The first few milliseconds of HTTPS - phpnz14

Transcript

1. The first 200 milliseconds of HTTPS
   1
   Joshua Thijssen
   jaytaph
   

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3. ➡ What’s happening in the first 200+
   milliseconds in a initial HTTPS connection.
   2
   

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4. ➡ What’s happening in the first 200+
   milliseconds in a initial HTTPS connection.
   ➡ Give tips and hints on hardening your setup.
   2
   

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5. ➡ What’s happening in the first 200+
   milliseconds in a initial HTTPS connection.
   ➡ Give tips and hints on hardening your setup.
   ➡ Give you insights in new and upcoming
   technologies.
   2
   

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6. ➡ What’s happening in the first 200+
   milliseconds in a initial HTTPS connection.
   ➡ Give tips and hints on hardening your setup.
   ➡ Give you insights in new and upcoming
   technologies.
   ➡ Show you things to you (probably) didn’t
   knew.
   2
   

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7. This talk is inspired by
   a blogpost from Jeff Moser
   http://www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html
   Unknown fact!
   3
   

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8. HTTPS ==
   HTTP on top of TLS
   4
   

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9. Transport Layer Security
   (TLS)
   5
   

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10. Secure Socket Layer
    (SSL)
    6
    A short and scary history
    

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11. then
    now
    7
    

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12. then
    now
    SSL 1.0
    Vaporware
    1994
    7
    

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13. then
    now
    feb
    1995
    SSL 2.0
    Not-so-secure-socket-layer
    SSL 1.0
    Vaporware
    1994
    7
    

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14. then
    now
    feb
    1995
    SSL 2.0
    Not-so-secure-socket-layer
    jun
    1996
    SSL 3.0
    Something stable!
    SSL 1.0
    Vaporware
    1994
    7
    

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15. then
    now
    feb
    1995
    SSL 2.0
    Not-so-secure-socket-layer
    jun
    1996
    SSL 3.0
    Something stable!
    jan
    1999
    TLS 1.0
    SSL 3.1
    SSL 1.0
    Vaporware
    1994
    7
    

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16. then
    now
    feb
    1995
    SSL 2.0
    Not-so-secure-socket-layer
    jun
    1996
    SSL 3.0
    Something stable!
    jan
    1999
    TLS 1.0
    SSL 3.1
    apr
    2006
    TLS 1.1
    SSL 1.0
    Vaporware
    1994
    7
    

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17. then
    now
    feb
    1995
    SSL 2.0
    Not-so-secure-socket-layer
    jun
    1996
    SSL 3.0
    Something stable!
    jan
    1999
    TLS 1.0
    SSL 3.1
    apr
    2006
    TLS 1.1
    TLS 1.2
    aug
    2008
    SSL 1.0
    Vaporware
    1994
    7
    

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18. https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/
    25,7%
    99,6% 99,3%
    18,2% 20,7%
    SSL 2.0 SSL 3.0 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2
    8
    November 2013
    

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19. https://www.trustworthyinternet.org/ssl-pulse/
    25,7%
    99,6% 99,3%
    18,2% 20,7%
    SSL 2.0 SSL 3.0 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2
    8
    20,5%
    98,5% 99,3%
    38,4% 40,8%
    SSL 2.0 SSL 3.0 TLS 1.0 TLS 1.1 TLS 1.2
    November 2013 Aug 2014
    

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20. RFC 5246
    (TLS v1.2)
    9
    

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21. 10
    Record Layer
    

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22. 10
    Record Layer
    Type Version Length
    

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23. 10
    Record Layer
    Type Version Length
    Protocol
    

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24. 10
    Record Layer
    Type Version Length
    Protocol
    Protocol
    Protocol
    

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25. 10
    Record Layer
    Type Version Length
    Protocol
    Protocol
    Protocol
    Record Layer
    Type Version Length
    Protocol
    

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26. ➡ Handshake protocol records
    ➡ Setup communication
    ➡ Change Cipher Spec protocol records
    ➡ Change communication
    ➡ Alert protocol records
    ➡ Errors
    ➡ Application Data protocol records
    ➡ Actual data transfers
    11
    

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27. 12
    https://github.com/vincentbernat/rfc5077/blob/master/ssl-handshake.svg
    

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28. Attention:
    (live)
    wiresharking
    up ahead
    13
    

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29. View Slide

30. View Slide

31. Generating
    randomness is HARD
    16
    

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32. entropy
    (uncertainty)
    17
    

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33. TIME is NOT random
    thus not a very good
    entropy source
    18
    

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34. PHP is bad
    when it comes to
    entropy
    19
    Unknown fact!
    

