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Chaos engineering - why breaking things should be practised.

Chaos engineering - why breaking things should be practised.

With the rise of micro-services and large-scale distributed architectures, software systems have grow increasingly complex and hard to understand. Adding to that complexity, the velocity of software delivery has also dramatically increased, resulting in failures being harder to predict and contain. While the cloud allows for high availability, redundancy and fault-tolerance, no single component can guarantee 100% uptime. Therefore, we have to understand availability but especially learn how to design architectures with failure in mind. And since failures have become more and more chaotic in nature, we must turn to chaos engineering in order to identify failures before they become outages. In this talk, I will deep dive into availability, reliability and large-scale architectures and make an introduction to chaos engineering, a discipline that promotes breaking things on purpose in order to learn how to build more resilient systems.

Adrian Hornsby

October 05, 2018
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  1. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its Affiliates. All

    rights reserved. Adrian Hornsby, Cloud Architecture Evangelist @ AWS @adhorn Chaos Engineering: Why Breaking Things Should Be Practiced.
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    rights reserved. https://xkcd.com/1428/
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    rights reserved. © 2017, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its Affiliates. All rights reserved. The micro-services architecture
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    rights reserved. Failures are a given and everything will eventually fail over time. Werner Vogels CTO – Amazon.com “ “
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    rights reserved. Jesse Robbins GameDay: Creating Resiliency Through Destruction https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zoz0ZjfrQ9s
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    rights reserved. Netflix 2013 https://medium.com/netflix-techblog
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    rights reserved. © 2017, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its Affiliates. All rights reserved. https://bit.ly/2uKOJMQ
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    rights reserved. What “really” is Chaos Engineering?
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    rights reserved. “Chaos Engineering is the discipline of experimenting on a distributed system in order to build confidence in the system’s capability to withstand turbulent conditions in production.” http://principlesofchaos.org
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    rights reserved. Break your systems on purpose. Find out their weaknesses and fix them before they break when least expected.
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    rights reserved. Building Confidence Through Testing Unit testing of components: • Tested in isolation to ensure function meets expectations. Functional testing of integrations: • Each execution path tested to assure expected results. Is it enough???
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    rights reserved. Failure Injection • Start small & build confidence • Application level • Host failure • Resource attacks (CPU, memory, …) • Network attacks (dependencies, latency, …) • Region attacks!
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    rights reserved. “CHAOS DOESN’T CAUSE PROBLEMS. IT REVEALS THEM.” Nora Jones Senior Chaos Engineer, Netflix
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    rights reserved. Phases of Chaos Engineering
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    rights reserved. Steady State Hypothesis Design & Run Experiment Verify & Learn Fix
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    rights reserved. What is Steady State? • ”normal” behavior of your system https://www.elastic.co/blog/timelion-tutorial-from-zero-to-hero
  17. What is Steady State? • ”normal” behavior of your system

