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[BlackHoodie] Malware analysis for policy muggles

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November 24, 2017
110

[BlackHoodie] Malware analysis for policy muggles

Lightning-ish talk given for a mini-conference hosted by CIRCL prior to the 2017 BlackHoodie reverse engineering bootcamp in Luxembourg.

Avatar for marasawr

marasawr

November 24, 2017

Transcript

  1. M A LWA R E A N A LY S

    I S F O R P O L I C Y P E O P L E C A N M U G G L E S D O M A G I C ?
  2. O B S E R V E D I N

    T H E W I L D
  3. – T H O M A S D U L

    L I E N [ H A LVA R F L A K E ] , B L A C K H AT A S I A 2 0 1 7 . “All offensive problems are technical problems, and all defensive problems are political problems.”
  4. A B R I E F H I S T

    O RY B A D I D E A S I N C Y B E R P O L I C Y
  5. • Export controls (cryptography, “intrusion software”) • ‘Hacking back,’ a.k.a.

    cyber letters of marque and reprisal, a.k.a. cyber privateers • Cyber-as-armed-conflict <= really, really terrible idea
  6. H O W D O E S I T W

    O R K ? P O L I C Y
  7. • Démarche (strongly-worded letter) • Economic penalties (i.e. trade) •

    Targeted sanctions (e.g. against individuals or entities)
  8. G A P I N G A B Y S

    S C U R R E N T S TAT E O F ‘ C Y B E R ’ D O C T R I N E
  9. W H Y D O E S N ’ T

    T H I S W O R K ? • Open-source / industry analysis is fragmented • Analysis lacks rigour • Confidence is 100 or 0 • Weak third-party attribution
  10. • Group 74 • APT28 • Sofacy • Fancy Bear

    • Tsar Team • Pawn Storm • Sednit • GRIZZLY STEPPE (APT28 + APT29)
  11. • Group 74 • APT28 • Sofacy • Fancy Bear

    • Tsar Team • Pawn Storm • Sednit • GRIZZLY STEPPE (APT28 + APT29)
  12. – J E F F R E Y L E

    W I S ( @ A R M S C O N T R O LW O N K ) “The technology is only interesting insofar as it answers policy questions.”
  13. I N T E R E S T I N

    G S T U F F • Attribution : let’s talk about confidence • Verification in arms control is a mosaic of imperfect technical indicators whose strengths + limits are generally agreed • Intent : what can we infer from design? • What does it mean when anatomically correct ransomware is observed to function as a wiper? • Modularity / ease of code re-use super interesting
  14. M O A R I N T E R E

    S T I N G S T U F F • [your thoughts here]
  15. C O N TA C T • @marasawr open dms

    • marasawr [at] gmail • linkedin.com/in/marasawr