How to Secure Your Secret

Transcript

1. How to Secure Your Secret 2019.05.08 Brice Bang Buzzvil
2. How to Secure Your Secret 2019.05.08 Brice Bang Buzzvil
3. How to Secure Your Secret 2019.05.08 Brice Bang Buzzvil No one knows but you Security Goal
4. How to Secure Your Secret 2019.05.08 Brice Bang Buzzvil No one knows but you Security Goal Password
6. Authentication
7. Contents • A Password-ful World • Beyond Password • A Password-less World
8. A Password-ful World
9. A chain is as strong as its weakest link
10. Security Chain
11. How to create/manage password securely
12. https://haveibeenpwned.com/ (HIBP)
13. The input sequence of 我的密嗎(my password) in Chinese Zhuyin Keyboard https://haveibeenpwned.com/ (HIBP)
14. https://haveibeenpwned.com/ (HIBP)
15. ‘비밀번호’ in 2-Set 🡨 QWERTY https://haveibeenpwned.com/ (HIBP)
16. Strong Password Guidelines • Increase Entropy (the number of all cases) • as long as possible • as random as possible • Do not reuse password • Check if the password is compromised (HIBP) • Its API is implemented with K-Anonymity • Different password for different sites
17. Length vs Complexity for Passwords • Password length increases the complexity exponentially
18. Length vs Complexity for Passwords
19. Length vs Complexity for Passwords pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis [명] (병리) =pneumoconiosis. 가장 긴 단어로서 종종 인용된다. [N] (pathology) It is often quoted as the longest word.
20. Length vs Complexity for Passwords pneumonoultramicroscopicsilicovolcanoconiosis [명] (병리) =pneumoconiosis. 가장 긴 단어로서 종종 인용된다. [N] (pathology) It is often quoted as the longest word. Isn’t it good for password?
21. Length vs Complexity for Passwords Do not make the password too long if you type frequently
22. Password Frequency Follows Zipf Distribution
23. According to the UK Cyber Survey of NCSC Most used in total Names Premier League football teams Musicians Fictional characters 123456 (23.2m) ashley (432,276) liverpool (280,723) blink182 (285,706) superman (333,139) 123456789 (7.7m) michael (425,291) chelsea (216,677) 50cent (191,153) naruto (242,749) qwerty (3.8m) daniel (368,227) arsenal (179,095) eminem (167,983) tigger (237,290) password (3.6m) jessica (324,125) manutd (59,440) metallica (140,841) pokemon (226,947) 1111111 (3.1m) charlie (308,939) everton (46,619) slipknot (140,833) batman (203,116)
24. histories = { 00000: {0: 2, 1: 3}, 00001: {0: 3, 1: 1}, 00010: {0: 9, 1: 0}, 00011: {0: 5, 1: 4}, …. }
25. histories = { 00000: {0: 2, 1: 3}, 00001: {0: 3, 1: 1}, 00010: {0: 9, 1: 0}, 00011: {0: 5, 1: 4}, …. } randomize! 🡨 🡨
26. Use Password Generator to Create Random Passwords It also • Dramatically decreases the probability of using the compromised password • Prevents password reuse
27. Strong Password Guidelines • Increase Entropy (the number of all cases) • as long as possible • as random as possible • Do not reuse password • Check if the password is compromised (HIBP) • Its API is implemented with K-Anonymity • Different password for different sites ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
28. Strong Password Guidelines • Increase Entropy (the number of all cases) • as long as possible • as random as possible • Do not reuse password • Check if the password is compromised (HIBP) • Its API is implemented with K-Anonymity • Different password for different sites ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
29. How to Manage Lots of Password • Limited human memory • Too many passwords to remember if we use different passwords for different sites • Do you remember the password Chrome suggested? • Write somewhere • In TXT file • Take pictures • In cloud storage with encryption (Evernote, Dropbox, Google Drive, …) • …
30. Use A Password Manager
31. A Password Manager • Assists in • generating and retrieving complex passwords (password generator) • storing passwords in encrypted database • auto-typing the password in the login form: Autofill • Pros • Only need to remember one master password • Easy to create, store and type the password • Prevent phishing • Cons • Some flaws may be exist • Save my password on cloud Autofill
32. How to create/manage password securely
33. How to create/manage password securely A. Use a password manager (generator)
35. Thanks to Your Professional Care I assumes that your devices are secure
36. How to transfer password securely
37. Outsider (Korean Rapper) Company ID: Buzzvil ID: brice.bang PW: strongpassword
38. Outsider (Korean Rapper) Company ID: Buzzvil ID: brice.bang PW: strongpassword
39. Outsider (Korean Rapper) Company ID: Buzzvil ID: brice.bang PW: strongpassword ID: employee number PW: (same as main page) strongpassword
40. Outsider (Korean Rapper) Company ID: Buzzvil ID: brice.bang PW: strongpassword ID: employee number PW: (same as main page) strongpassword
41. Outsider (Korean Rapper) Company ID: Buzzvil ID: brice.bang PW: strongpassword ID: employee number PW: (same as main page) strongpassword
42. Outsider (Korean Rapper) Company ID: Buzzvil ID: brice.bang PW: strongpassword ID: employee number PW: (same as main page) strongpassword
