IBM, Red Hat v. SCO, SCO V. Norvell, SCO v. DaimlerChrysler, SCO v. Auto-‐Zone • Microso4 backing • Mobile Wars • Apple, Google (with Motorola), Samsung, Oracle, Yahoo!, Nokia • Samsung v. Apple and vice versa in various world jurisdic<ons • EU regulators hi[ng Google (via Motorola) with a complaint for aNemp<ng to enforce an injunc<on against Apple products
Founded in 2005 by IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, Sony, and NEC • Joined later by Canonical and Google Member Obliga<ons • Pool License • Defensive Pledge • Viral licensing Member Beneﬁts • License to OIN pool patents
large patent holders already have non-‐aggression agreements with the other large patent holders, limi<ng the u<lity of the pooled patents for counter-‐suits. • The members of the pool are, by deﬁni<on, not the threats the FOSS community fears. • Counter-‐suits only work if you are being sued by a company that develops so4ware; infringement suits are useless against NPE trolls. • The percep<on is that bigger companies only commit their least-‐ eﬀec<ve, least-‐important patents to a patent pool.
by Jason Schultz and Jennifer Urban, law professors and directors of UC Berkeley's Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic. • A DPL par<cipant ac<ng as a Licensor agrees to: • License enAre porlolio • License to all DPL users • Defensive pledge to DPL users only • Provisions: • Irrevocable • Withdrawal • License on Transfer • “Travels with patent”
licensors to open their en<re porlolio, unlike patent pools where members can choose to oﬀer only their weakest patents • The “travels with patent” and “license on transfer” provisions help de-‐weaponize patents and make them less valuable for trolls. • Weaknesses • Lacks the “viral clause” found in “patenle4” licenses like the OIN agreement • Creates a fenced-‐in zone of defensive safety between DPL members while allowing oﬀensive ac<ons outward