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Instrumentation as a Living Documentation: Tea...

Instrumentation as a Living Documentation: Teaching Humans about Complex Systems

Instrumentation of Complex Systems is necessary and addresses the issues of static documentation of said systems. Instrumentation is flawed, flaws which are resolvable with an intentional kind of documentation.

Given at Write the Docs, Portland OR 2014.

Avatar for Brian L. Troutwine

Brian L. Troutwine

May 06, 2014

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  1. W E ’ R E A N A D T

    E C H C O M P A N Y .
  2. R E A L - T I M E B

    I D D I N G
  3. The nature of the problem domain: • Low latency (

    < 100ms per transaction ) • Firm real-time system • Highly concurrent ( > 55 billion transactions per day ) • Global, 24/7 operation
  4. Complex Systems • Non-linear feedback • Tightly coupled to external

    systems • Difficult to model, understand • Usually a solution to some “wicked problem”
  5. - - C . W E S T C H

    U R C H M A N , - G U E S T E D I T O R I A L : W I C K E D P R O B L E M S - M A N A G E M E N T S C I E N C E V O L . 4 , 1 9 6 7 [WICKED PROBLEMS ARE] SOCIAL PROBLEMS WHICH ARE ILL FORMULATED, WHERE THE INFORMATION IS CONFUSING, WHERE THERE ARE MANY CLIENTS AND DECISION-MAKERS WITH CONFLICTING VALUES, AND WHERE THE RAMIFICATIONS IN THE WHOLE SYSTEM ARE THOROUGHLY CONFUSING. […] THE ADJECTIVE ‘WICKED’ IS SUPPOSED TO DESCRIBE THE MISCHIEVOUS AND EVEN EVIL QUALITY OF THESE PROBLEMS, WHERE PROPOSED ‘SOLUTIONS’ OFTEN TURN OUT TO BE WORSE THAN THE SYMPTOMS. ”
  6. HUMANS ARE BAD AT PREDICTING THE PERFORMANCE OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS(…).

    OUR ABILITY TO CREATE LARGE AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS FOOLS US INTO BELIEVING THAT WE’RE ALSO ENTITLED TO UNDERSTAND THEM. C A R L O S B U E N O “ M AT U R E O P T I M I Z AT I O N H A N D B O O K ”
  7. I F Y O U D O N ’ T

    K N O W H O W T H E S Y S T E M S H O U L D B E H A V E Y O U C A N ’ T S AY H O W I T S H O U L D N ’ T O R I S N ’ T .
  8. D AV I D E . H O F F

    M A N “ T H E D E A D H A N D : T H E U N T O L D S T O R Y O F T H E C O L D WA R A R M S R A C E A N D I T ’ S D A N G E R O U S L E G A C Y ” ONE OPERATOR (…) WAS CONFUSED BY THE LOGBOOK. HE CALLED SOMEONE ELSE TO INQUIRE. ! “WHAT SHALL I DO?” HE ASKED. “IN THE PROGRAM THERE ARE INSTRUCTIONS OF WHAT TO DO, AND THEN A LOT OF THINGS CROSSED OUT.” ! THE OTHER PERSON THOUGHT FOR A MINUTE, THEN R E P L I E D , “ F O L L O W T H E C R O S S E D O U T INSTRUCTIONS.”
  9. E R I C S C H L O S

    S E R C O M M A N D A N D C O N T R O L : N U C L E A R W E A P O N S , T H E D A M A S C U S A C C I D E N T, A N D T H E I L L U S I O N O F S A F E T Y CLEARLY THE TEXTBOOKS (…) DIDN’T TELL YOU WHAT REALLY HAPPENED IN THE FIELD. (…) (T)HERE WAS A WAY YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO DO THINGS – AND THE WAY THINGS GOT DONE. RFHCO SUITS WERE HOT AND CUMBERSOME (…) AND IF A MAINTENANCE TASK COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED QUICKLY WITHOUT AN OFFICER NOTICING, SOMETIMES THE SUITS WEREN’T WORN.
  10. H E N R Y S . F. C O

    O P E R , J R . X I I I : T H E A P O L L O F L I G H T T H AT FA I L E D THE FIRST DISASTER IN SPACE HAD OCCURRED, AND NO ONE KNEW WHAT HAD HAPPENED. ON THE GROUND, THE FLIGHT CONTROLLERS W E R E N O T E V E N S U R E T H AT ANYTHING HAD.
  11. THIS “COLLECTIVE ENTITY” WAS ORGANIZED AROUND THE PILOT TO MAKE

    IT “SAFER AND MORE EFFICIENT IF THERE WAS A FOCAL POINT. AND I WAS THE FOCAL POINT. JIM FED THINGS INTO MY EARS. THE MOON FED THINGS INTO MY EYES AND I COULD FEEL THE MACHINE OPERATING.” C O M M A N D E R D AV I D S C O T T A S Q U O T E D I N D AV I D A . M I N D E L L ' S D I G I TA L A P O L L O : H U M A N A N D M A C H I N E I N S PA C E F L I G H T
  12. Case Study: Exchange Throttling • All other metrics (run-queue, CPU,

    network IO) were fine. • Confirmed that no changes had been made to the running systems via deployment. • Amazon data showed no network issues to our machines.
  13. Case Study: Timeout Jumps • Timeouts jump occurred only in

    US East, US West fine. • All other metrics (as above) checked out. • System deployment strongly correlated with timeout jump. • Rollback to previous release reduce timeouts to acceptable levels.
  14. (THE FIREFIGHTERS) TRIED TO BEAT DOWN THE FLAMES (OF CHERNOBYL

    REACTOR 4). THEY KICKED AT THE BURNING GRAPHITE WITH THEIR FEET. … THE DOCTORS KEPT TELLING THEM THEY’D BEEN POISONED BY GAS. - S V E T L A N A A L E X I E V I C H - V O I C E S F R O M C H E R N O B Y L : T H E O R A L H I S T O R Y O F A N U C L E A R D I S A S T E R
  15. SAFETY SYSTEMS, SUCH AS WARNING LIGHTS, ARE NECESSARY, BUT THEY

    HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR DECEPTION. (…) ONE OF THE LESSONS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND (THREE MILE ISLAND) IS THAT ANY PART OF THE SYSTEM MIGHT BE INTERACTING WITH OTHER PARTS IN UNANTICIPATED WAYS. - C H A R L E S P E R R O W - N O R M A L A C C I D E N T S : L I V I N G W I T H H I G H - R I S K T E C H N O L O G I E S
  16. The more contextual layers you add, the more you reduce

    “big boards of blinky lights”. Too Much Information
  17. INSTRUMENTATION IS LIKE A SUIT. IT NEEDS TO FIT YOUR

    OWN MIND. VA L E N T I N O V O L O N G H I
  18. IF YOU DON'T TRUST A COMPUTER BECAUSE SOMETIMES IT DOESN'T

    TELL YOU THE TRUTH, TELLING IT TO TELL YOU TO TRUST IT IS ASKING IT TO LIE TO YOU SOMETIMES. M I K E S A S S A K , C U R B S I D E
  19. I PROPOSE THAT MEN AND WOMEN BE RETURNED TO WORK

    AS CONTROLLERS OF MACHINES, AND THAT THE CONTROL OF PEOPLE BY MACHINES BE CURTAILED. I PROPOSE, FURTHER, THAT THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION ON LIFE PATTERNS BE TAKEN INTO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, AND THAT THE CHANGES BE WITHHELD OR INTRODUCED ON THE BASIS OF THIS CONSIDERATION. K U R T V O N N E G U T P L AY E R P I A N O