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A runtime verification system for Software Defined Networks
Victor Altukhov, Eugene Chemeritskiy, Vladislav Podymov and Vladimir Zakharov, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow
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Eugene Chemeritskiy Victor Altukhov An automatic correctness and safety checker
for network-wide forwarding policies VERMÓNT – VERifying MONiTor A watchdog for your network Vladislav Podymov Vladimir Zakharov Applied Research Center for Computer Networks Lomonosov Moscow State University -
Packet Forwarding Policy What is the intended behavior of a
network? • No external flow reaches office mail server • Outgoing flows have to pass a DPI server • Any pair of hosts in office is connected • Departments are isolated from each other • Each route includes at most five hops • No packet loops (reaches its original state) • Host A is unable to connect host B until host B has tried to connect host A before How to ensure your network is configured to operate in compliance with your expectations? -
VERMONT core operation principles Specification parser Network model builder V
erification engine Policy A holds Topology FlowTables Abstract Syntax Tree BDD relations Formal policy specifications Policy B violated by packet set P Network infrastructure R equirements to network behavior -
A formal model of SDN {Data Plane abstraction} A B
State 1: Header h1 Port #1 Switch #1 State 2: Header h2 Port #1 Switch #2 State 3: Header h3 Port #1 Switch #3 State 4: Header h4 Port #2 Switch #3 h1 h2 h3 h4 -
Example of PFP specification: prevent packet state cycles aux: lead_to_cycle(
x) := In(x) and Exist[y: R_tc( x, y) and Exist[z: R_tc(y,z) and y == z ] ]; main: no_state_cycles() := Foral l [ x: not lead_to_cycle( x) ] ; x y z -
90 Mb router configuration files Fat Tree topology with 16
routers 757000 rules 48 tables Stanford University Backbone Network -
Activity Verdict Time spend (ms) Initial model constructi on -
3043.687 Packet cycles YES 166.191 Blac k hole s NO 174.845 Routes <= 3 hops NO 293.522 Routes <= 4 hops YES 736.015 Rule insertion seq. / paral. - 100 / 0.3* Rule removal seq. / paral. - 70 / 1* Stanford network verification -
controller commands OpenFlow Switches Proxy Server SDN controller Feeder V
erifier n PFP specificatio switch messages controller commands switch messages Is command safe? Verifier verdict: PFP violated - block the command PFP holds - apply it to the network Initial network state VERMONT anticipates loading of the switches after a certain command of the controller is applied and blocks it, if it results into violation of the given PFP specifications VERMONT deployment -
VERMÓNT – VERifying MONiTor VERMONT checks the compliance of network
configurations resulted by the application of a given sequence of commands to an arbitrary set of packet forwarding policies Checking network configuration in dynamic Express your intentions to the behavior of a certain network with our PFP specification language Single-time work Deploy VERMONT in your software-defined network Launch a couple of programs • Prevent network to violate any policies of network safety • Reveal the problems in your configuration • Detect problems in application compatibility Prerequisites Benefit s -
A place of VERMONT Currently there are several ways to
ensure correct and safe operation of SDN: 3. Verify the application during its operation and detect policy violations in dynamic 2. Write controller application in a specialized language that finds all the mistakes during the compilation phase 1. Apply formal method to controller application in the same manner it is applied to programs -
Run-Time network verification tools Tool Model constructi ng time (ms)
Model modificatio n time (ms) Policy specificati on language OpenFlo w support VERMONT 2013 3100 100 - 600 FO[TC] full NetPlumber Stanford University 2013 37000 2 - 1000 CTL partial VeriFlow University of Illinois 2013 >4000 68 - 100 A fixed set of properties minimal AP Verifier University of Texas 2013 1000 0.1 A fixed set of properties minimal Anteater University of Illinois 2011 400000 ??? A fixed set of properties none FlowChecker University of North Carolina 2010 1200000 350 - 67000 CTL full -
• Fast constructing of an initial model (1÷10 s) •
Fast model modification (1÷10 ms) • Fast checking of the policy compliance (1÷10 ms) VERMÓNT – VERifying MONiTor Our nearest goals and current results • Expressive language to specify policies (FO[TC]) • A possibility to localize the violation • Sensible information about the problem • Deeper integration with a controller • Monitoring the operation of the controller applications • Interpreting commands and preventing temporal violations • Application advising and synthesizing safe commands -
h1 h2 h3 h4 s1 VERMONT demonstration Static network disjoint
Switch s1 connects hosts h1 and h3 only -
Forwarding policy for static disjoint / / connect sw i
t ch ports f or h1 and h3 aux: f orward( in) : = in[p] == 0x10 and !Exist[out: R(in,out) and out[p] != 0x30]; aux: backward(in) := in[p] == 0x30 and !Exist[out: R(in,out) and out[p] != 0x10]; / / no other connections exist aux: isolated(in) := !Exist[out: R(in, out)]; main: static_disjoint_flows() := Forall[in: forward(in) or backward(in) or isolated(in)]; Switch s1 connects hosts h1 and h3 only -
Static network disjoint Ping h1 there rules h1 there •
Rules to connect hosts h1 and h3 are correct • VERMONT sends commands to switches -
Static network disjoint Ping h2 there rules s1 there •
Rules to connect hosts h2 and h4 violate forwarding policy • VERMONT blocks spurious commands of the controller • Pings received because the controller tends to delivers packets directly • Technically, we can block them -
Static network disjoint Upon error detection: • Proxy server notifies
administrator with “command blocked” messages • Proxy server notifies controller with an appropriate error message -
VERMONT demonstration h1 h2 h3 h4 s1 Dynamic network disjoint
Switch s1 can be used only by one pair of hosts at a time -
Dynamic network disjoint Ping h1 there rules h1 there Due
to the policy VERMONT always allows the first flow -
Dynamic network disjoint Ping h2 there rules s1 there •
Rules to connect hosts h2 and h4 violate forwarding policy • VERMONT blocks spurious commands of the controller • Pings received because the controller tends to delivers packets directly • Technically, we can block them -
Dynamic network disjoint Ping h2 there rules s1 there •
Rules have expiry timeout • When the rules are not used long enough they are extinct from forwarding table • After h1 stops ping h3 • Rule (h1<->h3) is removed • Rule (h2<->h4) becomes valid