The Psychology of Alert Design

It's 3:37am. Your phone starts buzzing. It doesn't stop. 1000s of alerts. All the things are broken. Where do you even begin?

You freeze.

The infrastructure we're operating are increasingly complex and nuanced. Events at one edge can have unintended and unpredictable effects on the other, and there is no obvious causal relationship. This makes debugging failure hard.

Good alert design is important to lowering the MTTR when our complex infrastructures fail, but what constitutes a "good alert"? Our brains work in unexpected ways, with cognitive biases and priming skewing our perception of reality. It's vitally important to understand how we think and react under pressure when designing alerts and communicating failure.

In this talk, Lindsay will showcase some of the psychological underpinnings you should take into account when designing your alerts, how other industries handle alert design, and what tools are available to increase your operational effectiveness in the face of massive failures today.

Sources used to create this talk:

- http://www.columbiadisaster.info/images/foam_debris_548x627.jpg
- http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/95/Impact-test.jpg
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94J9oVeST0k
- http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oBTzbKx0jo
- http://www.flickr.com/photos/frostnova/2268471558
- http://www.flickr.com/photos/buttim/1297081125
- http://www.flickr.com/photos/gsairpics/8318261080
- http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/Map_Tenerife_Disaster_EN.svg/2000px-Map_Tenerife_Disaster_EN.svg.png
- http://i1.ytimg.com/vi/LSPkRMbyrGc/maxresdefault.jpg
- http://awesomestories.com/images/user/9add18ae4d.jpg
- http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/rh/RH_Fluency_2008.pdf
- http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/07/final-air-france-447-report-pilots-misunderstood-their-situation/54209/
- http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020136/Pierre-Cedric-Bonin-David-Robert-blamed-Atlantic-Ocean-Air-France-crash-killed-228.html
- http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/europe/france-air-crash-report/index.html
- http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2012/07/af447-final-report.html
- http://gizmodo.com/5923866/air-france-447-crash-a-result-of-crew-ignoring-alarms
- http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/af447-inquiry-grapples-with-stall-warning-enigma-373857/
- http://www.anesthesia-analgesia.org/content/112/1/78.long
- http://www.used-equipment-medical.com/th_sogemed/medias/big/moniteur-drager-kappa-xlt-infinity.jpg
- http://img.medicalexpo.com/pdf/repository_me/68268/zeus-infinity-empowered-83059_5b.jpg
- http://www.flickr.com/photos/quinnanya/5646121120
- http://www.flickr.com/photos/digital-noise/3650559857
- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arterial_kateter.jpg
- http://drugline.org/img/term/venous-catheter-central-15887_1.jpg
- http://riemann.io/howto.html#group-events-in-time

