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Hello, TLS 1.3 2018.09.12 Brice Bang Buzzvil Hello, TLS 1.3
2018.09.12 Brice Bang Buzzvil -
Disclaimer • This presentation may have incorrect information • Because
• I’m not a • If you have any questions, they will help you Hacker Expert -
August 10, 2018 Have you ever waited for TLS 1.3
to be published here? -
History of TLS • Netscape developed the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) Protocol TLS v1.3 2014.04: first draft 2016.09: available by Cloudflare 2018.03: 28Th draft 2018.08: Finalized (RFC 8446) -
Pass Notes in Class • Sender • Prepare a paper
• Write your name • Write a message • Fold it • Write the receiver’s name • Pass it to a nearby one • Deliverer • See the name on the outside of the note • Find where the receiver is • Pass it to a shortest path or to a closer one • Receiver • See the name on the outside of the note • Open it • Check the name of the sender • Read the message -
Pass Notes in Class • Sender • Prepare a paper
• Write your name • Write a message • Fold it • Write the receiver’s name • Pass it to a nearby one • Deliverer • See the name on the outside of the note • Find where the receiver is • Pass it to a shortest path or to a closer one • Receiver • See the name on the outside of the note • Open it • Check the name of the sender • Read the message • Client • Prepare a buffer • Write your IP address • Write a payload • Create a packet from the buffer • Write the receiver’s IP address • Pass it to a nearby one • Router • See the receiver’s IP address of the packet • Find where the receiver is (routing protocol) • Pass it to a shortest path or to a better one • Receiver • See the receiver’s IP address of the packet • Parse it • Check the IP address of the sender • Read the payload Pass Packets in the Internet -
Pass Notes in Class • Sender • Prepare a paper
• Write your name • Write a message • Fold it • Write the receiver’s name • Pass it to a nearby one • Deliverer • See the name on the outside of the note • Find where the receiver is • Pass it to a shortest path or to a closer one • Receiver • See the name on the outside of the note • Open it • Check the name of the sender • Read the message • Client • Prepare a buffer • Write your IP address • Write a payload • Create a packet from the buffer • Write the receiver’s IP address • Pass it to a nearby one • Router • See the receiver’s IP address of the packet • Find where the receiver is (routing protocol) • Pass it to a shortest path or to a better one • Receiver • See the receiver’s IP address of the packet • Parse it • Check the IP address of the sender • Read the payload Pass Packets in the Internet Is it secure protocol? -
The Protocols Are Not Secure Sender(Client) Receiver(Server) Man-in-the-Middle Attack -
Can’t trust the middle Alice Bob Eve -
Security Threats and Goals • Eve can communicate to Alice
pretending to be Bob • Authentication • Your buddy is Bob, not Eve • Eve can read the messages • Confidentiality (Privacy) • Only Alice and Bob can read, no one else (including Eve) can read it • Eve can modify or forge the messages • Integrity • The messages written by Alice is not altered -
• Security Goal • Authentication • Confidentiality (Privacy) • Integrity
• Cipher Suite • A set of algorithms that help secure a network connection How Has TLS Achieved the Security Goals? -
Cryptographic Primitives • Low-level cryptographic algorithms that are used to
build cryptographic protocols • Symmetric-Key Cryptography: Cipher • Asymmetric-Key Cryptography: Key establishment, Authentication • Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange: Key establishment • Cryptographic Hash Function: Data Integrity • Message Authentication Code (MAC): Data Integrity Cipher Suite -
Symmetric-Key Cryptography • Uses a same keys (session key) on