43. Outsider (Korean Rapper)
44. Outsider (Korean Rapper)
45. Outsider (Korean Rapper)
46. Outsider (Korean Rapper) How to protect the password in transit?
48. Hello, TLS 1.3 – Buzzvil Blog • https://www.buzzvil.com/ko/2019/02/11/atech-blog-hello-tls-1-3/
49. Hello, TLS 1.3 – Buzzvil Blog • https://www.buzzvil.com/ko/2019/02/11/atech-blog-hello-tls-1-3/
50. How to transfer password securely
51. How to transfer password securely A. Use TLS1.2+
52. How to save password securely
53. The Updated Version of This Naver Blog https://d2.naver.com/helloworld/3187 32
54. Save as Plain Text I don’t know
55. Save as Plain Text The hacker uploaded the database dump on PasteBin Winwinsoft denied our proposal to negotiate with us. But, we are generous and our window to negotiations is still open. We will disclose every information we have in a few days if the negotiation is denied. Until then, stay tuned :) P.S. Here are some informations that we have.
56. Save as Plain Text The hacker uploaded the database dump on PasteBin Winwinsoft denied our proposal to negotiate with us. But, we are generous and our window to negotiations is still open. We will disclose every information we have in a few days if the negotiation is denied. Until then, stay tuned :) P.S. Here are some informations that we have.
57. Save as Plain Text The hacker uploaded the database dump on PasteBin Winwinsoft denied our proposal to negotiate with us. But, we are generous and our window to negotiations is still open. We will disclose every information we have in a few days if the negotiation is denied. Until then, stay tuned :) P.S. Here are some informations that we have. It is dangerous because people generally use the same password on multiple services
58. NEVER PLAINTEXT • We need a cryptographic primitive
59. Requirements • Based on user’s password • Available for authentication • Don’t save as plain text • … Symmetric key cryptography Asymmetric key cryptography Cryptographic hash function One-time password Cryptographic random Public key infrastructure Diffie-Hellman key exchange
60. Cryptographic Hash Function • Hash Function with cryptographic properties • Hash Function • Any function that maps data of arbitrary size to data of a fixed size • Cryptographic Properties • Pre-image resistance • given h1, find m1 that h(m1) = h1 • Second pre-image resistance • given m1, find m2 that h(m1)=h1=h(m2) • Collision resistance • find any m1, m2 that h(m1)=h(m2) • if P = Pi, h(P) = Pi • ex) MD5, SHA-N
61. Cryptographic Hash Function • mystrongpassword • 40B4FCF08C5AA55DE46384513B21F0888AAFEEFCD73EB7CBA1BCC 5A84E97117A • mystrongpassword2 • 24038067DB337E1726EDBCBA90ED56EEF17A573A666A73D2E9D1C A628055BBA0
62. Cons of Cryptographic Hash Function • Surprisingly, cryptographic hash functions are not designed for hashing password • Why? • Recognizability • Too Fast
63. Cons of One-Way Hash Function - Recognizability • Same passwords have same hashes • Rainbow Table id password_hash john 5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6cf8331b7ee68fd8 young 5baa61e4c9b93f3f0682250b6cf8331b7ee68fd8
64. Salt • A random string added to password before hashing • Saved alongside the hashed output in the database id salt to_be_hashed password_hash john k5kgHa2Rta k5kgHa2Rtapassword e020a56cc237fa2a6640aef6bf5b262256c603bc young sJXIhDiK3q sJXIhDiK3qpassword 9ffbf61794b11ebe929a18b722b0cec38bdefd51
65. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
66. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed len(PRINTABLE_ASCII)
67. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed len(PRINTABLE_ASCII) 🡨 DELETE Control
68. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed len(PRINTABLE_ASCII) 🡨 DELETE Control
69. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
70. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
71. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
72. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
73. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
74. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed
75. Cons of One-Way Hash Function – Speed Original password can be found on average of • 9.2 hours on a single core • 1.15 hours on a 8 cores
76. Key Stretching • Techniques used to make a key more secure by increasing the resources (time and space) it takes to test each possible key
77. Key Derivation Function (KDF) • It derives one or more secret keys from a secret value using pseudorandom function • Has the characteristics for a password hash function • DK = KDF(key, salt, iterations) • ex) • PBKDF2: NIST standard, government-friendly • bcrypt • scrypt • argon2: Password Hashing Competition Winner Master Key KDF Secret Key
78. How About Buzzvil
79. How About Buzzvil
80. How to save password securely
81. How to save password securely A. Use argon2 or PBKDF2
83. Our Solutions 1. How to create password securely • Password generator 2. How to manage password securely • Password manager 3. How to transfer password securely • TLS 1.2+ 4. How to save password securely • argon2, PBKDF2
84. Our Solutions 1. How to create password securely • Password generator 2. How to manage password securely • Password manager 3. How to transfer password securely • TLS 1.2+ 4. How to save password securely • argon2, PBKDF2 Do you feel safe?