    • Business Metric https://medium.com/netflix-techblog/sps-the-pulse-of-netflix-streaming-ae4db0e05f8a
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    rights reserved. Business Metrics at work Amazon: 100 ms of extra load time caused a 1% drop in sales (Greg Linden). Google: 500 ms of extra load time caused 20% fewer searches (Marissa Mayer). Yahoo!: 400 ms of extra load time caused a 5–9% increase in the number of people who clicked “back” before the page even loaded (Nicole Sullivan).
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    rights reserved. Steady State Important: • Know the value range of Healthy State!
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    rights reserved. What if…? “What if this load balancer breaks?” “What if Redis becomes slow?” “What if a host on Cassandra goes away?” ”What if latency increases by 300ms?” ”What if the database stops?” Make it everyone’s problem!
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    rights reserved. Important! Don’t make an hypothesis that you know will break you!
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    rights reserved. Netflix team members Casey Rosenthal, Lorin Hochstein, Aaron Blohowiak, Nora Jones, and Ali Basiri, suggest the following inputs for Chaos experiments: • Simulating the failure of an entire region or datacenter. • Partially deleting Kafka topics over a variety of instances to recreate an issue that occurred in production. • Injecting latency between services for a select percentage of traffic over a predetermined period of time. • Function-based chaos (runtime injection): Randomly causing functions to throw exceptions. • Code insertion: Adding instructions to the target program and allowing fault injection to occur prior to certain instructions. • Time travel: Forcing system clocks out of sync with each other. • Executing a routine in driver code emulating I/O errors. • Maxing out CPU cores on an Elasticsearch cluster.
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    rights reserved. Design & Run Experiment
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    rights reserved. Designing Experiment • Pick hypothesis • Scope the experiment • Identify metrics • Notify the organization
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    rights reserved. Rules of thumbs • Start with very small • As close as possible to production • Minimize the blast radius. • Have an emergency STOP!
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    rights reserved. New Version Users Canary deployment Old Version 99% Users 1% Users Start with .. Dynamic Routing (Route53)
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    rights reserved. Quantifying the result of the experiment • Time to detect? • Time for notification? And escalation? • Time to public notification? • Time for graceful degradation to kick-in? • Time for self healing to happen? • Time to recovery – partial and full? • Time to all-clear and stable?
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    rights reserved. DON’T blame that one person …
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    rights reserved. PostMortems – COE (Correction of Errors) The 5 WHYs Outage Because of … Because of … Because of … Because of …
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    rights reserved. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. More questions to ask. • Can you clarify if there were any preceding events? • Why would they believe acting in this way was the best course of action to deliver the desired outcome? • Is there another failure mode that could present here? • What decisions or events prior to this made this work before? • Why stop there – are there places to dig deeper that could shine a light more on this? • Did others step in to help, to advise, or to intercede?
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    rights reserved. Big Challenges to Chaos Engineering Mostly Cultural • no time or flexibility to simulate disasters. • teams already spending all of its time fixing things. • can be very political. • might force deep conversations. • deeply invested in a specific technical roadmap (micro- services) that chaos engineering tests show is not as resilient to failures as originally predicted.
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    rights reserved. Before breaking things …
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    rights reserved. People Application Network & Data Infrastructure
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    rights reserved. Patterns for Resilient Architectures Infrastructure
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    rights reserved. Availability Availability Downtime per year 99% (2-nines) 3 days 15 hours 99.99% (4-nines) 52 minutes 99.999% (5-nines) 5 minutes 99.9999% (6-nines) 31 seconds
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    rights reserved. System Availability Availability = Normal Operation Time Total Time MTBF** MTBF** + MTTR* = * Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) **Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF)
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    rights reserved. Availability in Series Component Availability Downtime X 99% (2-nines) 3 days 15 hours Y 99.99% (4-nines) 52 minutes X and Y Combined 98.99% 3 days 16 hours 33 minutes
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    rights reserved. Availability in Parallel Component Availability Downtime X 99% (2-nines) 3 days 15 hours Two X in parallel 99.99% (4-nines) 52 minutes Three X in parallel 99.9999% (6-nines) 31 seconds
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    rights reserved. Availability Zone 1 Availability Zone 2 Availability Zone n Multi-AZ Support Instance Failure Application
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    rights reserved. Auto-Scaling • Compute efficiency • Node failure • Traffic spikes • Performance bugs
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    rights reserved. Infrastructure as Code • Template of the infrastructure in code. • Version controlled infrastructure. • Repeatable template. • Testable infrastructure. • Automate it!