encryption and decryption • Used for block/stream cipher because it is fast • Types • Block Ciphers: AES, SEED, ARIA • Stream Ciphers: ChaCha20, RC4 • Confidentiality • Authentication • How to share the key? -
Asymmetric-Key Cryptography • Use the different keys on encryption and
decryption • Private key • Public key • Algorithms: RSA, DSA • Authentication • Key exchange f -
Digital Certificates • A digital document certifies the ownership of
a public key • Algorithms • RSA • ECDSA • ANON • Authentication 28 f Alice Bob -
Key Exchange / Agreement / Establishment • The methods to
share same key on insecure channel • Types • RSA based • Diffie-Hellman (DH) based: DH, DHE, ECDH, ECHDE f -
RSA Key Exchange • Alice encrypts the session key with
the Bob’s RSA pubic key and send • Only Bob can decrypt it and get the session key f -
RSA Key Exchange • Alice encrypts the session key with
the Bob’s RSA pubic key and send • Only Bob can decrypt it and get the session key f Is Bob’s private key always safe for its lifetime? -
RSA Key Exchange • Alice encrypts the session key with
the Bob’s RSA pubic key and send • Only Bob can decrypt it and get the session key f Is Bob’s private key always safe for its lifetime? -
The Heartbleed Bug – CVE-2014-0160 • A buffer over-read vulnerability
due to missing bounds check in the implementation of the TLS heartbeat extension in the OpenSSL library • Long-lived private key can be compromised in the future -
RSA Key Exchange • Alice encrypts the session key with
the Bob’s RSA pubic key and send • Only Bob can decrypt it and get the session key f Is Bob’s private key always safe for its lifetime? -
RSA Key Exchange • Alice encrypts the session key with
the Bob’s RSA pubic key and send • Only Bob can decrypt it and get the session key f What If Eve keeps records all communications and obtains the Bob’s private key later? Is Bob’s private key always safe for its lifetime? -
RSA Key Exchange • Alice encrypts the session key with
the Bob’s RSA pubic key and send • Only Bob can decrypt it and get the session key f What If Eve keeps records all communications and obtains the Bob’s private key later? Is Bob’s private key always safe for its lifetime? -
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) 37 • The conversation are kept
secure even if the long-term private key is compromised in the future To provide PFS • Use temporary session key • Do not save session key in permanent storage f -
Diffie-Hellman(-Merkle) Key Exchange (DHM, DH) • An method allows two
parties can have a shared session key over an insecure channel without prior knowledge • Algorithm • based on the discrete logarithm problem • ! = #$ %& = ((%$)%& = ((%&)%$= #& %$ • It’s hard to derive ! with just #& and #$ • Pros • Share a session key through unsafe channel • Perfect forward secrecy 38 f Public -
Data Integrity • Hash Function • Keyed Hash Function •
Message Authentication Code (MAC) • Pseudo-Random Functions (PRF) 39 f -
Hash Function • Any function that maps data of arbitrary
size to data of a fixed size • Cryptographic Hash Function • It has cryptographic properties • Pre-image resistance • Second pre-image resistance • Collision resistance • MD5, SHA-N, BLAKE2 • Integrity • Anyone can forge any messages • ex) python2 -c "print(hash('1’))” • Always same 40 f -
Message Authentication Code (MAC) • A secret keyed hash function
used to protect both a data integrity and its authenticity • Resistant to forgery attack • HMAC, CMAC, Poly1305, SipHash • Integrity and Authentication • ex) python3 -c "print(hash('1’))” • Different per process 41 f -
TLS 1.2 Handshake Overview 1. Check the certificate of the
peer 2. Choose a cipher suite that both support 3. Setup and share the parameters and the key of the cipher suite 4. Encrypt / decrypt suing that cipher suite -
