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Squeezing a key through a carry bit @ 34c3

Squeezing a key through a carry bit @ 34c3

Filippo Valsorda

December 27, 2017
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  1. Squeezing a key
    through a carry bit
    Sean Devlin, Filippo Valsorda

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  2. View Slide

  3. View Slide

  4. One month later

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  5. The code
    a = a - b
    mod p
    a = a - b
    x = a
    a = a + p

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  6. The code
    a = a - b
    mod p
    a = a - b
    x = a
    a = a + p
    a = a - b
    t = a
    t += p
    a ?= t

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  7. The code
    a = a - b
    mod p
    a = a - b
    x = a
    a = a + p
    a < b
    a = a - b
    t = a
    t += p
    a ?= t

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  8. a = a - b
    x = a
    a = a + p
    The bug
    a = a - b
    t = a
    t += p
    a ?= t

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  9. The bug

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  10. The bug
    Wrong result with
    probability 2-32

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  11. A carry propagation bug

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  12. ECCCCCCC
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Crash Course for CCC
    • Field: numbers modulo p
    • Points: like (3, 7); fitting an equation
    • Group: a generator point and addition
    • Multiplication: repeated addition

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  13. ECCCCCCCC
    Elliptic Curve Cryptography Crash Course for CCC (cont.)
    • Multiplication: 5Q = Q + Q + Q + Q + Q
    • ECDH private key: a big integer d
    • ECDH public key: Q = dG (think y = ga)
    • ECDH shared secret: Q2 = dQ1

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  14. Double and add
    Q2 = dQ1
    d is BIG. Like, 256 bit.
    Can't add Q to itself 2256 times.

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  15. Double and add
    Q2 = dQ1
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    +Q1
    Z +Q

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  16. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    x2
    Z +Q x2
    Q2 = dQ1

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  17. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    x2
    Z +Q x2 x2
    Q2 = dQ1

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  18. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    +Q1
    Z +Q x2 x2 +Q
    Q2 = dQ1

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  19. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    Z +Q x2 x2 +Q x2
    x2
    Q2 = dQ1

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  20. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    Z +Q x2 x2 +Q x2 +Q
    +Q1
    Q2 = dQ1

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  21. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    Z +Q x2 x2 +Q x2 +Q x2
    x2
    Q2 = dQ1

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  22. Double and add
    1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    Z +Q x2 x2 +Q x2 +Q x2 x2 ...
    x2
    Q2 = dQ1

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  23. Back to the carry bug

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  24. secret = ScalarMult(point, scalar) ← Q2 = dQ
    └─ p256PointAddAffineAsm
    └─ p256SubInternal
    attacker supplied secret key
    session key

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  25. Q1
    → ScalarMult(Q1, )
    Q2
    → ScalarMult(Q2, )
    1 1 1 0 1
    Z +Q1 x2 x2 +Q1 x2 +Q1 x2 +Q1

    0 1 1 0 1
    Z +Q2 x2 x2 +Q2 x2 +Q2 x2 x2

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  26. Q1
    → ScalarMult(Q1, ) →
    Q2
    → ScalarMult(Q2, ) → ✅
    ? 1 1 0 1
    ? 1 1 0 1
    1 1 1 0 1

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  27. Q1

    Q2

    0 1 1 0 1
    1 1 1 0 1
    Q1

    Q2

    0 0 1 1 0 1
    1 0 1 1 0 1
    Q1

    Q2

    0 1 0 1 1 0 1
    1 1 0 1 1 0 1


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  28. View Slide

  29. Go implementation of ScalarMult
    Booth's multiplication in 5-bit windows.
    Precomputed table of 1Q to 16Q. Add, double 5 times.
    01 00010 01110 01010 01010 10010 00001 01111 10011 01101 ...

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  30. Precomp
    table

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  31. Multiplication
    loop

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  32. Go implementation of ScalarMult
    Booth's multiplication in 5-bit windows.
    Precomputed table of 1Q to 16Q. Add, double 5 times.
    Limbs representation: less overlap and aliasing problems.
    01 00010 01110 01010 01010 10010 00001 01111 10011 01101 ...
    {1 0} {15 1} {7 0} {5 0} {5 0} {9 0} {1 0} {8 1} {6 1} {9 1} ...

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  33. Go implementation of ScalarMult
    Booth's multiplication in 5-bit windows.
    Precomputed table of 1Q to 16Q. Add, double 5 times.
    Attack one limb at a time, instead of one bit.
    34 limb values → 17 points / 5 key bits on average.
    01 00010 01110 01010 01010 10010 00001 01111 10011 01101 ...

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  34. Multiplication
    loop


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  35. Assembly
    hook

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  36. View Slide

  37. View Slide

  38. View Slide

  39. The first limb
    3 3 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x25
    Precomp Doubling
    Limb

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  40. The first limb
    3 3 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x25
    3 x2 6 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x26
    3 x2 x2 12 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x27
    Precomp Doubling
    Limb



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  41. The first limb
    3 3 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x25
    3 x2 6 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x26
    3 x2 x2 12 x2 x2 x2 x2 x2 → 3 x27
    Precomp Doubling
    Limb





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  42. The
    last bits

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  43. Kangaroo jumps depend from the terrain at the start point.
    Let a tracked kangaroo loose. Place a trap at the end.

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  44. Kangaroo jumps depend from the terrain at the start point.
    If the wild kangaroo intersects the path at any point,

    it ends up in the trap.

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  45. Back to elliptic curves.
    A jump is QN+1 = QN + H(QN) where H is a hash.
    Same starting point, same jump.
    You run from a known starting point, then from dG.

    If you collide, you traceback to d!


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  46. A target
    • JSON Object Signing and Encryption, JOSE (JWT)
    • ECDH-ES public key algorithm
    • go-jose and Go 1.8.1
    • Check if the service successfully decrypts payload

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  47. Spot instance infrastructure

    Sage
    dispatcher /work
    /result

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  48. Figures!
    • Each key: ~52 limbs, modulo the kangaroo
    • Each limb: ~16 points on average
    • Each point: ~226 candidate points
    • (226 * 16) candidate points: ~85 CPU hours
    • 85 CPU hours: $1.26 EC2 spot instances
    • Total: 4,400 CPU hours / $65 on EC2

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  49. Demo

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  50. Demo

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  51. Demo

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  52. Filippo Valsorda
    @FiloSottile
    Sean Devlin
    @spdevlin
    Thank you!
    No bug is small enough.

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