known as KeenTeam) • Marco (@marcograss): • My main focus is iOS/Android/macOS and sandboxes. But now shifted to hypervisors, basebands, firmwares etc. • pwn2own 2016 Mac OS X Team • Mobile pwn2own 2016 iOS team • pwn2own 2017 VMWare escape team • Mobile pwn2own 2017 iOS Wi-Fi + baseband team • Kira (@0xKira233): • Security researcher at Tencent KeenLab • Interested in hypervisors, basebands etc. • CTF player in AAA / A*0*E, DEFCON 25 & 26
• White Hat Security Researchers • Several times pwn2own winners • We are based in Shanghai, China • Our blog is https://keenlab.tencent.com/en/ • Twitter @keen_lab
MediaTek communication processor” - Charles Muiruri , Nitay Artenstein, Anna Dorfman • Introduces the MediaTek modem, where it’s popular and internal structure • “Path of Least Resistance: Cellular Baseband to Application Processor Escalation on MediaTek Devices” – Comsecuris, György Miru • Examine the attack surface from the modem to the application processor in order to escape the modem and compromise the phone, with a bug. • Not much public research
contract with a vendor to improve the security of their modem • Recently we are working on a 5G project with another vendor • We previously worked on basebands and also a little bit on the MediaTek modem • We disclosed to the vendor a bunch of bugs in the modem and they were fixed • This talk covers some of our work, and how to bootstrap your own research on this modem.
research company Statista, Qualcomm had 45% overall market share in 2018, followed by Apple with 17%, Samsung with 14%, MediaTek with 11% and Huawei with 8%.Aug 25, 2019” • MediaTek has a significant market share, especially on budget-mid price devices • They implement a lot of components, the SoC, the modem, etc • In Europe also there are several popular devices using the MediaTek SoC and Modem.
of hardware component that implements a set of specifications to communicate with a cellular network. • Several “generations” implemented, 2G to 5G usually Source: ResearchGate
the phone don’t authenticate the base station • Possible to setup a fake base station and impersonate • Send malicious data (exploit) • Some newer stacks starting from 3G the phone authenticate the BTS • Not all layers and components are protected
mobile stacks are also “layered” • Complexity often progressively higher the higher you go on the stack • (think like the difference TCP/IP vs full blown HTTP web app running on top of it)
cheap phones and cheap call/data plans, to get everyone connected. • 4G, high bandwidth, rich media, HD videos, content. • Now everyone has a smartphone with a data plan, how the carriers can make more money? There are no more people to sell a smartphone and a data plan.
capacity. • How carrier can make money? • Connect everything! Devices, cars, sensors. • People already connected, now the only way to expand the market is to connect “THINGS”
for 1 km2 • In a 4G and lower network, most of the consumer are end users • In a 5G network? • Private deployments (in a factory for example, instead of using wires) • Connect industrial robots • Fleet of shared cars in a network slice • Medical equipment/ personal health equipment • Semaphores/ road traffic management network. • In a 4g network, reliability is important, but not TOO critical • In a 5g one, it might be, if you control critical infrastructure. • Also the connected devices are different in nature.
on smartphones because now they are the main consumers of baseband devices. • But this is rapidly changes, it can be readily applied to other areas such as smart cars, which have a modem of course. • Also, the “endpoints” are not the only attackable target .. Also base stations
(eMBB): richer and faster data consumption for humans, high definition videos, downloads etc. • Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC): MISSION CRITICAL applications, that cannot afford delays and unreliabilities. • Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC): Big networks of potentially low power devices. It must support low power consumtion and high capacity and low cost.
solution yet • Eurecom is working on the OpenAir5G and created a consortium to foster the development of a opensource 5G stack • Possible to use it with a SDR such as a USRP B210 • Still work in progress • We are actively tracking the progress and we hope we can use it (and maybe contribute to it) in the future for our 5G testing, without having to use closed source testing equipment
best solution in our opinion for now is to use docker on linux • Can proxy the USB directly without the overhead of a virtualized USB 3.0 controller (latencies are bad for SDR) • The BTS software expects all kind of weird requirements, from linux version, to dependencies, to the most exotic ones: kernel changes or modules docker run -t -i --privileged -v /dev/bus/usb:/dev/bus/usb ubuntu bash
station software stack to trigger the exploit OpenBSC OpenBTS srsLTE … Software defined Radio, or equivalent hardware USRP BladeRF CMU200 (Testing hardware) Over the air exploit RCE inside the phone baseband
a single CPU executing an OS anymore. • Several other processors involved in the radio area: • Baseband processor • Wi-Fi and Bluetooth SoC • The baseband handles the radio communication with many types of networks: 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G etc. • Those radio components can be attacked remotely Source: https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/04/over-air- exploiting-broadcoms-wi-fi_4.html
OS and apps (Android for example) • The Baseband runs a RTOS • They communicate with • USB • PCI-e • Shared Memory • SDIO • … • Separate systems. If you get RCE you run code on the Baseband, not the AP. • The Basebands lag behind in terms of mitigations compared to the AP • This lack of mitigations is widespread between all manufacturers. Source : https://www.evelta.com/introduction-smartphone- architecture
mentioned before • Download what you can download from the network. • Leaked source code if any • Reverse scripts • Vendor specific code • … • Extract the firmware from phone • Reverse engineering and bug hunting • 3GPP TS
leaked on github, of some source code, and object files • Old ARM version • Might be still useful for bug hunting • You still need the firmware of the target though • The object files can be recompiled and linked together to fuzz in a binary instrumentation environment such as QEMU
over by RTOS • CM / MM / RR / SM / CC , etc • AT commands to communicate • Shared memory between AP and CP • CCCI (Cross Core Communication Interface) • IPC channel • /dev/tty[s] • CCCI FS • IOCTL
• Available at /dev/block/by-name/* • For kernel • /dev/block/by-name/boot • Great tool: https://github.com/nforest/droidimg • For modem • /dev/block/by-name/md1img • No encryption at all
Found in the image and sdcard. • Format can be guessed • Or explained in detail: tools/DebuggingSuite/convertAddr2FuncAndFile.pl • Fix the segments in IDA • Guess the base? No! • https://github.com/sgayou/rbasefind • Find some entrances to audit • Important functions’ handlers
typical of RTOS system and modem, endless while loop, waiting and dequeuing messages and handling them. • It receives messages from other tasks and invokes mm_main
message ID • It’s not hard to find message handlers, although they are sometimes deep into the state machine • With the specifications you can search for the method names as well
fuzz • No / Very few IPC calls • Decode / unpack functions catch our attention • mcd_unpack • errc_asn1_decoder • … • Write a C wrapper to call the target • Link what we need and compile provided APIs • AFL QEMU mode to do the fuzzing
store in the sdcard • Built-in log tool: *#800# --> Logkit • MTK makes its own format • Logged by dhl_trace and other similar functions • Reverse to get more information
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