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Single Sign-On und User Self Service für den Ha...
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fraosug
November 19, 2019
Technology
0
150
Single Sign-On und User Self Service für den Hausgebrauch
Single Sign-On und User Self Service für den Hausgebrauch, Vortrag von Christopher J. Ruwe
fraosug
November 19, 2019
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Transcript
SSO für den Hausgebrauch Christopher J. Ruwe <
[email protected]
> selbstständiger IT-Consultant
Problem • mehrere Services sollen dem gleichen Nutzerkreis zur Verfügung
gestellt werden • die Services sollen nicht öffentlich sein • Berechtigungen sollen nicht separat gepflegt werden (müssen)
Lösungsskizze • auf einer zentralen Instanz werden Nutzer und Berechtigungen
gepflegt • es existiert ein Vertrauensverhältnis von allen Services zu dieser zentralen Instanz • es existiert ein Mechanismus, Identitäten und/oder Berechtigungen zu transportieren
Protokolle (Auswahl) • SAML v2.0 (Security Assertion Markup Languange): authn
/ authz • OAuth v2.0 (Open Authorization): authz • OIDC (OpenIF Connect): authn
Lingo • Resource Owner • Client • Authorization Server •
Resource Server • Realm • Relying Party • OpenID Provider • End-User • User Agent • Resource Server
Authorization Code Grant: OAuth2, § 4.1 (three-legged) Anwendung: • Authentifizierung
und Zugriffssteuerung Wann / Wer?: • Web-Applikationen mit Server Komponente • Desktop / Mobile App (PKCE) • time-scoped with refresh Resource Owner Resource Owner User Agent User Agent Client App Client App Authorization Server Authorization Server Resource Server Resource Server 1 access 2 redirect + params 3 authenticates 4 validates 5 auth code + redirect 6 auth code 7 auth code + redirect 8 validates 9 access (+ refresh) token 10 access token 11 validates 12 resource 13 whatever
auth endpoint GET /authorize ?response_type=code &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://client.example.com/cb ?code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA &state=xyz
token endpoint POST /token HTTP/1.1 Host: server.example.com Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded grant_type=authorization_code &code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
token endpoint HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8 Cache-Control: no-store Pragma:
no-cache { "access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA", "token_type":"example", "expires_in":3600, "refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA", "example_parameter":"example_value" }
Resource Owner Resource Owner User Agent User Agent Client App
Client App Authorization Server Authorization Server Resource Server Resource Server 1 access 2 redirect + params 3 authenticates 4 validates 5 access token + redirect 6 extract access token 7 access token 8 access token 9 validates 10 resource 11 whatever Implicit Grant: OAuth2, § 4.2 (two-legged) Anwendung: • Authentifizierung und Zugriffssteuerung Wann / Wer?: • Single Page App Caveat: • Exfiltrierung von Tokens • deprecated!
auth endpoint GET /authorize ?response_type=token &client_id=s6BhdRkqt3 &state=xyz &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1 Host:
server.example.com HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: http://example.com/cb #access_token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA &state=xyz &token_type=example &expires_in=3600
Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant: OAuth2, § 4.3 Anwendung: •
Authentifizierung und Zugriffssteuerung Wann / Wer?: • trusted clients Resource Owner Resource Owner Client App Client App Authorization Server Authorization Server Resource Server Resource Server 1 access 2 prompt creds 3 provide creds 4 pass creds and params 5 validates 6 pass access token 7 send access token 8 validates 9 resource 10 whatever
