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Your API ain't as secure as you think

Your API ain't as secure as you think

The Bad News:

Last year OWASP published a new top 10, with some surprising changes. Broken access control rocketed from #5 to #1, and cryptographic failures moved up from #3 to #2.

Data breaches are costing organisations more than ever. According to IBM, the average cost of a data breach has climbed 12.7% since 2020.

APIs are at the centre of many of these attacks. Either through misuse or exploitation by attackers.

The Good News:

There are architectural approaches that give you new techniques to manage data security risk. These help you separate concerns, divide risk, and defend smaller attack surfaces.

There are also old techniques getting new life due to new breakthroughs in adjacent technologies.

In this talk, attendees will learn:

🪤 What the hidden security traps are when handling data in your APIs
🗺 What architectural approaches you can start iterating towards, to prepare you for the next 10 years
🏃What techniques you can use today to improve data security in your APIs

Presented at Apidays Australia, September 2022

Appendix — Links

Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022 — IBM
Don’t Look Now, but Congress Might Pass an Actually Good Privacy Bill — Wired
Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2021
2022 Costa Rican ransomware attack
OWASP Top 10:2021
How Unsecure gRPC Implementations Can Compromise APIs — Trend Micro
Four different authorization models to map users to the correct permission — Auth0
twitchtv/twirp: A simple RPC framework with protobuf service definitions
GRPC Server Reflection Protocol
neex/http2smugl: detect and exploit HTTP request smuggling
aquasecurity/tfsec: Security scanner for your Terraform code
returntocorp/semgrep: Lightweight static analysis for many languages. Find bug variants with patterns that look like source code

Lindsay Holmwood

September 14, 2022
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Transcript

  1. Your API ain’t as secure
    as you think
    Lindsay Holmwood
    @auxesis
    Chief Product Officer @ CipherStash

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  3. 👋 I’m Lindsay
    cipherstash.com/lindsay
    @auxesis
    CipherStash helps you
    protect sensitive data while
    still enabling safe access
    across your org.

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  4. The bad news

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  5. USD 4.35 million
    Global average total cost of a data breach
    Source: IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022

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  6. Data breach costs are increasing

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  7. The landscape is changing
    ○ Compliance requirements (e.g.,
    GDPR, CCPA) are becoming
    more stringent
    ○ Ransomware cost $20B globally
    in 2021, $6.9B in USA alone
    ○ Attackers are becoming more
    sophisticated (exploiting supply
    chains, brokering access) and
    are moving faster
    Notable breaches this year
    August: Twilio 󰑔
    125 customers accessed
    July: Shanghai Police 󰎩
    1 billion citizens exposed
    July: Twitter 󰑔
    5.4 million user accounts exposed
    May: Costa Rican government 󰎫
    $30M in losses per day
    May: NIC e-Hospital 󰏝
    250 million patients exposed

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  8. Compliance requirements
    (e.g., GDPR, CCPA) are
    becoming more stringent.
    USA regulations in the
    wings.
    The landscape
    is changing

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  9. Ransomware cost
    $20B globally —
    $6.9B in 󰑔 alone
    — in 2021
    The landscape
    is changing
    Source: FBI IC3 Crime Report 2021

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  10. Ransomware costs in 2021:
    ○ $20B globally
    ○ $6.9B in USA alone
    Attackers are becoming more sophisticated (exploiting supply chains,
    brokering access) and are moving faster
    The landscape is changing

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  11. May: NIC e-Hospital 󰏝
    250 million patients exposed
    May: Costa Rican government 󰎫
    $30M in losses per day
    July: Shanghai Police 󰎩
    1 billion citizens exposed
    July: Twitter 󰑔
    5.4 million user accounts exposed
    August: Twilio 󰑔
    125 customers accessed
    Notable breaches in the last 6 months

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  12. Source: ibm.com/security/data-breach

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  13. APIs are at the center of many of
    these incidents.

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  14. View Slide

  15. #5 => #1
    Broken Access Control
    Based on volume of weaknesses

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  16. #3 => #2
    Cryptographic Failures
    Based on volume of weaknesses

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  17. #1 => #3
    Injection
    Based on volume of weaknesses

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  18. 💨 ⇒ #4
    Insecure design
    Based on volume of weaknesses

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  19. The good news:

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  20. There are technical solutions:
    ● New tech that are safe bets.
    ● Old architecture techniques
    getting new life.

