End-to-End Encryption

Transcript

1. End-to-End Encryption. Mrinal Wadhwa Ockam
5. hello
6. 0xaf3d…
7. hello
8. 0xcdfa…
9. hello
10. hello
11. 0x14d8…
12. 0x14d8…
13. 0x14d8…
14. hello
15. They’re both secure channels. The green one is decoupled from the transport layer, which is why it can be - end-to-end.
16. Secure Channels protect en-route data from tampering, forgery and eavesdropping. It’s not just about con fi dentiality.
17. THREAT DESIRED PROPERTY S Spoo fi ng identity Identi fi cation, Authentication T Tampering with data Integrity R Repudiation Non-repudiability (some applications desire the opposite) I Information disclosure Con fi dentiality D Denial of service Availability E Elevation of privilege Authorization The STRIDE threat model.
18. Initiator Responder Shared Secret Shared Secret M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 Secure Channels
19. Initiator Responder Shared Secret Shared Secret M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 The shared secret is then used as a key in Symmetric Key Cryptography to maintain con fi dentiality and integrity of application data. Application Data - Authenticated Encryption The entities involved use Public Key Cryptography to authenticate each other and agree on a shared secret. Authenticated Key Exchange
20. Initiator Responder Shared Secret Shared Secret M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 AEAD_AES_128_GCM, AEAD_AES_256_GCM, AEAD_AES_128_CCM, AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 X3DH, SIGMA protocols, Noise Protocol Framework …. Double Ratchet, Rekey …
21. All Secure Channel designs are not equal …
27. Implementing an end-to-end secure channel protocol, from scratch, is complex, error prone, and will take more time than application teams can typically dedicate to this problem. But, if we can make it easy …
28. Mutually Authenticated, End-to-End Encrypted Secure Channels enable an application to enforce least-privileged access to commands, data, con fi guration, machine-learning models, and software updates that are fl owing, as messages, between its distributed parts. We can build applications that have a strikingly smaller vulnerability surface.
29. Remove implicit trust in porous network boundaries
30. A lot of people say their Industrial Control Systems are air-gapped but what they mean is they think they are air-gapped. – Andrew Tierney: Pwning an oil rig, DEF CON 27 creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/legalcode youtube.com/watch?v=JoJ6uzIsQNs
31. Remove implicit trust in porous network boundaries
32. Remove implicit trust in porous network boundaries
33. Lower trust in intermediaries
34. Lower trust in intermediaries
35. Lower trust in intermediaries
36. Lower trust in intermediaries
37. Secure Channels can become considerably more powerful if we decouple them from the transport layer.
38. They’re both secure channels. The green one is decoupled from the transport layer, which is why it can be - end-to-end.
42. Ockam is a suite of open source programming libraries that make it simple for distributed applications to dynamically create any number of lightweight, mutually authenticated, end-to-end encrypted, granularly authorized secure channels.
44. github.com/ockam-network/ockam#next-steps Mrinal Wadhwa CTO, Ockam mrinal 🙏 thank you.