every ceiling Explicitly govern every capability that must not rely on blanket auto-approval. As an author recommendation, also use an allow-list for filesystem. write that excludes agent-configuration directories. This is defense in depth, not a hard sandbox boundary. { "version": 1, "boot": { "fail_closed": true }, "network": { "egress": { "mode": "allow", "allow": ["*.amazonaws.com", "*.kiro.dev", "management.*.kiro.dev", "runtime.*.kiro.dev"] } }, "commands": { "mode": "deny", "deny": ["curl*://*", "wget*://*", "nc *", "ncat *", "ssh *", "scp *", "python -c*", "python3 -c*"] }, "capabilities": { "telemetry": { "enabled": false }, "publish": { "enabled": false }, "theme_install": { "enabled": false } }, "filesystem": { "write": { "mode": "allow", "allow": ["~/work/**", "/tmp/**"] } }, } Caution: filesystem.write allow-lists are lexical. A symlink placed under an allowed directory can point elsewhere. The specification calls this a “lexical scoping aid, not a hardened sandbox against symlinks.” Sensitive-path resolution is a separate control, and the agent configuration paths discussed here are outside that floor. "mcp": { "mode": "deny", "deny": ["@kirocrew-computer"] } © NTT TechnoCross Corporation 60