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35. srand(microtime())
    20
    Unknown fact!
    

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36. rand()
    mt_rand()
    uniqid()
    21
    

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37. View Slide

38. openssl_pseudo_random_bytes()
    22
    

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39. openssl_pseudo_random_bytes()
    read from /dev/(u)random
    22
    

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40. openssl_pseudo_random_bytes()
    read from /dev/(u)random
    Use a HRNG
    22
    

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41. openssl_pseudo_random_bytes()
    read from /dev/(u)random
    Use a HRNG
    “A million random digits”
    22
    

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42. openssl_pseudo_random_bytes()
    read from /dev/(u)random
    Use a HRNG
    “A million random digits”
    https://github.com/ircmaxell/RandomLib
    22
    

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43. View Slide

44. TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
    24
    

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45. TLS
    ECDHE_ECDSA
    WITH
    AES_128_GCM
    SHA256
    25
    

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46. TLS
    ECDHE_ECDSA
    WITH
    AES_128_GCM
    SHA256
    Cipher for exchanging
    key information
    25
    

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47. TLS
    ECDHE_ECDSA
    WITH
    AES_128_GCM
    SHA256
    Cipher for exchanging
    key information
    Cipher for
    authenticating key
    information
    25
    

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48. TLS
    ECDHE_ECDSA
    WITH
    AES_128_GCM
    SHA256
    Cipher for exchanging
    key information
    Cipher for
    authenticating key
    information
    Actual cipher (and
    length) used for
    communication
    25
    

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49. TLS
    ECDHE_ECDSA
    WITH
    AES_128_GCM
    SHA256
    Cipher for exchanging
    key information
    Cipher for
    authenticating key
    information
    Hash algo for message
    authenticating
    Actual cipher (and
    length) used for
    communication
    25
    

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50. TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
    26
    

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51. TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL
    27
    

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52. Client gives cipher options,
    Server ultimately decides on cipher!
    28
    

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53. THIS IS WHY YOU SHOULD ALWAYS
    CONFIGURE YOUR CIPHERS
    ON YOUR WEB SERVER!
    29
    Unknown fact!
    

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54. SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 -SSLv3
    SSLHonorCipherOrder on
    SSLCipherSuite "EECDH+ECDSA+AESGCM EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM EECDH+ECDSA+SHA384 \
    EECDH+ECDSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+SHA384 EECDH+aRSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+RC4 \
    EECDH EDH+aRSA RC4 !aNULL !eNULL !LOW !3DES !MD5 !EXP !PSK !SRP !DSS"
    ssl_protocols TLSv1 TLSv1.1 TLSv1.2;
    ssl_prefer_server_ciphers on;
    ssl_ciphers "EECDH+ECDSA+AESGCM EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM EECDH+ECDSA+SHA384 \
    EECDH+ECDSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+SHA384 EECDH+aRSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+RC4 \
    EECDH EDH+aRSA RC4 !aNULL !eNULL !LOW !3DES !MD5 !EXP !PSK !SRP !DSS";
    Apache
    Nginx
    30
    https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/08/05/configuring-apache-nginx-and-openssl-for-forward-secrecy
    

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55. https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
    31
    

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62. 38
    New Zealand,
    

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63. View Slide

64. 40
    ➡ SNI (Server Name Indication)
    ➡ Extension 0x0000
    ➡ Pretty much every decent browser /
    server.
    ➡ IE6, Win XP, Blackberry, Android 2.x
    ➡ So no worries!
    

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65. View Slide

66. View Slide

67. What an SSL certificate is NOT:
    43
    ➡ SSL certificate (but a X.509 certificate)
    ➡ Automatically secure
    ➡ Automatically trustworthy
    ➡ In any way better self-signed certificates
    ➡ Cheap
    

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68. What an SSL certificate is:
    44
    ➡ The best way (but not perfect) to prove authenticity
    ➡ A way to bootstrap encrypted communication
    ➡ Misleading
    ➡ (Too) Expensive
    

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69. View Slide

70. 45
    ➡ X.509 Certificate
    

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71. 45
    ➡ X.509 Certificate
    ➡ Owner info (who is this owner)
    

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72. 45
    ➡ X.509 Certificate
    ➡ Owner info (who is this owner)
    ➡ Domain info (for which domain(s) is
    this certificate valid)
    

