Deursen Del6 University of Technology @avandeursen 1 Keynote Presented at MTD 2015, The 7th IEEE InternaJonal Workshop on Managing Technical Debt. October 2, 2015, Bremen, Germany flickr: kfcatles
coined the debt metaphor to explain the refactoring that we were doing.” • Michael Feathers: – “The refactoring effort needed to add a feature non invasively” 2 hVps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hL6g1aTGvo hVp://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WardExplainsDebtMetaphor
Scare You hVps://medium.com/message/why-‐the-‐great-‐glitch-‐of-‐july-‐8th-‐should-‐scare-‐you-‐b791002fff03 • United flights grounded • NYSE down • Wall Street Journal website down 6
First version. – Maven – Acegi Security v1.0 – Spring, Struts, JSP • 2004-‐2011 – Dependencies carved in stone • 2011: Single sign on needed – Use Atlassian Crowd Libraries Issues • Crowd ✖ Acegi • Acegi included in Spring 2 • Crowd needs Spring 3 • Upgrade to Spring 3 needed • Struts JSP 2 ✖ Spring 3 • Upgrade to JSP 3 needed • JSP3 syntax ✖ JSP2 syntax Total upgrade effort: 1 week 19 Steven Raemaekers, Arie van Deursen, Joost Visser. Measuring so6ware library stability through historical version analysis. ICSM 2012: 378-‐387
released jar files; 100,000 with source • As in Maven Central on July 30, 2011 • With resolved usage data 20 Steven Raemaekers, Arie van Deursen, Joost Visser. The maven repository dataset of metrics, changes, and dependencies. MSR 2013: 221-‐224 Julius Davies, Daniel M. German, Michael W. Godfrey, and Abram Hindle. So6ware BerJllonage -‐ determining the provenance of so6ware development arJfacts. EMSE, 2013
1 of Lib1 1. public class Lib1 { 2. public void foo() {...} 3. public int doStuff() {...} 4. } 1. // method2 uses foo & doStuff 1. public class System1 { 2. public void method2() { 3. Lib1 c1 = new Lib1(); 4. c1.foo(); 5. int x = c1.doStuff(); 6. anUnrelatedChange(); 7. }} 1. // Version 2 of Lib1 1. public class Lib1 { 2. public void foo(int bar) {...} 3. public String doStuff() {...} 4. } 1. // method2 uses foo & doStuff 1. public class System1 { 2. public void method2() { 3. Lib1 c1 = new Lib1(); 4. c1.foo(); 5. int x = c1.doStuff(); 6. } 7. }
Removals: Interface, class, method, or field Changes: Nr of parameters, or change in field / parameter / return type 22 “Pre-‐exis@ng client binaries must link and run with new releases of the component without recompiling.” -‐-‐-‐ the CLIRR tool. flickr.com/photos/dullhunk/
... each other – S uses L; – L updated to L’; – Will S compile with L’? • Assess impact by step by step injec@on of breaking changes 25 Let’s do this for 48,000 (L,L’)-‐pairs where L is used in some S. Steven Raemaekers, Arie van Deursen, Joost Visser. InjecJng Breaking API Changes to Assess the Impact of Library Updates. TUD-‐SERG-‐2014-‐020. SubmiHed.
2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000 4,500,000 MR CR FR PTC RTC IR NPC MAI FTC CFR Frequency #Errors # CompilaJon errors a6er injecJng breaking changes The breaking API changes cause actual pain.
Major: incremented when incompaJble API changes are made • Minor: incremented when funcJonality is added in backward compaJble manner • Patch: incremented when backward-‐compaJble bug fixes are made 27 “Based on pre-‐exis@ng widespread common prac@ces” “SemanJc Versioning” semver.org
normal part of soJware development and is oJen required” (semver) DeprecaJon in semanJc versioning: 1. Update documentaJon 2. Introduce deprecaJon in minor release 3. A6er that remove method in major release 31
changes? Hardly: 0.14 for minor releases 0.02 and 0.08 for patch and major releases 35 Number of major / minor / patch versions lagging behind Breaking changes do not explain update lags
< 3.2.11: CVE-‐2013-‐0155/0156 – SQL InjecJon, code execuJon, bypass authenJcaJon, denial of service – Fix involved a regression • 2.0.x affected, not fixed – Must upgrade to 2.3 • 9M Dutch ciJzens • Tax payments • DigiD immediately upgraded – Site was taken off line for 9 hours – Mostly for regression tes@ng purposes 38 Arie van Deursen, “Design for Upgradability and the Rails DigiD Outage”, hVp://avandeursen.com, January 2013
allows easy remote code execu@on / shell access and a security patch that breaks compa@bility. You are doing great Rails team! This is preHy much the death of Rails reputa@on”
began compromising Drupal 7 websites that were not patched or updated to Drupal 7.32 within hours of the announcement of SA-‐CORE-‐2014-‐005 -‐ Drupal core -‐ SQL injec@on. You should proceed under the assump@on that every Drupal 7 website was compromised unless updated or patched before Oct 15th, 11pm UTC, that is 7 hours aJer the announcement. Simply upda@ng to Drupal 7.32 will not remove backdoors.
