is simply not appropriate ience imaging — e.g., multispacecraft distributed interferometers ying in formation to enable imaging at microarcsecond resolution Sandia National Labs MBARI AOSN NASA Terrestrial Planet Finder J. Cort´ es MAE247 – Spring 2013 robotic networks decision making social networks science imaging — e.g., multispacecraft distributed interferom flying in formation to enable imaging at microarcsecond reso Sandia National Labs MBARI AOSN NASA Terrestrial Planet Find J. Cort´ es MAE247 – Spring 2013 sensor networks self-organization Transportation networks: users that own part of local decisions about the flow circulating over a porti Social networks: social agents and/or groups make on local consensus or trends Man-machine networks: humans make use of rem machines while interacting over networks Pervasive computing Ground traffic networks The Internet “S pervasive computing Transportation networks: users that own part of th local decisions about the flow circulating over a portion Social networks: social agents and/or groups make d on local consensus or trends Man-machine networks: humans make use of remot machines while interacting over networks Pervasive computing Ground traffic networks The Internet “Sma traffic networks smart power grids 3 / 22
Goddard Space Flight Center Electric energy is critical for our technological civilization Energy supply via power grid Complexities: multiple scales, nonlinear, & non-local 4 / 22
to bottom operation: generate/transmit/distribute power hierarchical control & operation Smart & green power to the people: distributed generation & deregulation demand response & load control 5 / 22
with harmonic waveforms Ei cos(θi + ωt) 2 active and reactive power flows 3 loads demanding constant active and reactive power 4 synchronous generators & power electronic inverters 5 coupling via Kirchhoff & Ohm Gij + i Bij i j Pi + i Qi i mech. torque electr. torque injection = power flows active power: Pi = j Bij Ei Ej sin(θi − θj ) + Gij Ei Ej cos(θi − θj ) reactive power: Qi = − j Bij Ei Ej cos(θi − θj ) + Gij Ei Ej sin(θi − θj ) 7 / 22
capacity ⇒ voltages drop recent outages: Qu´ ebec ’96, Northeast ’03, Scandinavia ’03, Athens ’04 “Voltage collapse is still the biggest single threat to the transmission sys- tem. It’s what keeps me awake at night.” – Phil Harris, CEO PJM. 10 / 22
bus system (New England) Ongoing work & next steps: existence & collapse cond’: (load) < (network)(source voltage)2/4 analysis to design: reactive compensation & renewable integration 12 / 22
microgrid research program @ University of Aalborg DC Source LCL filter DC Source LCL filter DC Source LCL filter 4 DG DC Source LCL filter 1 DG 2 DG 3 DG Load 1 Load 2 12 Z 23 Z 34 Z 1 Z 2 Z 0 10 20 30 40 50 300 305 310 315 320 325 330 Voltage Magnitudes Time (s) Voltage (V) 0 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 Reactive Power Injections Time (s) Power (VAR) 0 10 20 30 40 50 49.5 49.6 49.7 49.8 49.9 50 50.1 Voltage Frequency Time (s) Frequency (Hz) 0 10 20 30 40 50 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 A ctive Power Injection Time (s) Power (W) t = 22s: load # 2 unplugged t = 36s: load # 2 plugged back t ∈ [0s, 7s]: primary & tertiary control t = 7s: secondary control activated 16 / 22
microgrid research program @ University of Aalborg DC Source LCL filter DC Source LCL filter DC Source LCL filter 4 DG DC Source LCL filter 1 DG 2 DG 3 DG Load 1 Load 2 12 Z 23 Z 34 Z 1 Z 2 Z 0 10 20 30 40 50 300 305 310 315 320 325 330 Voltage Magnitudes Time (s) Voltage (V) 0 10 20 30 40 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 Reactive Power Injections Time (s) Power (VAR) 0 10 20 30 40 50 49.5 49.6 49.7 49.8 49.9 50 50.1 Voltage Frequency Time (s) Frequency (Hz) 0 10 20 30 40 50 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 A ctive Power Injection Time (s) Power (W) t = 22s: load # 2 unplugged t = 36s: load # 2 plugged back t ∈ [0s, 7s]: primary & tertiary control t = 7s: secondary control activated Ongoing work & next steps: time-domain modeling & control design integrate market/load dynamics & control 16 / 22
control link =⇒ nearly centralized performance 15 5 12 11 10 7 8 9 4 3 1 2 17 18 14 16 19 20 21 24 26 27 28 31 32 34 33 36 38 39 22 35 6 13 30 37 25 29 23 1 10 8 2 3 6 9 4 7 5 F Fig. 9. The New England test system [10], [11]. The system includes 10 synchronous generators and 39 buses. Most of the buses have constant active and reactive power loads. Coupled swing dynamics of 10 generators are studied in the case that a line-to-ground fault occurs at point F near bus 16. 0 -5 0 5 10 15 δ i / rad 0 -5 0 5 10 15 δ i / rad Fig. 10. Couple The fault duration by numerical inte !"#$%&'''%()(*%(+,-.,*%/012-3*%)0-4%5677*%899: 1 10 Ongoing work & next steps: cyber-physical security: corruption of wide-area signals data-driven & learning: what if we don’t have a model? 20 / 22
Changhong Zhao Matthias Rungger Voltage dynamics Marco Todescato Basilio Gentile Sandro Zampieri Wide-area control Diego Romeres Mihailo Jovanovic Xiaofan Wu Microgrids Quobad Shafiee Josep Guerrero Sairaj Dhople Abdullah Hamadeh Brian Johnson Jinxin Zhao Hedi Boattour Robotic coordination Bruce Francis Cyber-physical security Fabio Pasqualetti Port-Hamiltonian Frank Allg¨ ower Jorgen Johnsen Social networks Mihaela van der Schaar Yuanzhang Xiao . . . Group @ ETH Bala Kameshwar Poolla plus some students on other prof’s payrolls . . . more people to join . . . 22 / 22