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  21. Most attacks are
    not on core systems.
    They are on
    people who have access
    to core systems.
    Source: OAIC Feb 2022

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  22. Cheaper to invest now
    than after you get
    breached or regulated

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  23. You succeed by
    doing the basics well

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  24. What architectures and
    techniques should you be
    iterating towards?

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  25. 1. Third party
    identity providers

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  26. 3rd party IDPs for APIs — before
    Authentication:
    ● Challenge–Response authentication
    ● Secure Remote Password protocol
    ● Client certificate authentication
    Authorisation:
    ● ???

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  27. Authentication:
    ● OAuth2 + JWT
    ● SAML
    ● Self managed identity via Google Workspace, O365
    3rd party IDPs — now

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  28. 3rd party IDPs for APIs
    Don’t roll your own auth — use third party identity provider:
    ● Auth0, Ping, Okta
    Untrusted clients, trusted servers:
    ● Client authenticates to IDP
    ● IDP sets up session with API
    ● API is ignorant of users — only knows if IDP gives an OK

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  29. Why you should care
    ● Less code, lower ongoing maintenance costs
    ● Better threat detection than what you can build
    ● Your APIs become integrated with broader organisational IAM controls
    ● Access and behaviour tied back to identity
    3rd party IDPs for APIs

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  30. Limit impact of attacks
    Attack vector Frequency
    Compromised credentials ~20%
    Cloud misconfiguration ~15%
    Phishing ~15%
    Malicious insider ~11%
    Source: IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022

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  31. Identification and authentication failures
    ● Cred stuffing and spraying — automated blocking and alerting
    ● Cred recovery abuse — reduce and narrow recovery paths
    Broken access controls
    ● Check bypass — implement standard controls across all endpoints
    ● Allow by default — invert to deny by default
    Defend against:

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  32. We’re so focused on building auth
    that we forget about auth

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  33. Authorization
    ● RBAC: static permissions assigned to users via roles
    ● ABAC: dynamic policies based on user attrs + request context
    Stronger authentication methods
    ● Passwordless
    ● FIDO2
    Frees you up to work impactful problems

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  34. 2. RPC +
    standardised
    serialisation
    formats

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  35. Use code generation to handle:
    ● Routes
    ● Serialisation
    ● HTTP methods, request/response headers
    ● Errors
    RPC

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  36. RPC Examples
    gRPC Twirp
    Origin Google Twitch
    Payloads protobufs Binary or JSON
    HTTP HTTP/2 HTTP 1.1 only
    Streaming Bidirectional None
    Honorable mention: GraphQL

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  37. Strongly typed communication for:
    ● Network transport
    ● Storage
    Reduces attack surface, to mitigate attacks like:
    ● Injection
    Serialisation

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  38. Example: Protocol Buffers
    Binary representation of data
    structures:
    1. Describe data structure using
    built in types
    2. Compile bindings for languages
    3. Encode/decode data structure in
    efficient binary format
    Supports basic backwards
    compatibility via tags.
    service SearchService {
    rpc Search(SearchRequest) returns (SearchResponse);
    }
    message SearchRequest {
    required string query = 1;
    optional int32 page_number = 2;
    optional int32 result_per_page = 3;
    }
    message SearchResponse {
    repeated Result results = 1;
    }
    message Result {
    string url = 1;
    string title = 2;
    repeated string snippets = 3;
    }

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  39. Reduce attack surface:
    ● To only what the endpoint explicitly exposes
    ● Stop enumeration
    Build secure clients, faster:
    ● Automatically generate clients for different languages
    ● Automatically generate documentation
    ● Backwards compatibility baked in
    RPC + serialisation formats for APIs

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  40. Limit impact of attacks
    Attack vector Frequency
    Vulnerability in third-party software ~13%
    System Error ~7%
    Source: IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022

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  41. Deserialization attacks
    ● Injection — data injection, only support primitive data types
    ● Privilege escalation — gaining RCE through object deserialisation
    Denial of Service
    ● Resource Exhaustion — drop and log deserialization failures
    Defend against:

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  42. Defence in depth:
    ● Use strongly typed languages to stop injection attacks propagating from
    client to server
    ● WASM, to more tightly control the client side
    gRPC reflection:
    ● Enumerates gRPC services
    ● Exposes protobufs in human readable format (arguments, fields)
    Also consider:

