Identiverse 2021 - Cryptographic Protocols for Machine Identities and Credentials

Transcript

1. JUNE 2021 Cryptographic Protocols for Machine Identities and Credentials Mrinal Wadhwa CTO, Ockam
2. IoT will have an economic impact between $4 trillion and $11 trillion, by 2025. Source: McKinsey & Company
5. JUNE 2021 1. Implicit trust in network boundaries. Source: Dragos - Industrial Control Systems, CyberSecurity, Year in Review 2019 & 2020 Root causes
7. JUNE 2021 1. Implicit trust in network boundaries . 2. Lack of end-to-end data integrity and con fi dentiality. Root causes
8. Least Privilege. Principle of Every program and every privileged user of the system should operate using the least amount of privilege necessary to complete the job.” — Jerome Saltzer, Communications of the ACM, 1974
9. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Application
10. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Application
11. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service Heart Rate Application
12. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm Heart Rate Application
13. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm Heart Rate Application
14. The phone may not be online all the time so the service also caches this data to deliver it later … Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm Heart Rate Application
15. Initiator Responder Shared Secret Shared Secret M1 M2 M3 The shared secret is then used as a key in Symmetric Key Cryptography to maintain con fi dentiality and integrity of application data. Application Data - Authenticated Encryption The entities involved use Public Key Cryptography to authenticate each other and agree on a shared secret. Authenticated Key Exchange D Secure Channel
16. THREAT DESIRED PROPERTY S Spoo fi ng identity Identi fi cation, Authentication T Tampering with data Integrity R Repudiation Non-repudiability (some applications desire the opposite) I Information disclosure Con fi dentiality D Denial of service Availability E Elevation of privilege Authorization Note that this model is very high level, there is massive amounts of nuance in dealing with each of the rows. The STRIDE threat model can help us evaluate every message.
17. Coming back to our heart rate solution, for secure communication … Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service Heart Rate Application
18. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service Secure Channel We setup a secure channel between the monitor and the service. Heart Rate Application
19. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service Secure Channel Secure Channel And another secure channel between the phone and the service. Heart Rate Application
20. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Since these devices have direct access to the internet, with TLS … Heart Rate Application
21. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
22. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm 0x217c5111… Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
23. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm 0x217c5111… 80 bpm Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
24. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm 0x217c5111… 80 bpm 0x8621f842… Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
25. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm 0x217c5111… 80 bpm 0x8621f842… 80 bpm This type of setup is industry best practice. Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
26. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm 0x217c5111… 80 bpm 0x8621f842… 80 bpm But even when we manage to setup the channels correctly the data is still exposed to the service. 
 The service doesn’t need to know the contents of the message to route and cache messages (its primary job). Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
27. Route on/off instructions. Connected Outlet Connected Outlet Application Connected Outlet Service
28. Route open/close instructions. Connected Lock Connected Lock Application Connected Lock Service
29. Route/Cache sensor data, alerts and videos. Camera Door Bell Camera Door Bell Application Camera Door Bell Service
30. Gateway Flood Warning Sensor Multiple transport protocols in the path of one message. TCP TCP Flood Monitoring System Sensors Vendor’s Service LPWAN
31. Gateway Flood Warning Sensor Flood Monitoring System Sensors Vendor’s Service TLS TLS LPWAN
32. Messages, within modern applications, rarely flows over a single, direct, point-to-point transport connection.
37. Secure Channel implementations are usually tightly coupled with the length and duration of the underlying transport layer connection.
38. Data integrity and confidentiality guarantees are lost at every transport connection hop.
39. JUNE 2021 1. Implicit trust in network boundaries . 2. Lack of end-to-end data integrity and con fi dentiality . 3. Lack of mutual authentication. Root causes
42. JUNE 2021 1. Implicit trust in network boundaries . 2. Lack of end-to-end data integrity and con fi dentiality . 3. Lack of mutual authentication . 4. Poor management of keys and credentials. Root causes
43. JUNE 2021 End-to-end Encrypted
 Secure Channels
44. Initiator Responder Shared Secret Shared Secret M1 M2 M3 The shared secret is then used as a key in Symmetric Key Cryptography to maintain con fi dentiality and integrity of application data. Application Data - Authenticated Encryption The entities involved use Public Key Cryptography to authenticate each other and agree on a shared secret. Authenticated Key Exchange D Secure Channel
45. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Service 80 bpm 0x217c5111… 80 bpm 0x8621f842… 80 bpm But even when we manage to setup the channels correctly the data is still exposed to the service. 
 The service doesn’t need to know the contents of the message to route and cache messages (its primary job). Transport Layer Security Transport Layer Security Heart Rate Application
46. Heart Rate Monitor Heart Rate Application Heart Rate
51. TLS IP TCP Application
52. TLS TCP Application TCP Application Routing Secure Channels IP IP
55. TCP Application Routing Secure Channels IP
56. TCP Application Routing Secure Channels IP UDP WebSocket HTTP
57. TCP Application Routing Secure Channels IP UDP WebSocket HTTP Bluetooth LPWAN
58. THREAT DESIRED PROPERTY S Spoo fi ng identity Identi fi cation, Authentication T Tampering with data Integrity R Repudiation Non-repudiability (some applications desire the opposite) I Information disclosure Con fi dentiality D Denial of service Availability E Elevation of privilege Authorization Note that this model is very high level, there is massive amounts of nuance in dealing with each of the rows. The STRIDE threat model can help us evaluate every message.
59. JUNE 2021 Device Enrollmen t Leased API access token s Firmware Updat e Find my lost device …
60. JUNE 2021 Privacy Contexts & Identity Profiles
61. JUNE 2021 Selective Disclosure
62. JUNE 2021 Anonymous Credentials
63. JUNE 2021 Zero Knowledge Proofs Mozilla is using Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs to collect telemetry from the Firefox browser without collecting any private browser usage. A large subset of IoT use cases is telemetry collection.
64. JUNE 2021 Federated Learning Google Keyboard learns out-of-vocabulary words on mobile phones without exposing sensitive text to servers. 
 Connected sensors could similarly learn to improve accuracy while preserving privacy.
65. JUNE 2021 Homomorphic Encryption
67. JUNE 2021 Mrinal Wadhw a github.com/ockam-network/ocka m twitter.com/mrinal