Cooperation Science Workshop

7d3cf0465b50eaa48ffd2a9205455452?s=47 Tim Waring
September 20, 2018

Cooperation Science Workshop

A presentation to accompany our Cooperation Science Workshop. The presentation uses case studies to show how cooperation dynamics influence social and ecological outcomes, and distills the major leverage points for applying cooperation to sustainability challenges.

7d3cf0465b50eaa48ffd2a9205455452?s=128

Tim Waring

September 20, 2018
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Transcript

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    Hanes, S. P. and Waring, T. M. (2017) ‘Cultural evolution

    and US agricultural institutions: a historical case study of Maine’s blueberry industry’, Sustainability Science, pp. 1–10. Sam Hanes
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    Coordina6on Organized ac,on. Collec6ve Ac6on Ac,on organized toward a common

    goal. Coopera6on Ac,on that benefits others. Altruism Ac,on that benefits others at a cost to oneself.
  9. 12.

    Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A

    Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B )
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    Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A

    Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B ) 2 , 2 0 , 3 3 , 0 1 , 1
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    C C C C C C C C C D

    C C C C C D D D D D D D D D C = Cooperator D = Defector (free-rider) individual and group condi,ons decline free-riding spreads free-riding spreads free-riding enters
  12. 16.

    C C C C C C C C C D

    C C C C C D D D D D D D D D C = Cooperator D = Defector (free-rider) individual and group condi,ons decline free-riding spreads free-riding spreads free-riding enters Coopera'on is a puzzle!!
  13. 22.

    Going global: How humans conquered the world. The New Scientist,

    2007 Coopera6on allowed us to colonize the earth. (That's good and bad)
  14. 25.

    peak Orono Local T = 84 0 10 20 30

    0 20 40 60 80 Time Value Type Isolates Splitters Number of Isolates out of Total Network Size of oronolocal Over Time ## Picking joint bandwidth of 1.33 Individual Shared ('splits') Purchase Type Purchases the death of a food club
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    10 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 Avg.Degree Siz 0 5

    10 15 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Date Degree Distribution Degree Distribution over Time the death of a food club peak death Sharing Relationships
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    1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness 2. Among Reciprocators

    (Trivers, 1971) - repeat interac,ons Coopera,on grows: in any species.
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    1. Among Kin (Haldane, Price) - relatedness 2. Among Reciprocators

    (Trivers, 1971) - repeat interac,ons 3. Within Compe6ng Groups (Sober & Wilson, 1994) - compe,,on Coopera,on grows: in any species.
  18. 35.

    KraS-Todd, G., Yoeli, E., Bhanot, S., Rand, D., 2015. Promo6ng

    coopera6on in the field. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences, Social behavior 3, 96–101. h]ps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2015.02.006
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    1. Generous and reciprocal individuals 2. Frequent interac,ons 3. Chosen

    members 4. Shared iden,ty, abili,es, interests 5. Good leadership Coopera6on grows best in groups ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺
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    Ins6tu6onal Design Principles 1. Clear social boundaries 2. Fair rules

    3. Collec,ve-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanc,ons 6. Conflict resolu,on 7. Self determina,on 8. Nested governance Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolu,on of Ins,tu,ons for Collec,ve Ac,on. Cambridge University Press. Elinor Ostrom
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    Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A

    Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Payoffs to ( A , B )
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    Social Dilemma Prisoner’s Dilemma Player B Cooperate Defect Player A

    Cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3 Defect 3 , 0 1 , 1 Change the game Payoffs to ( A , B ) Coordina6on Game Stag Hunt Player B Stag Hare Player A Stag 2 , 2 0 , 1 Hare 1 , 0 1 , 1
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    coopera,on spreads if coopera,ve groups mul,ply C C C D

    C C D D D D D D C C C D C C C C D C C D D D D D D D
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    • Via compe66on with other groups • Peaceful group compe,,on

    can increase public goods (Tan and Bolle, 2007) • WARNING: Resource compe''on breeds extrac've ins'tu'ons • Via between-group migra6on • People migrate to be]er ins,tu,ons when they can (Gürerk et al., 2006) • Via between-group learning • Between-group learning for effec,ve resource use breeds sustainability (Waring et al., 2017) • Environmental Policy Diffusion (Tews, 2005)
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    • Via compe66on with other groups • Peaceful group compe,,on

    can increase public goods (Tan and Bolle, 2007) • WARNING: Resource compe''on breeds extrac've ins'tu'ons • Via between-group migra6on • People migrate to be]er ins,tu,ons when they can (Gürerk et al., 2006) • Via between-group learning • Between-group learning for effec,ve resource use breeds sustainability (Waring et al., 2017) • Environmental Policy Diffusion (Tews, 2005) Coopera6on (and ins6tu6ons) can spread between groups
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    organiza6onal inheritance 1844 - Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers 1863