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    rights reserved. © 2018, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Immutable Infrastructure • No updates on live systems • Always start from a new resource being provisioned • Deploy the new software • Test in different environments (dev, staging) • Deploy to prod (inactive) • Change references (DNS or Load Balancer) • Keep old version around (inactive) • Fast rollback if things go wrong
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    rights reserved. Patterns for Resilient Architectures Network & Data
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    rights reserved. CAP Theorem Consistency Availability Partition Tolerance Data is consistent. All nodes see the same state. Every request is non-failing. Service still responds as expected if some nodes crash. Distributed System In the presence of a network partition, you must choose between consistency and availability!
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    rights reserved. Eventual Consistency … if no new updates are made to a given data item, eventually all accesses to that item will return the last updated value. Availability An eventually consistent system can return any value before it converges!! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eventual_consistency Distributed System Every request is non-failing.
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    rights reserved. Process A Process B Process A Process B Synchronous Asynchronous Waiting Working Continues get or fetch result Get result
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    rights reserved. Decoupling with async pattern A Queue B A Queue B Listener Pub-Sub
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    rights reserved. Web Instances Worker Instance Worker Instance Queue API Instance API Instance API Instance API: {DO foo} PUT JOB: {JobID: 0001, Task: DO foo} API: {JobID: 0001} GET JOB: {JobID: 0001, Task: DO foo} Cache Result: { JobID: 0001, Result: bar }
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    rights reserved. Worker Instance Worker Instance Queue API Instance API Instance API Instance Cache Amazon SNS Push Notification User
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    rights reserved. Read / Write Sharding RDS DB Instance Read Replica App Instance App Instance App Instance RDS DB Instance Master (Multi-AZ) RDS DB Instance Read Replica RDS DB Instance Read Replica
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    rights reserved. Database Federation Users DB Products DB App Instance App Instance App Instance
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    rights reserved. Database Sharding User ShardID 002345 A 002346 B 002347 C 002348 B 002349 A C B A App Instance App Instance App Instance
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    rights reserved. Transient state does not belong in the database.
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    rights reserved. Patterns for Resilient Architectures Application
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    rights reserved. Stateless Services AZ1 AZ2 AWS Region Data Store Cache Auto-Scaling Group User
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    rights reserved. Cascading Failures
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    rights reserved. Retries & Exponential Backoff
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    rights reserved. No jitter With jitter https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/architecture/exponential-backoff-and-jitter/
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    rights reserved. Idempotent operation No additional effect if it is called more than once with the same input parameters.
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    rights reserved. Service Degradation & Fallbacks
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    rights reserved. Avoiding Cascading Failures • Timeouts • Retries & Exponential Backoff • Idempotent operations • Exception Handling • Rejection • Intermittent and transient errors • Service degradation & fallbacks
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    rights reserved. Circuit Breaker • Wrap a protected function call in a circuit breaker object, which monitors for failures. • If failures reach a certain threshold, the circuit breaker trips. Producer Circuit Breaker Consumer Connection Monitoring Timeouts Breaking Circuit
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    rights reserved. Non-blocking UI https://medium.com/@sophie_paxtonUX/stop-getting-in-my-way-non-blocking-ux-5cbbfe0f0158
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    rights reserved. Patterns for Resilient Architectures People
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    rights reserved. “It is not failure itself that holds you back; it is the fear of failure that paralyses you.” Brian Tracy
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    rights reserved. Changing Culture takes time! Be patient…
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    rights reserved. More Resources • https://mvdirona.com/jrh/talksAndPapers/JamesRH_Lisa.pdf • https://www.gremlin.com • https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2353017 • https://softwareengineeringdaily.com/ • https://github.com/dastergon/awesome-sre • https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/osdi14/osdi14-paper-yuan.pdf • https://medium.com/@NetflixTechBlog • http://principlesofchaos.org • https://speakerdeck.com/tammybutow/chaos-engineering-bootcamp • https://github.com/adhorn/awesome-chaos-engineering • https://www.infoq.com/presentations/netflix-chaos-microservices • http://royal.pingdom.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/pingdom_uptime_cheat_sheet.pdf • http://willgallego.com/2018/04/02/no-seriously-root-cause-is-a-fallacy
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    rights reserved. Thanks you! @adhorn https://medium.com/@adhorn