Major Difference from TLS 1.2 • 1-RTT handshake • initial
support for 0-RTT • TLS 1.2 version negotiation mechanisms are deprecated • Split a cipher suite into cipher, key exchange and signature algorithm • All key exchange algorithms provide forward secrecy • EdDSA is added into the signature algorithms • Remove insecure ciphers (CBC-mode, RC4, SHA1, MD5, …) • Only AEAD is allowed for symmetric cryptography • The entire handshake is signed • All handshake messages after ServerHello are encrypted • Elliptic curve algorithms are in the base spec Security Speed -
Handshakes Comparison • TLS 1.3 reduces 1 RTT TLS 1.2
Full Handshake TLS 1.3 Full Handshake -
TLS Resumption • Remember the last connection, and cut short
the handshake TLS 1.2 – 1-RTT TLS 1.3 – 0-RTT -
Simplify Negotiation • TLS 1.3 removes many legacy features, and
split between three orthogonal negotiations -
Key Exchange Algorithms of TLS 1.3 TLS1.3: All algorithms provide
forward secrecy TLS 1.2 -
Signature Algorithms TLS 1.2 • RSA • DSA • ECDSA
TLS 1.3 • RSA • ECDSA • EdDSA -
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) • A form of
encryption which simultaneously provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity on the data • The Attempts using cryptography and MAC before AE • Encrypt-and-MAC (E&M) • Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) • MAC-then-Encrypt (MtE) • à Error prone and difficult • AD: The data that needs integrity, not confidentiality • ex) header -
ChaCha20-Poly1305 • AES • AES-CBC • Widely used • Attack
on CBC mode is emerged • AES-GCM • No known breaks • Slow • Small size nonce (8 bytes) • ChaCha20-Poly1305 • Faster than AES • No known breaks • Chosen by • Google • Cloudflare • TLS 1.3 -
• The server’s signature only covers part of the handshake
• A Symmetric MAC is used to ensure the integrity • It makes vulnerabilities (FREAK, LogJam, etc.) Signing the Entire Transcript -
• The server’s signature only covers part of the handshake
• A Symmetric MAC is used to ensure the integrity • It makes vulnerabilities (FREAK, LogJam, etc.) Signing the Entire Transcript -
• The server’s signature only covers part of the handshake
• A Symmetric MAC is used to ensure the integrity • It makes vulnerabilities (FREAK, LogJam, etc.) Signing the Entire Transcript -
• The server’s signature only covers part of the handshake
• A Symmetric MAC is used to ensure the integrity • It makes vulnerabilities (FREAK, LogJam, etc.) Signing the Entire Transcript -
Encryption after ServerHello • TLS 1.3 reduces 1 RTT TLS
1.2 Full Handshake TLS 1.3 Full Handshake -
Elliptic Curve Cryptography • Using special computations on elliptic curve
(!" = $% + '$ + () What is the pros? • Short encryption key • 256 bits are enough to offer 128-bits of security (compare to RSA-3072) • Faster • With 256-bit key is over 20 times faster than RSA-2048 RSA key size (bits) ECC key size (bits) 1024 160 2048 224 3072 256 7680 384 15360 521 -
Famous Elliptic Curves • NIST-p256 • NIST-p384 • NIST-p521 •
Curve25519 • OpenSSL default • … -
Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDH) • An method allows two
parties can have a shared secret key over an insecure channel without prior knowledge • Traditional DIffie-Hellman (DH) • ! = #$ %& = ((%$)%& = ((%&)%$= #& %$ • Elliptic-Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) • ! = %& #$ = %& (%$ *) = %$ (%& *) = %$ #& • Pros • Share a session key through unsafe channel • Perfect forward secrecy -
Why did the TLS finalization take a long time? Because
of the backward compatibility -
The Version Negotiation of older TLS • Backward Compatibility of
TLS 1.0 • SSLv3 = 3.0 = 0x0300 • TLS 1.0 = 3.1 = 0x0301 • TLS 1.1 = 3.2 = 0x0302 • TLS 1.2 = 3.3 = 0x0303 • TLS 1.3 = 3.4 = 0x0304 Client (TLS 1.3) 0x0304 Server (TLS 1.2) 0x0303 0x0303 -