85. REALIT Y
86. Vulnerability of Password Managers Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management
87. Vulnerability of Your Machine In memory
88. Vulnerability of Your Network - Phishing TLS and HTTPS don’t mean that you’re connecting a safe
89. Vulnerability of Your Browser - Phishing What we see is not always true
90. Vulnerability of Your Browser - Phishing What we see is not always true Fake Address Bar Real Address Bar
91. Vulnerability of Your Service
93. There is no one to believe
94. Contents • A Password-ful World • Beyond Password • A Password-less World
95. Contents • A Password-ful World • Beyond Password • A Password-less World
96. Beyond Password
97. Multi-Factor Authentication
98. Multi-Factor Authentication – Examples
99. OTP won’t save you from Phishing
100. The Avengers
102. FIDO Alliance • FIDO: Fast IDentify Online • Problems • Create a standard for interoperability among strong authentication devices • Solve the problems users face creating and remembering multiple accounts • Core values • Easy of use • privacy and security • standardizations
103. What is the problem of password and OTP? First Factor Second Factor
104. Symmetric Encryption
105. Symmetric Encryption Ev e
106. IDEA1: Use Asymmetric Encryption PRVAT E KEY PUBLI C KEY
107. IDEA2: Offline User Verification On offline As Is To Be
108. FIDO’s Solutions • FIDO U2F: The Replacement for The Second Factor • FIDO UAF: The Replacement for The First Factor
109. FIDO U2F: The Replacement for The Second Factor
110. U2F: A Phishing-proof Secret Key for General Human Beings Yubico YubiKey
111. FIDO Universal Second Factor (U2F) • An open authentication standard that strengthens and simplifies 2FA hosted by the FIDO Alliance • What if I lost? Yubico YubiKey
112. FIDO Universal Second Factor (U2F) • An open authentication standard that strengthens and simplifies 2FA hosted by the FIDO Alliance • What if I lost? • The acquired can use it as his own U2F without knowing my account credentials Yubico YubiKey
115. Google Titan Key
116. Android 7.0+ Device as U2F Security Key
117. FIDO U2F: The Best Solution for The Second Factor
118. Contents • A Password-ful World • Beyond Password • A Password-less World
119. Contents • A Password-ful World • Beyond Password • A Password-less World
120. FIDO UAF: The Replacement for The First Factor
121. Recall Our Solutions 1. How to create password securely • Password generator 2. How to manage password securely • Password manager 3. How to transfer password securely • TLS 1.2+ 4. How to save password securely • argon2, PBKDF2 5. Beyond Password • Multi-factor authentication (U2F)
122. Recall Our Solutions 1. How to create password securely • Password generator 2. How to manage password securely • Password manager 3. How to transfer password securely • TLS 1.2+ 4. How to save password securely • argon2, PBKDF2 5. Beyond Password • Multi-factor authentication (U2F) What is the REAL problem?