Client Credentials Grant: OAuth2, § 4.4 Anwendung: • Authentifizierung und
Zugriffssteuerung von autnomen Apps Wann / Wer?: • trusted clients non interactive Client App Client App Authorization Server Authorization Server Resource Server Resource Server 1 pass creds and params 2 validates 3 pass access token 4 send access token 5 validates 6 whatever
OIDC Authorization Code Flow OIDC v1.0, § 3.1 Anwendung: •
User-Authentifizierung • RP Authentifizierung • SSO auf RP • Authorisierung • verschiedene Scopes Resource Owner User Agent Client App (Relying Party) OpenID Provider Resource Server 1 access 2 redirect + params 3 authenticate at authorization endpoint 4 validate 5 auth code + redirect 6 auth code 7 auth code to token endpoint 8 validate 9 ID, access, (opt. refresh) token 10 validate ID 11 validate access 12 opt. request from userinfo endpoint) 13 validate access 14 additional claims
OIDC Authorization Code Flow OIDC v1.0, § 3.1 Anwendung: •
User-Authentifizierung • RP Authentifizierung • SSO auf RP • Authorisierung • verschiedene Scopes Resource Owner User Agent Client App (Relying Party) OpenID Provider Resource Server 8 validate 9 ID, access, (opt. refresh) token 10 validate ID 11 validate access 12 opt. request from userinfo endpoint) 13 validate access 14 additional claims 15 access token 16 validates 17 req add clains from user endpoint 18 validate access 19 return claims 20 resource 21 whatever
OIDC token { "sub" : "alice", "iss" : "https://openid.c2id.com", "aud"
: "client-12345", "nonce" : "n-0S6_WzA2Mj", "auth_time" : 1311280969, "acr" : "c2id.loa.hisec", "iat" : 1311280970, "exp" : 1311281970 } subject issuer audience authentication context class ref issued_at expires
Token eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjFlOWdkazcifQ.ewogImlzcyI6ICJodHRw Oi8vc2VydmVyLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tIiwKICJzdWIiOiAiMjQ4Mjg5NzYxMDAxIiw KICJhdWQiOiAiczZCaGRSa3F0MyIsCiAibm9uY2UiOiAibi0wUzZfV3pBMk1qIi wKICJleHAiOiAxMzExMjgxOTcwLAogImlhdCI6IDEzMTEyODA5NzAKfQ.ggW8hZ 1EuVLuxNuuIJKX_V8a_OMXzR0EHR9R6jgdqrOOF4daGU96Sr_P6qJp6IcmD3HP9 9Obi1PRs-cwh3LO-p146waJ8IhehcwL7F09JdijmBqkvPeB2T9CJNqeGpe-gccM g4vfKjkM8FcGvnzZUN4_KSP0aAp1tOJ1zZwgjxqGByKHiOtX7TpdQyHE5lcMiKP XfEIQILVq0pc_E2DzL7emopWoaoZTF_m0_N0YzFC6g6EJbOEoRoSK5hoDalrcvR YLSrQAZZKflyuVCyixEoV9GfNQC3_osjzw2PAithfubEEBLuVVk4XUVrWOLrLl0
nx7RkKU8NXNHq-rvKMzqg
Auslassungen • OIDC Implicit Flow (§ 3.2) • OIDC Hybrid
Flow (§ 3.3)
Anwendung • Vertrauensverhältnis von Ressourcen- Konsument zu Authorization Server /
Identity Provider • sichere Kommunikation zwischen den Komponenten
Funktionen für ein SSO auf Basis von OAuth/OIDC IDP: Keycloak
Web u. SSL: nginx Zertifikate: Let‘s Encrypt Zert-Mgmt: cert-manager Mailer: mailu Cluster-Manager: k8s
cert-manager $ kubectl get clusterissuers.certmanager.k8s.io cruwe-le-prod --output=yaml apiVersion: certmanager.k8s.io/v1alpha1 kind:
ClusterIssuer metadata: name: cruwe-le-prod spec: acme: email:
[email protected]
http01: {} privateKeySecretRef: name: issuer-cruwe-le-prod server: https://acme-v02.api.letsencrypt.org/directory
cert-manager apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1beta1 kind: Ingress metadata: annotations: certmanager.k8s.io/cluster-issuer: cruwe-le-prod kubernetes.io/ingress.class:
nginx name: www-cruwe-de namespace: www-cruwe-de spec: tls: - hosts: - www.cruwe.de secretName: www-cruwe-de-le-prod-certificate
keycloak
zum Einlesen • RFC 6749: The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
• https://medium.com/@robert.broeckelmann/saml-v2-0-vs- jwt-series-550551f4eb0d • https://medium.com/@darutk/diagrams-and-movies-of-all- the-oauth-2-0-flows-194f3c3ade85 (Tahiko Kawasaki) • https://openid.net/developers/specs/ • https://connect2id.com/learn/openid-connect • RFC 7519: JSON Web Token (JWT) • https://medium.com/@darutk/understanding-id-token- 5f83f50fa02e