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  43. “New” attacks like request smuggling
    SSRF
    WASM
    Also consider:

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  44. 3. Application
    Level
    Encryption

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  45. Encrypt data before it
    hits your database

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  46. ID Name Email Medicare DOB Last Visit
    1 Bob Alice [email protected] 1234-1679 1985-04-13 2021-11-12
    2 Ada Lovelace [email protected] 7811-8900 1815-12-18 2021-03-01
    3 Ron Rivest [email protected] 1111-7777 1947-05-06 2020-08–17
    ID Name Email Medicare DOB Last Visit
    1 FaEZff3jxBo Ooi9EGk9AHY kFUXefymauo AIaq/7zh8Bg 8E7bW/piQdc
    2 /+P5vR/Y6c8 l9pjVGliPpY coOsKQoqMGs v65rNTAOLbc Jrh2cWxZQFI
    3 GzSs7yV+om8 rnm2X1+f8pw lKWK7jdaUBk 1dPr3mM/nzY MysZlt3F6FE
    Application-Level Encryption is the best defence against data breaches
    But adoption is low.

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  47. Why? Queries are impossible!
    ID Name Email Medicare DOB Last Visit
    1 FaEZff3jxBo Ooi9EGk9AHY kFUXefymauo AIaq/7zh8Bg 8E7bW/piQdc
    2 /+P5vR/Y6c8 l9pjVGliPpY coOsKQoqMGs v65rNTAOLbc Jrh2cWxZQFI
    3 GzSs7yV+om8 rnm2X1+f8pw lKWK7jdaUBk 1dPr3mM/nzY MysZlt3F6FE
    4 8LDcY5j8as0 o4+DZioP8Y8 jUxr2zGw0UQ TwaxYXYaLzA kBhGkhRZh2s
    5 7KkpjDE39ng hm1dbQpe/iA dqMY09YeG8s zcIxZM7sVVw rLqsko3LmW8
    Medicare number = “1234-1567” ?

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  48. Wide range of App Level
    Encryption plugins for most
    languages + frameworks:
    All have the same caveat:
    You do this, you lose search
    JavaScript objection-encryption, sequelize-encrypted,
    mongoose-encryption, typeorm-encrypted,
    typeorm-encrypted-model, prisma-field-encryption,
    bookshelf-encrypt-columns, mongoose-field-encryption,
    Ruby ActiveRecord Encryption, Lockbox, attr_encrypted,
    strongbox, crypt_keeper, active_record_encryption,
    mongoid-encrypted-fields, mongoid-encrypted,
    symmetric-encryption
    Python django-fernet-fields, django-encrypted-model-fields,
    django-cryptographic-fields, django-cryptography,
    sqlalchemy_utils EncryptedType
    C# EntityFrameworkCore.DataEncryption,
    EntityFrameworkCore.EncryptColumn, EntityEncryption
    PHP EloquentEncryption, eloquent-aes,
    ambta/DoctrineEncryptBundle,
    absolute-quantum/DoctrineEncryptBundle,
    EncryptBundle,
    elgibor-solution/laravel-database-encryption

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  49. What’s changed?
    Searchable
    Symmetric
    Encryption
    Index encrypted records
    and search them
    Searchable encrypted index

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  50. Emerging tools:
    Old pattern, new applications
    JavaScript objection-encryption, sequelize-encrypted,
    mongoose-encryption, typeorm-encrypted,
    typeorm-encrypted-model, prisma-field-encryption,
    bookshelf-encrypt-columns, mongoose-field-encryption,
    Ruby ActiveRecord Encryption, Lockbox, attr_encrypted,
    strongbox, crypt_keeper, active_record_encryption,
    mongoid-encrypted-fields, mongoid-encrypted,
    symmetric-encryption
    Python django-fernet-fields, django-encrypted-model-fields,
    django-cryptographic-fields, django-cryptography,
    sqlalchemy_utils EncryptedType
    C# EntityFrameworkCore.DataEncryption,
    EntityFrameworkCore.EncryptColumn, EntityEncryption
    PHP EloquentEncryption, eloquent-aes,
    ambta/DoctrineEncryptBundle,
    absolute-quantum/DoctrineEncryptBundle,
    EncryptBundle,
    elgibor-solution/laravel-database-encryption
    +