    - North of England Co-opera,ve Wholesale Industrial and Provident Society 1872 - Co-opera,ve Wholesale Society 2001 - The Co-opera,ve Group The Co-opera6ve Group One Angel Square, CCBY2.0, wikimedia commons
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    Co-op principles ukscs.coop Ins6tu6onal design principles 1. Clear social boundaries

    2. Fair rules 3. Collec,ve-choice 4. Monitoring 5. Graduated sanc,ons 6. Conflict resolu,on 7. Self determina,on 8. Nested governance Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolu,on of Ins,tu,ons for Collec,ve Ac,on. Cambridge University Press.
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    1. Psychology - Coopera,on is rooted in intui,on, not delibera,on

    (Rand, 2016) 2. Anthropology - Coopera,on is bolstered by culture and ins,tu,ons (Sosis and Ruffle, 2003) 3. Economics - Coopera,on responds to costs and benefits (material and social) (Bowles, 2004; Gin,s et al., 2003) 4. Biology – Coopera,on is a central human adapta,on (Bowles, 2004; Gin,s et al., 2003) Coopera6on unites disciplines
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    Sustainability Theory Gap "Finally, we need to understand at a

    more generalizable level which features of coupled human-environment systems enhance and which constrain their adaptability." Levin and Clark 2010
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    Cellular ‘Cheaters’ Give Rise to Cancer. George Johnson, July 27,

    2015 How Can We Promote Coopera6on in an Uncoopera6ve Society? Naghmeh Momeni, August 8, 2018
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    • Interviews – semi-structured interviews • Is collec,ve contribu,on necessary?

    • Is it provided? By whom? How is it shared? • Surveys – psychology scales, others • Trust, Social Capital, Prosociality constructs • Extensivity, self iden,fica,on (Einolf, 2010) • Team cohesion survey in sports • Experiments - coopera,on experiments such as the Dictator Game, and the Public Goods Game measure coopera,on and prosocial behaviors. • In the laboratory • In the field (Ne]le et al., 2011; Waring, 2011)
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    • Catalog groups - successes, status, differences • Historical analysis

    - build ,melines of change • Search for coopera6on factors - rules, endowments, leadership, reciprocity, similarity • Measure between-group processes - learning, migra,on, economic compe,,on, warfare, etc.
  42. 76.

    Tribou, A., Collins, K., 2015. This Is How Fast America

    Changes Its Mind. Bloomberg.com. Women's Suffrage (19th amendment)
  43. 77.

    Jänicke, M., Jacob, K., 2006. Environmental Governance in Global Perspective.

    New Approaches to Ecological and Political Modernisation. Berlin: Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik. Freie Universität Berlin.
  44. 78.

    Group-level Cultural Selection via and or and or Natural Selection

    Cultural Transmission Trait-based Migration No group-level cultural selection Indicators of Group Adaptation . . . 1 if none if not both if none Group Structure and Selection Mechanism and or and or 3 if any if both if any Trait affects group survival or expansion. Trait variation is group-structured. Trait outcomes are group-structured. Trait is transmitted between groups. Trait-based selective migration between groups. Group-level Cultural Adaptation if stronger than other evolutionary forces Cooperative Behaviors Enforcement Behaviors Reinforcing Institutions 4 5 2 Kline et al., 2018. Designing cultural mul'level selec'on research for sustainability science. Sustainability Science 13, 9–19. h]ps://doi.org/10.1007/s11625-017-0509-2 How to design mul,-group coopera,on research for sustainability science
  45. 79.

    Coopera6on in Social- Ecological Systems Models NOTE: Be wary of

    any model of coopera'on that does not include the perpetual free-riding problem
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    ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺

    ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ the balance of coopera6on Conserva'on behaviors and ins'tu'ons can emerge and spread if the pressure on groups for resource conserva3on is greater than the pressure on individuals for resource exploita3on.
  47. 84.

