organized ac,on. Collec6ve Ac6on Ac,on organized toward a common goal. Coopera6on Ac,on that beneﬁts others. Altruism Ac,on that beneﬁts others at a cost to oneself.