Transcript

1. Psychology of alert design
3. G'day! I'm Lindsay Holmwood @auxesis
4. Engineering manager @ Bulletproof
5. cucumber-nagios Visage Flapjack
7. January 16, 2003
8. foam debris broke off the space shuttle's external tank struck left wing http://www.columbiadisaster.info/images/foam_debris_548x627.jpg
9. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/95/Impact-test.jpg mockup of polyurethane foam hitting wing structure at 850km/h
10. February 3, 2003
11. from nasa tv http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94J9oVeST0k
12. from free to air television http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oBTzbKx0jo
13. Did NASA have "good alerts"?
14. What constitutes a good alert?
15. good alert is a moral judgement
16. No one sets out to create "bad alerts"
17. Alerts designed in context
18. Locally rational
19. “people make what they think are best decisions based on data at hand”
20. We design alerts for humans
21. Let's understand how humans think
22. 2 principles
23. Don't startle the operator
24. Don't suggest, expose
26. What is cognitive bias?
27. "Mental shortcut"
28. http://www.flickr.com/photos/frostnova/2268471558/sizes/o
29. Timeliness Accuracy http://www.flickr.com/photos/frostnova/2268471558/sizes/o
31. • Problem solving
32. • Problem solving • Heuristic
33. • Problem solving • Heuristic • Correct result
34. • Problem solving • Heuristic • Correct result • Rational choice
36. • Problem solving
37. • Problem solving • Heuristic
38. • Problem solving • Heuristic • Incorrect result
39. • Problem solving • Heuristic • Incorrect result • Cognitive bias!
40. Heuristic?
41. Pattern matching Heuristics are simple, efficient rules often used by people to form judgements and make decisions. Involve focusing on specific information, and ignoring others. http://www.flickr.com/photos/buttim/1297081125/sizes/o
42. What helped your ancestors survive!
44. March 27, 1977
45. http://www.flickr.com/photos/gsairpics/8318261080/
46. http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/0d/ Map_Tenerife_Disaster_EN.svg/2000px-Map_Tenerife_Disaster_EN.svg.png
47. http://i1.ytimg.com/vi/LSPkRMbyrGc/maxresdefault.jpg
48. http://awesomestories.com/images/user/9add18ae4d.jpg
49. KLM: 234 passengers 16 crew
50. Pan Am: 326 passengers 9 crew
51. Frozen in place
53. Normalcy bias
54. Before a disaster:
56. • Underestimate:
57. • Underestimate: • risk
58. • Underestimate: • risk • effects
59. • Underestimate: • risk • effects • preparation
60. "Because something bad has never happened, it never will happen"
61. During a disaster:
62. people need an average of 4 prompts before they take action "this truly can't be happening, everything will be ok"
63. • Response: people need an average of 4 prompts before they take action "this truly can't be happening, everything will be ok"
64. • Response: • slow reaction people need an average of 4 prompts before they take action "this truly can't be happening, everything will be ok"
65. • Response: • slow reaction • seek validation people need an average of 4 prompts before they take action "this truly can't be happening, everything will be ok"
66. • Response: • slow reaction • seek validation • optimistic interpretation people need an average of 4 prompts before they take action "this truly can't be happening, everything will be ok"
68. Reaction steps
70. • Cognition
71. • Cognition • Perception
72. • Cognition • Perception • Comprehension
73. • Cognition • Perception • Comprehension • Decision
74. • Cognition • Perception • Comprehension • Decision • Implementation
75. • Cognition • Perception • Comprehension • Decision • Implementation • Movement
76. These are complex tasks
77. You cannot skip these tasks
78. You can practice to make them more automatic
79. People who don't practice deliberate during the disaster
80. http://i1.ytimg.com/vi/LSPkRMbyrGc/maxresdefault.jpg
81. 70% freeze 15% freak out 15% react to situation
82. No practice == higher MTTR
83. Don't startle the operator
84. Drill
85. Limit interruptions
86. This is a test
88. 1.Read the statement once
89. 1.Read the statement once 2.Count the letter F
91. FINAL FOLIOS SEEM TO RESULT FROM YEARS OF DUTIFUL STUDY OF TEXTS ALONG WITH YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERIENCE.
93. How many did you see?
94. How many did you see? The answer is 8
95. Fluency heuristic http://library.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/ft/rh/RH_Fluency_2008.pdf
96. FINAL FOLIOS SEEM TO RESULT FROM YEARS OF DUTIFUL STUDY OF TEXTS ALONG WITH YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERIENCE.
97. Brain expects pattern to continue
98. Brain skips other information
100. Modeling "failure"
102. • a
103. • a • b
104. • a • b • c
105. • a • b • c • d
106. • a • b • c • d • *boom*
107. Let's add barriers
109. • a • b • c • d •
110. • a • b • c • d •
111. • a • b • c • d • Soft Hard Soft Hard
112. • a • b • c • d •
113. • a • b • c • d • e *boom*
114. • a • b • c • d • e *boom*
115. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f
116. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f
117. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h
118. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h
119. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k
120. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k
121. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
122. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
123. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
124. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
125. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
126. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
127. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