    How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

    pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
  48. 85.

    How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

    pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
  49. 86.

    How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

    Village Irrigation System pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
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    How does environmental cooperation emerge? individuals villages nations Multi-village Forest

    Village Irrigation System pressure pressure Situation favors non-cooperation Situation favors cooperation
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    ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺

    ☺ ☺ ☺ ☺ the balance of coopera6on Conserva'on behaviors and ins'tu'ons can emerge and spread if the pressure on groups for resource conserva3on is greater than the pressure on individuals for resource exploita3on.
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    1. Conserva,on poses a coopera,ve dilemma (Smith and Wishnie, 2000)

    2. Policies that target self-interest may backfire (Bowles, 2008) 3. Coopera,on typically precedes durable ins,tu,onal or policy solu,ons 4. Coopera,on is not always good, and some,mes must be stopped. (Muthukrishna, 2017) 5. Coopera,on-based interven,ons can be self-suppor,ng and cheaper 6. Good for Collabora,on: (e.g. UMA Mexico, Mexico City; Konrad Lorenz Ins,tute, Vienna) Why Apply Coopera6on Science?
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    Forest dependent communities • Cultivation, cloves • Firewood, huts, boats

    • Outside demand (Zanzibar & mainland) • Government officials
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    Forest dependent communities • Cultivation, cloves • Firewood, huts, boats

    • Outside demand (Zanzibar & mainland) • Government officials
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    REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation & Forest Degradation • Reduce

    greenhouse gas emissions • Global initiative offering financial incentives (public sources, carbon market finance, private sector) to reduce carbon emissions • UN-Framework Convention on Climate Change (voluntary/ Norway/Paris) • Developing countries • Two routes: national or local
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    Celebration of REDD Readiness (26th August 2015), presided over by

    the President of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
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    Poaching: Kisiwa Panza wants Chokocho to join REDD+ to stop

    Chokocho stealing Kisiwa Panza trees Leakage: Wambaa wants to join REDD+ to stop their neighbouring CoFMAs conduct leakage Will there be a cooperation cascade of REDD+ behaviour?
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    Scoping 1. Iden,fy sustainability ac,on or ins,tu,on 2. Iden,fy coopera,ve

    costs and benefits 3. Iden,fy actors and groups 4. Iden,fy appropriate placement rela,ve to problem 5. Es,mate balance of coopera,on
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    Features of the ac6on • Increase salience of contribu,ng ac,on

    • Enhance observability of contribu,on • Make contribu,on intui,ve, reflexive instead of delibera,ve • Improve the benefits to cost ra,o (make it cheaper to contribute) • Kickstart reciprocity, reputa,on, shame Features of the group • Highlight similarity, shared history • Build shared iden,ty • Secure group autonomy • Find effec,ve leadership • Strengthen suppor,ng ins,tu,ons (Ostrom’s Principles)
  65. 119.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups.
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    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups.
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    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups
  68. 122.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons
  69. 123.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management
  70. 124.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons
  71. 125.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on
  72. 126.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on
  73. 127.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups
  74. 128.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources
  75. 129.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources b. Facilitate between-group learning of sustainable solu,ons
  76. 130.

    Spreading Coopera6on between groups 1. Requirements a. Group posi,oned to

    solve the dilemma locally. b. A popula,on of those groups. 3. Within groups a. Leverage our coopera,ve intui,ons b. Raise the stakes for successful management c. Strengthen group culture & ins,tu,ons d. Reward coopera,on, punish exploita,on 5. Between groups a. Encourage peaceful compe,,on to protect & enhance resources b. Facilitate between-group learning of sustainable solu,ons c. Nudge the "Balance of Coopera,on" toward conserva,on
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    Small Group Discussion Session • Topic: • Coopera,on in sustainability

    research and solu,ons • Springboard ques,ons: • What relevance for your work? • What connec,ons do you see? • What problems do you foresee? • What more do you need?
  78. 137.

    Puong it Together: Group Discussion • Topic: • Coopera,on in

    sustainability research and solu,ons • Ques,ons: • Can you use coopera,on in research or solu,ons? • Where would you start? • What do you need?
  79. 139.

    Coordina6on Organized ac,on. Collec6ve Ac6on Ac,on organized toward a common

    goal. Coopera6on Ac,on that benefits others. Altruism Ac,on that benefits others at a cost to oneself.
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