Cooperation Science Workshop

A presentation to accompany our Cooperation Science Workshop. The presentation uses case studies to show how cooperation dynamics influence social and ecological outcomes, and distills the major leverage points for applying cooperation to sustainability challenges.

Transcript

1. Blueberry Research in Maine
7. Hanes, S. P. and Waring, T. M. (2017) ‘Cultural evolution and US agricultural institutions: a historical case study of Maine’s blueberry industry’, Sustainability Science, pp. 1–10. Sam Hanes
8. How Coopera6on Works
10. Coopera'on benefits others o/en at personal cost
11. Coordina6on Organized ac,on. Collec6ve Ac6on Ac,on organized toward a common goal. Coopera6on Ac,on that benefits others. Altruism Ac,on that benefits others at a cost to oneself.
12. Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B )
13. Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B ) 2 , 2 0 , 3 3 , 0 1 , 1
14. Coopera'on is ephemeral
15. C C C C C C C C C D C C C C C D D D D D D D D D C = Cooperator D = Defector (free-rider) individual and group condi,ons decline free-riding spreads free-riding spreads free-riding enters
16. C C C C C C C C C D C C C C C D D D D D D D D D C = Cooperator D = Defector (free-rider) individual and group condi,ons decline free-riding spreads free-riding spreads free-riding enters Coopera'on is a puzzle!!
17. Coopera'on influences outcomes
18. Teams of cooperators win
19. Case Studies
20. Humans are excellent cooperators (and free-riders)
21. 2018 Dorling Kindersley Human Prosociality
22. Going global: How humans conquered the world. The New Scientist, 2007 Coopera6on allowed us to colonize the earth. (That's good and bad)
23. Food Co-ops (AFon Hupper)
24. Blue Hill Food Co-op average donation: 68% Blue Hill Tradewinds Grocery average donation: 44%
25. peak Orono Local T = 84 0 10 20 30 0 20 40 60 80 Time Value Type Isolates Splitters Number of Isolates out of Total Network Size of oronolocal Over Time ## Picking joint bandwidth of 1.33 Individual Shared ('splits') Purchase Type Purchases the death of a food club
26. 10 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 Avg.Degree Siz 0 5 10 15 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Date Degree Distribution Degree Distribution over Time the death of a food club peak death Sharing Relationships
27. How Coopera6on Grows
28. Coopera'on can be cul'vated.
29. Those who give must also receive.
30. Coopera,on grows: in any species.
31. 1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness Coopera,on grows: in any species.
32. 1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness 2. Among Reciprocators (Trivers, 1971) - repeat interac,ons Coopera,on grows: in any species.
33. 1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness 2. Among Reciprocators (Trivers, 1971) - repeat interac,ons 3. Within Compe6ng Groups (Sober & Wilson, 1994) - compe,,on Coopera,on grows: in any species.
34. Coopera,on among individual humans
35. KraS-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., Rand, D., 2015. Promo6ng coopera6on in the field. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, Social behavior 3, 96–101. h]ps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006
37. Coopera,on grows best in groups
38. 1. Generous and reciprocal individuals 2. Frequent interac,ons 3. Chosen members 4. Shared iden,ty, abili,es, interests 5. Good leadership Coopera6on grows best in groups ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺
39. Ins6tu6onal Design Principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collec,ve-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanc,ons 6. Conflict resolu,on 7. Self determina,on 8. Nested governance Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolu,on of Ins,tu,ons for Collec,ve Ac,on. Cambridge University Press. Elinor Ostrom
40. Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B )
41. Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Change the game Payoffs to ( A , B ) Coordina6on Game Stag Hunt Player B Stag Hare Player A Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1
42. Coopera,on spreads between groups
43. coopera,on spreads if coopera,ve groups mul,ply C C C D C C D D D D D D C C C D C C C C D C C D D D D D D D
44. • Via compe66on with other groups • Peaceful group compe,,on can increase public goods (Tan and Bolle, 2007) • WARNING: Resource compe''on breeds extrac've ins'tu'ons • Via between-group migra6on • People migrate to be]er ins,tu,ons when they can (Gürerk et al., 2006) • Via between-group learning • Between-group learning for effec,ve resource use breeds sustainability (Waring et al., 2017) • Environmental Policy Diffusion (Tews, 2005)
45. • Via compe66on with other groups • Peaceful group compe,,on can increase public goods (Tan and Bolle, 2007) • WARNING: Resource compe''on breeds extrac've ins'tu'ons • Via between-group migra6on • People migrate to be]er ins,tu,ons when they can (Gürerk et al., 2006) • Via between-group learning • Between-group learning for effec,ve resource use breeds sustainability (Waring et al., 2017) • Environmental Policy Diffusion (Tews, 2005) Coopera6on (and ins6tu6ons) can spread between groups