3. Cross-‐site scripJng 4. Insecure direct object references 5. Security misconfiguraJon 6. SensiJve data exposure 7. Missing funcJon level access control 8. Cross site request forgery 9. Using components with known vulnerabiliJes 10. Unvalidated redirects and forwards 41 hVps://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-‐Top_10
43 20% of 12,000 open source systems 70% of 75 commercial systems Cadariu, Bouwers, van Deursen, Visser. Tracking known security vulnerabiliJes in third-‐party components. SANER, 2015.
libraries come with vulnerabiliJes aJer system-‐go-‐live • Upon disclosure, fast upgrading is required – System is either exposed to security risk; – Or not available. • “Upgrading debt” may come with high interest 45
Or Too Big to Exist? “Employees at the big banks themselves do not believe their top people know what's going on; the big banks have simply become too complex and too big to manage.” “This system is highly dysfunc@onal, deeply entrenched, and enormously abusive, both to its own workers and the society it operates in.” 49 hVp://www.theguardian.com/commenJsfree/joris-‐luyendijk-‐banking-‐blog/2013/jun/19/banking-‐britain-‐beyond-‐control
presented to us by a bank's internal management. But oJen they don't know what's going on, because banks today are so vast and hugely complex. The real threat is not a bank's management hiding things from us: it's the management not knowing themselves what the risks are, either because nobody realizes it or because some people are keeping it from their bosses. 50 hVp://www.theguardian.com/commenJsfree/joris-‐luyendijk-‐banking-‐blog/2013/oct/01/10-‐best-‐quotes-‐financial-‐insiders-‐banking-‐blog
readers would be shocked if they realized just how crap IT has been organized in many banks as well as corpora@ons and government ministries.” “Nobody has a complete and in-‐depth overview any longer.” 51 hVp://www.theguardian.com/commenJsfree/joris-‐luyendijk-‐banking-‐blog/2012/may/30/former-‐it-‐salesman-‐voices-‐of-‐finance
unavailable for days due to 'computer problems'. Have you no@ced these cases always take longer than expected? This is not because repairs take long. Finding out what the problem is in the first place – 'root cause analysis' – that's nearly always the most @me-‐consuming. 52
Belief that: • What maVers most is hidden and obscured • InvesJgaJve research / therapy is needed to idenJfy underlying phenomena • Revealing shocking outcomes will lead to recovery 54
most important tools for trying to comprehend par@ally what cannot be comprehended totally George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors we Live By, 1980 55 hVp://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WardExplainsDebtMetaphor
• Infected code • Design in good shape • Goto considered harmful • The design needs to recover from some intense hacking Religion • I am guilty of bypassing the layering • I confess violaJng the invariant • I have sinned against the SOLID principles • Please forgive me for this singleton 56
• Zero-‐day vulnerability & high technical debt? – Longer fix Jme – Lower availability, or longer exposed to risk • Security risks may be more compelling to management than principals or interest rates 57 What are the security implica@ons of your technical debt research?
favor of wri@ng code to reflect your current understanding of a problem even if that understanding is par@al 58 hVp://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WardExplainsDebtMetaphor
add a feature (resolve an issue) non invasively – Debt depends on features and issues to solve • Systems are used and society progresses – New libraries and versions come available – Actual usage affects our understanding 59 Can we rephrase Technical Debt as a knowledge problem?
Technical debt is a people problem – Managing it requires people management. • Calls for “Debt Confessions”: – How do best projects deal with debt? – How do people live with this huge pile of debt? – Mix qualitaJve research and benchmarks 60 Michaela Greiler, Arie van Deursen, Margaret-‐Anne Storey. Test Confessions: A Study of TesJng PracJces for Plug-‐In Systems. ICSE, 2012
Deursen Del6 University of Technology @avandeursen 61 Keynote Presented at MTD 2015, The 7th IEEE InternaJonal Workshop on Managing Technical Debt. October 2, 2015, Bremen, Germany flickr: kfcatles
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