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73. 45
    ➡ X.509 Certificate
    ➡ Owner info (who is this owner)
    ➡ Domain info (for which domain(s) is
    this certificate valid)
    ➡ Expiry info (from when to when is this
    certificate valid)
    

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74. 46
    yourdomain.com
    

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75. 46
    yourdomain.com
    Intermediate
    CA
    

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76. 46
    yourdomain.com
    Intermediate
    CA
    

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77. 46
    yourdomain.com
    Root
    CA
    Intermediate
    CA
    

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78. 46
    yourdomain.com
    Root
    CA
    Intermediate
    CA
    

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79. 46
    yourdomain.com
    Root
    CA
    Intermediate
    CA
    

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80. 47
    IMPLIED TRU$T
    

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81. ➡ (Root) Certificate Authorities
    ➡ They are built into your browser / OS
    and you will automatically trust them.
    48
    

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82. 49
    wget http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt\?raw\=1 -O - -q | grep Issuer | sort | uniq | wc -l
    

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83. 49
    wget http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt\?raw\=1 -O - -q | grep Issuer | sort | uniq | wc -l
    181
    And rising...
    

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84. View Slide

85. 50
    ➡ X.509 certificates are used to authenticate
    the server.
    

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86. 50
    ➡ X.509 certificates are used to authenticate
    the server.
    ➡ Servers can ask clients to authenticate
    themselves as well.
    

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87. 50
    ➡ X.509 certificates are used to authenticate
    the server.
    ➡ Servers can ask clients to authenticate
    themselves as well.
    ➡ APIs
    

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88. View Slide

89. View Slide

90. 53
    Generating secrets:
    

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91. 53
    pre master secret server rand
    client rand
    Generating secrets:
    + +
    

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92. 53
    pre master secret server rand
    client rand
    master secret
    Generating secrets:
    + +
    

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93. 53
    pre master secret server rand
    client rand
    master secret
    master secret server rand client rand
    Generating secrets:
    + +
    +
    +
    

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94. 53
    pre master secret server rand
    client rand
    master secret
    master secret server rand client rand
    key buffer
    Generating secrets:
    + +
    +
    +
    

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95. 53
    pre master secret server rand
    client rand
    master secret
    client MAC client KEY client IV server MAC server KEY server IV
    master secret server rand client rand
    key buffer
    Generating secrets:
    + +
    +
    +
    

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96. https://github.com/jaytaph/TLS-decoder
    54
    http://www.adayinthelifeof.nl/2013/12/30/decoding-tls-with-php/
    Try it yourself, php style:
    

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97. View Slide

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100. View Slide

101. 59
     Wireshark CAN decrypt your HTTPS traffic
     Unknown fact!
     SSLKEYLOGFILE
     https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Psst+Your+Browser+Knows+All+Your+Secrets+/16415
     

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102. 60
     launchctl setenv SSLKEYLOGFILE /tmp/keylog.secret
     on a mac:
     

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103. View Slide

104. ➡ TLS has overhead in computation and
     transfers. But definitely worth it.
     ➡ Google likes it.
     ➡ Some ciphersuites are better, but slower.
     ➡ Speed / Security compromise
     ➡ (try: “openssl speed”)
     62
     

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105. Are we safe yet?
     63
     

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106. euh,.. no :/
     64
     

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107. 65
     PRE MASTER
     SECRET
     

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108. What if somebody*
     got hold of the site
     private key?
     66
     

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109. View Slide

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111. View Slide

112. View Slide

113. (PERFECT)
     FORWARDING
     SECRECY
     71
     

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114. Compromising the
     pre-master secret does
     not compromise our
     communication.
     72
     

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115. PFS:
     Can’t compromise
     other keys with a
     compromised key.
     73
     

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116. Unfortunately..
     74
     

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117. 75
     PFS needs server
     AND browser support
     

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118. 76
     http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/25/ssl-intercepted-today-decrypted-tomorrow.html
     

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119. 77
     http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/25/ssl-intercepted-today-decrypted-tomorrow.html
     

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120. Update your cipher
     suite list and place
     PFS ciphers at the top
     78
     

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121. But beware:
     heavy computations
     79
     

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122. 80
     SSL Test
     https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/
     

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123. -ETOOMUCHINFO
     81
     

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124. 82
     https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practices/index.html
     

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125. http://farm1.static.flickr.com/73/163450213_18478d3aa6_d.jpg 83
     

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126. 84
     Find me on twitter: @jaytaph
     Find me for development and training: www.noxlogic.nl
     Find me on email: jthijssen@noxlogic.nl
     Find me for blogs: www.adayinthelifeof.nl
     

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