128. • a • b • c • d • e *boom* f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z Complexity
129. Our systems are not static
130. Our systems are dynamic
131. "Accidents come from relationships, not broken parts"
132. Parenting: does it even make sense?
133. Lots of work
134. Rapidly out of date
135. Emergent behaviour?
136. • a • b • c • d • q n e f h i j k l m o p r s t u v w x y z g
137. • a • b • c • d • n e f h i j k l m o p r s t u v w x y z g *boom*
138. • a • b • c • d • n f h i k m o p r s t u v w x y z g *boom* *boom* *boom* *boom*
139. • a • b • c • d • n f h i k m o p r s t u v w x y z g *boom* *boom* *boom* *boom* this is alerting
140. Don't suggest, expose
142. Other industries
143. Aviation
144. AF447
146. 70 stall warnings
147. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/07/final-air-france-447-report-pilots- misunderstood-their-situation/54209/ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020136/Pierre-Cedric-Bonin-David-Robert- blamed-Atlantic-Ocean-Air-France-crash-killed-228.html http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/europe/france-air-crash-report/index.html http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2012/07/af447-final-report.html http://gizmodo.com/5923866/air-france-447-crash-a-result-of-crew-ignoring-alarms
148. • Final Air France 447 Report: Pilots misunderstood their situation • Poorly-trained pilots to blame for Air France crash that killed 228 • Final Air France crash report says pilots failed to react swiftly • Air France 447 downed as crew ignored alarms • Air France 447 crash a result of crew ignoring alarms http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2012/07/final-air-france-447-report-pilots- misunderstood-their-situation/54209/ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020136/Pierre-Cedric-Bonin-David-Robert- blamed-Atlantic-Ocean-Air-France-crash-killed-228.html http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/05/world/europe/france-air-crash-report/index.html http://www.newscientist.com/blogs/onepercent/2012/07/af447-final-report.html http://gizmodo.com/5923866/air-france-447-crash-a-result-of-crew-ignoring-alarms
149. “They should have reacted!”
150. Autopilot disconnect audio warning
151. Alternate law reconfiguration audio warning
152. Stall warnings lasted for 54 seconds
153. C-chord altitude horn lasted for 34 seconds
154. Dual control signal indicator light on the controls
155. aural visual Autopilot disconnect x Alternate law reconfiguration x Dual input control x Altitude x Stall warning x
156. Overwhelmed by feedback
157. "In an aural environment that was already saturated by the C-chord warning, the possibility that the crew did not identify the stall warning cannot be ruled out" - BEA report on AF447 http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/af447-inquiry-grapples-with-stall-warning- enigma-373857/
158. Operating theatres
159. The Wolf Is Crying in the Operating Room: Patient Monitor and Anesthesia Workstation Alarming Patterns During Cardiac Surgery Schmid F, Goepfert M, et al, Anesthesia & Analgesia, 2010 http://www.anesthesia-analgesia.org/content/112/1/78.long
160. Kappa XLT patient monitor http://www.used-equipment-medical.com/th_sogemed/medias/big/moniteur-drager- kappa-xlt-infinity.jpg
161. Drager Zeus anesthesia workstation http://img.medicalexpo.com/pdf/repository_me/68268/zeus-infinity- empowered-83059_5b.jpg
162. http://www.flickr.com/photos/quinnanya/5646121120/sizes/l/ pulse oximeter was used
163. http://www.flickr.com/photos/digital-noise/3650559857/sizes/o electrocardiogram was used
164. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Arterial_kateter.jpg arterial blood pressure monitoring
165. central venous pressure was measured with a central venous catheter http://drugline.org/img/term/venous-catheter-central-15887_1.jpg
166. 1 second sampling interval
167. Procedures were video recorded
168. Results?
169. 1.2 alerts / minute
170. 80% of the 8975 alarms were of no consequence
171. 30% of the 8975 alarms were false positives
173. How can we improve?
174. Provide more context
179. Don't suggest, expose
181. Reduce notifications
183. No notifications on individual checks
184. Notify on the aggregate
185. check_check
186. $ check_check.rb -s solrserver OK=27 WARNING=0 CRITICAL=1 UNKNOWN=0 services=/solrserver/ hosts=// Services in CRITICAL: frontend1.example.com => solrserver client tests
187. Riemann's event grouping http://riemann.io/howto.html#group-events-in-time
188. Don't startle the operator
190. Rollup
191. Limit alerts that are emitted
192. Aggregate alerts together
193. Incident response:
194. Brute force: manual silence
195. limit # of engineers who watch alerts & graphs
196. Alerting system
197. Flapjack
198. Delay-based notification
199. Per-media rollup threshold
200. Don't startle the operator
201. Granular alerting levels
202. Alerta
203. github.com/guardian/alerta/wiki/Alert-Format Alerta alerting levels
204. Nagios alerting levels
205. • a • b • c • d • q n e f h i j k l m o p r s t u v w x y z g @abestanway's talk: https://speakerdeck.com/astanway/mom-my-algorithms-suck
206. • a • b • c • d • q n e f h i j k l m o p r s t u v w x y z g @abestanway's talk: https://speakerdeck.com/astanway/mom-my-algorithms-suck
207. • a • b • c • d • q n e f h i j k l m o p r s t u v w x y z g we alerts now @abestanway's talk: https://speakerdeck.com/astanway/mom-my-algorithms-suck
209. It's not all doom and gloom
210. We are on the cutting edge
211. http://www.flickr.com/photos/quinnanya/5646121120/sizes/l/ pulse oximeter was used
213. Don't startle the operator
214. Don't suggest, expose
215. We design alerts for humans
216. Let's understand how humans think
218. Thank you!
219. Thank you! — the talk? Let @auxesis know!