46. Coopera6on isn't: 1. always needed. 2. a panacea.
47. The “Co-op Principles” (Taylor Lange)
48. Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers Toad lane coop Rochdale
49. organiza6onal inheritance 1844 - Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers 1863 - North of England Co-opera,ve Wholesale Industrial and Provident Society 1872 - Co-opera,ve Wholesale Society 2001 - The Co-opera,ve Group The Co-opera6ve Group One Angel Square, CCBY2.0, wikimedia commons
51. Co-op principles ukscs.coop Ins6tu6onal design principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules 3. Collec,ve-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanc,ons 6. Conflict resolu,on 7. Self determina,on 8. Nested governance Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolu,on of Ins,tu,ons for Collec,ve Ac,on. Cambridge University Press.
52. Why Study Coopera6on?
53. Hard sustainability challenges contain social dilemmas
56. Coopera6on is important at all social scales
58. 1. Psychology - Coopera,on is rooted in intui,on, not delibera,on (Rand, 2016) 2. Anthropology - Coopera,on is bolstered by culture and ins,tu,ons (Sosis and Ruffle, 2003) 3. Economics - Coopera,on responds to costs and benefits (material and social) (Bowles, 2004; Gin,s et al., 2003) 4. Biology – Coopera,on is a central human adapta,on (Bowles, 2004; Gin,s et al., 2003) Coopera6on unites disciplines
59. Sustainability Theory Gap "Finally, we need to understand at a more generalizable level which features of coupled human-environment systems enhance and which constrain their adaptability." Levin and Clark 2010
60. Cellular ‘Cheaters’ Give Rise to Cancer. George Johnson, July 27, 2015 How Can We Promote Coopera6on in an Uncoopera6ve Society? Naghmeh Momeni, August 8, 2018
62. Web of Science
63. Coopera6on is fundable see grant list
64. The Oyster Navy (Sam Hanes)
68. Tools for Studying Coopera6on
69. Coopera6on within groups
70. • Interviews – semi-structured interviews • Is collec,ve contribu,on necessary? • Is it provided? By whom? How is it shared? • Surveys – psychology scales, others • Trust, Social Capital, Prosociality constructs • Extensivity, self iden,fica,on (Einolf, 2010) • Team cohesion survey in sports • Experiments - coopera,on experiments such as the Dictator Game, and the Public Goods Game measure coopera,on and prosocial behaviors. • In the laboratory • In the field (Ne]le et al., 2011; Waring, 2011)
71. The Dictator Game a measure of coopera,on
72. Public Goods Game a measure of coopera,on
73. Spread between groups
74. • Catalog groups - successes, status, differences • Historical analysis - build ,melines of change • Search for coopera6on factors - rules, endowments, leadership, reciprocity, similarity • Measure between-group processes - learning, migra,on, economic compe,,on, warfare, etc.
75. 1.Diffusion of ins,tu,ons 2.Coopera,on wars 3.Coopera,on cascades Look for:
76. Tribou, A., Collins, K., 2015. This Is How Fast America Changes Its Mind. Bloomberg.com. Women's Suffrage (19th amendment)
77. Jänicke, M., Jacob, K., 2006. Environmental Governance in Global Perspective. New Approaches to Ecological and Political Modernisation. Berlin: Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik. Freie Universität Berlin.
78. Group-level Cultural Selection via and or and or Natural Selection Cultural Transmission Trait-based Migration No group-level cultural selection Indicators of Group Adaptation . . . 1 if none if not both if none Group Structure and Selection Mechanism and or and or 3 if any if both if any Trait affects group survival or expansion. Trait variation is group-structured. Trait outcomes are group-structured. Trait is transmitted between groups. Trait-based selective migration between groups. Group-level Cultural Adaptation if stronger than other evolutionary forces Cooperative Behaviors Enforcement Behaviors Reinforcing Institutions 4 5 2 Kline et al., 2018. Designing cultural mul'level selec'on research for sustainability science. Sustainability Science 13, 9–19. h]ps://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0509-2 How to design mul,-group coopera,on research for sustainability science
79. Coopera6on in Social- Ecological Systems Models NOTE: Be wary of any model of coopera'on that does not include the perpetual free-riding problem
80. empty world full world resource crash 90% die rare surviving society long run sustainability
81. Core Conceptual Tool
82. ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ the balance of coopera6on Conserva'on behaviors and ins'tu'ons can emerge and spread if the pressure on groups for resource conserva3on is greater than the pressure on individuals for resource exploita3on.
83. Manavanur, Tamil Nadu, India
84. How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
85. How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
86. How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
87. How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest Village Irrigation System pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
88. ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ the balance of coopera6on Conserva'on behaviors and ins'tu'ons can emerge and spread if the pressure on groups for resource conserva3on is greater than the pressure on individuals for resource exploita3on.
