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STARTTLS Everywhere
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Yan!
August 05, 2014
Programming
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310
STARTTLS Everywhere
Yan Zhu and Jacob Hoffman-Andrews. PasswordsCon 2014.
Yan!
August 05, 2014
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Transcript
STARTTLS Everywhere Peter Eckersley, Jacob Hoffman-Andrews, Yan Zhu Electronic Frontier
Foundation {pde, jsha,yan}@eff.org
SMTP email transmission is mostly insecure
ngrep -i password tcp port 25
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Threat model 1. passive attackers 2. passive attacks w/ key
compromise 3. active attackers 4. sophisticated active attacks
Threat model 1. passive attackers turn on STARTTLS 2. passive
attacks w/ key compromise 3. active attackers 4. sophisticated active attacks
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STARTTLS in/out of Gmail
It'd be nice to stretch that graph further back in
time https://github.com/EFForg/smtp-tls-history. git Email
[email protected]
if you'd like to run that on a large set of historical headers
2. passive attacks w/ sophisticated assistance (key theft)
What's the easiest way for eavesdroppers to read billions of
encrypted email transfers?
Session key 1 Session key 2 Session key 3 Session
key 4 Normal TLS: session keys linked to long-term private keys Sender's public key Receiver's public key
...steal the private keys Image: betty le bon
Session key 1 Session key 2 Session key 3 Session
key 4 “Perfect” Forward Secrecy: Extra crypto unbinds session keys from private keys Sender's public key Receiver's public key ECD H ECD H
How do we turn on Perfect Forward Secrecy correctly for
SMTP?
Simple answer: - support TLS v1.2 - protect against downgrade
attacks
Need a new policy mechanism to do that!
3. active network attacks
Unfortunately, active attacks are really easy...
How does SMTP-TLS work?
One side say “STARTTLS”, the other replies “STARTTLS”
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The sender will fall back to insecure SMTP
Attackers can also “man in the middle”, speaking TLS themselves
Source: Facebook, May 2014
Threat model 1. passive attackers turn on STARTTLS 2. passive
attacks w/ key compromise 3. active attackers ??? 4. sophisticated active attacks
On the Web, we have the HSTS header for this
A quick pragmatic solution: STARTTLS Everywhere
git clone https://github.com/EFForg/starttls-everywhere.git
Main concepts: - Recipient security policy framework - Supports missing
functionality - Start with a centralized database - Multi-channel distribution
Related work DANE: fully distributed, uses DNSSEC SPF: Applies to
senders, not receivers
Scenario 1 (prototype, work in progress) git clone https://github.com/EFForg/starttls-everywhere.git #
Run our script, which does: while sleep 1d ; do git pull git tag --verify $LATEST_VERSION || exit ./MTAConfigGenerator.py --edit /etc/postfix ./FailureNotificationDaemon.py & done
Scenario 2 (common unix MTAs) apt-get install starttls-everywhere
Scenario 3 (large scale production) wget https://eff.org/starttls-everywhere/latest-db.json wget https://eff.org/starttls-everywhere/latest-db.sig gpg
--verify latest-db.sig latest-db.json || error-script MTAConfigGenerator.py latest-db.json -o mta-policy.cf your-deploy-script mta-policy.cf
Policy database is a set of JSON blobs:
// These match on the MX domain. "*.yahoodns.net": { "require-valid-certificate":
true, } "*.eff.org": { "require-tls": true, "min-tls-version": "TLSv1.1", "enforce-mode": "enforce" "accept-spki-hashes": [ "sha1/5R0zeLx7EWRxqw6HRlgCRxNLHDo=", "sha1/YlrkMlC6C4SJRZSVyRvnvoJ+8eM=" ] } "*.google.com": { "require-valid-certificate": true, "min-tls-version": "TLSv1.1", "enforce-mode": "log-only", "error-notification": "https://google.com/post/reports/here" }, } // Since the MX lookup is not secure, we list valid responses for each // address domain, to protect against DNS spoofing. "acceptable-mxs": { "yahoo.com": { "accept-mx-domains": ["*.yahoodns.net"] } "gmail.com": { "accept-mx-domains": [”*.gmail.com”, "*.google.com", ”*.googlemail.com”] # hypothetical }
demo time! https://eff.org/starttls
https://eff.org/join https://eff.org/starttls EFF depends on your support!
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