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  51. Limit impact of attacks
    Attack vector Frequency
    Compromised credentials ~20%
    Cloud misconfiguration ~15%
    Vulnerability in 3rd party software ~12%
    Malicious insider ~11%
    Physical Security Compromise ~9%
    Source: IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022

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  52. Most attacks are
    not on core systems.
    They are on
    people who have access
    to core systems.
    Source: OAIC Feb 2022

    View Slide

  53. Broken access controls
    ● Check bypass — multiple factors required to decrypt data
    Security misconfiguration
    ● Unauthorised access — even if authenticated, data still encrypted
    Insecure design
    ● Incomplete threat model — last line of defense
    Defend against:

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  54. 4. Security static
    analysis

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  55. Analyse code and infracode for known vulnerabilities.
    Well established tools:
    ● semgrep
    ● tfsec
    Integrate into CI, catch insecurity before it’s shipped to production.
    Security static analysis

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  56. ● Finds insecure defaults and
    configurations
    ● Hundreds of checks across
    major and minor clouds
    ● Drop into CI pipelines
    Example: tfsec

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  57. ● Supports 25+ languages
    ● Thousands of rules out of
    the box
    ● Easy to write new rules
    Example: semgrep

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  58. Limit impact of attacks
    Attack vector Frequency
    Cloud misconfiguration ~15%
    Physical security compromise ~9%
    System error ~7%
    Source: IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022

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  59. Security misconfiguration
    ● Default accounts & features — reduce attack surface
    ● Implementation exposure — disable debugging output
    Insecure design
    ● Missed controls — catch design errors early in build
    Defend against:

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  60. Use security static analysis to
    identify and enforce
    secure code standards:
    🚧 authorisation access controls
    🔒 app level encryption
    ☎ RPC + serialisation formats

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  61. Recap:
    These techniques
    should be on your radar:

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  62. A01:2021 Broken Access Control
    A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures
    A03:2021 Injection
    A04:2021 Insecure Design
    A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration
    A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components
    A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures
    A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures
    A09:2021 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
    A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery
    Third party
    identity providers

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  63. Standardised
    serialisation
    formats +
    RPC
    A01:2021 Broken Access Control
    A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures
    A03:2021 Injection
    A04:2021 Insecure Design
    A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration
    A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components
    A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures
    A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures
    A09:2021 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
    A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery

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  64. Application
    Level
    Encryption
    A01:2021 Broken Access Control
    A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures
    A03:2021 Injection
    A04:2021 Insecure Design
    A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration
    A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components
    A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures
    A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures
    A09:2021 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
    A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery

    View Slide

  65. Security
    Static
    Analysis
    A01:2021 Broken Access Control
    A02:2021 Cryptographic Failures
    A03:2021 Injection
    A04:2021 Insecure Design
    A05:2021 Security Misconfiguration
    A06:2021 Vulnerable and Outdated Components
    A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures
    A08:2021 Software and Data Integrity Failures
    A09:2021 Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
    A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery

    View Slide

  66. Most attacks are
    not on core systems.
    They are on
    people who have access
    to core systems.
    Source: OAIC Feb 2022

    View Slide

  67. Cheaper to invest now
    than after you get
    breached or regulated

    View Slide

  68. You succeed by
    doing the basics well

    View Slide

  69. Thank you!
    🙋 What questions do you have?
    💖 the talk? Let @auxesis know on Twitter.
    Appendix + sources at cipherstash.com/lindsay

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  70. 📒 Appendix — Links
    ○ Cost of a Data Breach Report 2022 — IBM
    ○ Don’t Look Now, but Congress Might Pass an Actually Good Privacy Bill — Wired
    ○ Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2021
    ○ 2022 Costa Rican ransomware attack
    ○ OWASP Top 10:2021
    ○ How Unsecure gRPC Implementations Can Compromise APIs — Trend Micro
    ○ Four different authorization models to map users to the correct permission — Auth0
    ○ twitchtv/twirp: A simple RPC framework with protobuf service definitions
    ○ GRPC Server Reflection Protocol
    ○ neex/http2smugl: detect and exploit HTTP request smuggling
    ○ aquasecurity/tfsec: Security scanner for your Terraform code
    ○ returntocorp/semgrep: Lightweight static analysis for many languages. Find bug variants with patterns
    that look like source code

    View Slide