The Version Negotiation of older TLS • Backward Compatibility of
TLS 1.0 • SSLv3 = 3.0 = 0x0300 • TLS 1.0 = 3.1 = 0x0301 • TLS 1.1 = 3.2 = 0x0302 • TLS 1.2 = 3.3 = 0x0303 • TLS 1.3 = 3.4 = 0x0304 Client (TLS 1.3) 0x0304 Server (TLS 1.2) 0x0303 0x0303 Disconnect -
Solutions • Make the ClientHello packet of v1.3 look like
that of v1.2 • Share the supported version list in extension ClientHello legacy_version = 0x0303; /* TLS 1.2 */ SupportedVersions List<ProtocolVersion> versions = { 0x0304, 0x0303, 0x0302 }; /* TLS 1.3, 1,2, 1.1, prefer order */ … ClientHello client_version = 0x0303; /* TLS 1.2 */ … TLS 1.2 TLS 1.3 Extensions -
DJB • Danial J. Bernstein • Bernstein v. United States
• Sued for the restriction on the export of cryptography from the United States • SipHash • Curve25519 • ed25519 • ChaCha20 • Poly1305 The reason that the Korean Internet became a ActiveX hell -
Candidate for Presentation Items (My interests) • CPU Optimization, Meltdown
and Spectre • WiFi Network is Insecure, Waiting for WPA3 • VPN • Elliptic Curve Cryptography • …. -
Discrete Logarithm Problem • !" = $ %&' ( •
A, B, x are integers, p is a public prime • A is a public information, B is a public key • It is easy to calculate B from x • It is hard to calculate x from B -
Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) • A keyed hash function whose output
looks like random values • MAC + The output should look like random: Stronger than MAC • HMAC, CMAC, Poly1305, SipHash • Integrity, Authentication • != Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG) • PRG: only if the input was chosen at random • PRF: regardless of how the inputs were chosen 87 f -
The Version Negotiation of older TLS • Backward Compatibility of
TLS 1.0 • SSLv3 = 3.0 = (3, 0) • TLS 1.0 = 3.1 = (3, 1) • TLS 1.1 = 3.2 = (3, 2) • TLS 1.2 = 3.3 = (3, 3) • Browser’s options • Enable 1.2 àMany sites will stop • Delay the deployment of 1.2 until these servers are fixed • Retry with an older version of TLS if connection fails Client (TLS 1.2) (3, 3) Server (TLS 1.0) (3, 1) (3, 1) Disconnect -
Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption (POODLE) Fixes • Disable
SSLv3 on both side • Enable a new TLS feature SCSV • Client mark its supported versions when downgraded • Server can detect the attack -
Discrete Logarithm on Elliptic Curve • ! = #$ %&'
( • P, G is a point with integer coordinate, n is an integer, p is a public prime • G is a public information, P is a public key • It is easy to calculate P from n • It is hard to calculate n from P • Provides same security level with smaller keys -
Discrete Logarithm on Elliptic Curve • ! = #$ %&'
( • P, G is a point with integer coordinate, n is an integer, p is a public prime • G is a public information, P is a public key • It is easy to calculate P from n • It is hard to calculate n from P • Provides same security level with smaller keys -
Discrete Logarithm on Elliptic Curve • ! = #$ %&'
( • P, G is a point with integer coordinate, n is an integer, p is a public prime • G is a public information, P is a public key • It is easy to calculate P from n • It is hard to calculate n from P • Provides same security level with smaller keys -
Security Level (Bits of security) • n-bit security: 2" operations
are needed to break it • Sufficient Length • 128 bits of security is sufficient until next revolutionary breakthrough in either mathematics or technology • 112 bits of security is sufficient until 2030 • Symmetric cryptography • Normally equal to the key size • AES-128 (key size 128 bits) offers a 128-bit security level • Asymmetric cryptography • The entropy is decrease because it have to provide asymmetric function • RSA-3072 offers a 128-bit security level -
TLS Resumption • Remember the last connection, and cut short
the handshake Browser can send only GET requests in 0-RTT