89. Worksheet
90. Gross Na6onal Happiness in Bhutan
91. Bhutan
92. Ethnic diversity within Bhutan
93. BEWARE ethnocentric solu6ons!
94. Why Apply Coopera6on?
95. Scoping 1. Is coopera,on necessary? Do you have a social dilemma?
96. 1. Conserva,on poses a coopera,ve dilemma (Smith and Wishnie, 2000) 2. Policies that target self-interest may backfire (Bowles, 2008) 3. Coopera,on typically precedes durable ins,tu,onal or policy solu,ons 4. Coopera,on is not always good, and some,mes must be stopped. (Muthukrishna, 2017) 5. Coopera,on-based interven,ons can be self-suppor,ng and cheaper 6. Good for Collabora,on: (e.g. UMA Mexico, Mexico City; Konrad Lorenz Ins,tute, Vienna) Why Apply Coopera6on Science?
97. Carbon Credits in Pemba Island, Tanzania
100. Forest dependent communities • Cultivation, cloves • Firewood, huts, boats • Outside demand (Zanzibar & mainland) • Government officials
101. Forest dependent communities • Cultivation, cloves • Firewood, huts, boats • Outside demand (Zanzibar & mainland) • Government officials
102. REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation & Forest Degradation • Reduce greenhouse gas emissions • Global initiative offering financial incentives (public sources, carbon market finance, private sector) to reduce carbon emissions • UN-Framework Convention on Climate Change (voluntary/ Norway/Paris) • Developing countries • Two routes: national or local
104. Community forests under REDD+ (CoFMAs)
105. Forest management practices CoFMA (18) versus village (10) Patrols Fines
106. Woodland (21 sites) Mangrove (22 sites)
107. Woodland (21 sites) Mangrove (22 sites) REDD readiness worked!
108. Celebration of REDD Readiness (26th August 2015), presided over by the President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
109. Poaching: Kisiwa Panza wants Chokocho to join REDD+ to stop Chokocho stealing Kisiwa Panza trees Leakage: Wambaa wants to join REDD+ to stop their neighbouring CoFMAs conduct leakage Will there be a cooperation cascade of REDD+ behaviour?
110. Tools for Growing Coopera6on
111. Coopera6on Science can't: • Get single en,,es to “cooperate.” • Help when coopera,on isn't necessary.
112. Scoping 1. Iden,fy sustainability ac,on or ins,tu,on 2. Iden,fy coopera,ve costs and benefits 3. Iden,fy actors and groups 4. Iden,fy appropriate placement rela,ve to problem 5. Es,mate balance of coopera,on
113. Growing Coopera6on within groups People are not en'ced to cooperate, they are rallied!
114. Features of the ac6on • Increase salience of contribu,ng ac,on • Enhance observability of contribu,on • Make contribu,on intui,ve, reflexive instead of delibera,ve • Improve the benefits to cost ra,o (make it cheaper to contribute) • Kickstart reciprocity, reputa,on, shame Features of the group • Highlight similarity, shared history • Build shared iden,ty • Secure group autonomy • Find effec,ve leadership • Strengthen suppor,ng ins,tu,ons (Ostrom’s Principles)
115. PROSOCIAL method (www.prosocial.world) 1.Core Design Principles of Ostrom 2.Group Flexibility Training (ACT)
116. Spreading Coopera6on between groups
117. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements
118. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally.
119. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups.
120. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups.
121. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups
122. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons
123. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management
124. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons
125. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on
126. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on
127. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups
128. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources
129. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources b. Facilitate between-group learning of sustainable solu,ons
130. Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources b. Facilitate between-group learning of sustainable solu,ons c. Nudge the "Balance of Coopera,on" toward conserva,on
131. Air Quality Regula6ons in California
132. Port of Long Beach
133. Cold Ironing (shore power)
134. Port of Los Angeles
135. Coopera6on Cascade
136. Small Group Discussion Session • Topic: • Coopera,on in sustainability research and solu,ons • Springboard ques,ons: • What relevance for your work? • What connec,ons do you see? • What problems do you foresee? • What more do you need?
137. Puong it Together: Group Discussion • Topic: • Coopera,on in sustainability research and solu,ons • Ques,ons: • Can you use coopera,on in research or solu,ons? • Where would you start? • What do you need?
138. Handout Images
139. Coordina6on Organized ac,on. Collec6ve Ac6on Ac,on organized toward a common goal. Coopera6on Ac,on that benefits others. Altruism Ac,on that benefits others at a cost to oneself.
140. Coopera6on Toolkit
142. ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