123. Security
124. Security: No one knows but you
125. Security: No one knows but you and server
126. Security: No one knows but you and server and your computer
127. Security: No one knows but you and server and your computer and your password manager
128. Security: No one knows but you and server and your computer and your password manager and JD
129. Security: No one knows but you and server and your computer and your password manager and JD
130. Yeah, get rid of it!
131. IDEA: Use Asymmetric Encryption for Password PRVAT E KEY PUBLI C KEY
132. Authentication with Password Client Server id: user, pw: P@ssw0rd check hash = H(P@ssw0rd + salt) POST Request (id, pw) Search the ‘user’ entry Get salt and hash Response succeeded or failed
133. Authentication without Password Client Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c
134. Authentication without Password Authenticator (UAF) Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client
135. Authentication without Password Authenticator (UAF) Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client Password-Less World
136. FIDO2: The Password-less World
137. Password-less World • Hackers cannot get the passwords or private keys • Because it is not in the world • Servers save and manage the public key with a little less effort • Because it is meaningless for others • Client vulnerabilities are meaningless • Because there is no protocol that retrieves the private key from the authenticator • Easy to human beings • Don’t need to create, remember and type the complicated passwords
138. Authenticator • There are two things you must keep safe • The authenticator • The verification code (PIN, biometrics) • The private keys never leave it • Physically separated from other devices • Authenticator doesn’t save your verification code • No one knows but you • Separates user verification from authentication Feitian (飞天) BioPass FIDO2
139. Authentication without Password Authenticator Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client
140. Authentication without Password Authenticator Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client FIDO UAF (Universal Authentication Framework)
141. Authentication without Password Authenticator Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client FIDO UAF (Universal Authentication Framework) CTAP (Client to Authenticator Protocol)
142. Authentication without Password Authenticator Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client FIDO UAF (Universal Authentication Framework) CTAP (Client to Authenticator Protocol) W3C’s WebAuthn (Web Authentication)
143. Authentication without Password Authenticator Server return create_challenge(id) POST Request (id) return validate(attestation, (challenge, domain), public_key) User verification attestation = sign((challenge, domain), private_key) Send response with the attestation Get public key from database Domain Id Private Key Public Key site.com user 0x570930d6 0x6b6bac8c Id Public Key user 0x6b6bac8c Client FIDO UAF (Universal Authentication Framework) CTAP (Client to Authenticator Protocol) W3C’s WebAuthn (Web Authentication) FIDO2
144. FIDO1 • FIDO U2F (CTAP1) • Universal Second Factor • Add strong second factor • Press button • FIDO UAF • Universal Authentication Framework • Replace the password • Register the device to the online services • thumbprint, camera, mic, PIN, …
145. FIDO2
146. FIDO2
147. WebAuthn Status
148. Status of Web Browsers Adoption of FIDO2
149. Status of Windows Adoption of FIDO2
150. Status of Android Adoption of FIDO2
151. Status of Android Adoption of FIDO2
152. Status of iOS Adoption of FIDO2
153. Status of iOS Adoption of FIDO2
154. Status of FIDO2 Authenticator • YubiKey 5 of Yubico • The popular secret key • https://www.yubico.com/ • concerns • Moved to closed source • Solo • The first open source FIDO2 security key • https://shop.solokeys.com/
155. Security: No one knows but you
156. Security: No one knows but you your authenticator
157. HOLD ON! How about username-less!
158. Username-Less Login
159. Welcome to the world of tomorrow
160. Recommended Resources • https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/ • https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn/ • https://medium.com/@herrjemand/introduction-to-webauthn-api-5fd 1fb46c285 • https://slides.com/fidoalliance/jan-2018-fido-seminar-webauthn-tuto rial • PasswordsCon 2018: WebAuthn and security keys (video, slide) • Google I/O ‘18: What's new with sign up and sign in on the web • BSidesSF 2019 - Navigating Passwordless Authentication with FIDO2 & WebAuthn • Google and Microsoft Debut: Replacing Passwords with FIDO2 Authentication • https://www.reddit.com/r/passwords
161. Thank you • TLDL • Use FIDO2 for a first factor (Former UAF) • Use FIDO2 for a second factor (Former U2F)
162. Have I Been Pwned (HIBP) API with K-Anonymity Client Server Get a string to be checked: P@ssw0rd SHA1(P@ssw0rd)=21BD12DC183F740EE76F27B78EB39C8AD972A 757 GET Request first 5 characters (https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/21BD1) Search the hashes start from query param 1.(21BD1) 0018A45C4D1DEF81644B54AB7F969B88D65:1 (password "lauragpe") 2.(21BD1) 00D4F6E8FA6EECAD2A3AA415EEC418D38EC:2 (password "alexguo029") 3.(21BD1) 011053FD0102E94D6AE2F8B83D76FAF94F6:1 (password "BDnd9102") 4.(21BD1) 012A7CA357541F0AC487871FEEC1891C49C:2 (password "melobie") 5.(21BD1) 0136E006E24E7D152139815FB0FC6A50B15:2 (password "quvekyny") Return the list with its count Find the correct hash
163. Salt and Pepper • Salt • A random string added to password before hashing • Saved alongside the hashed output in the database • Pepper • A secret added to password prevent • Stored separately
164. Yubic o