Cryptography Pitfalls at ConFoo Montreal 2017

Transcript

1. Cryptography Pitfalls John Downey | @jtdowney @jtdowney 1
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5. The views expressed in this presentation are my own, and not those of PayPal or any of its affiliates. @jtdowney 5
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7. Confidentiality @jtdowney 7
8. Authentication @jtdowney 8
9. Identification @jtdowney 9
10. Rigorous Science @jtdowney 10
11. Peer Review @jtdowney 11
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13. You have probably seen the door to a bank vault, at least in the movies. You know, 10-inch- thick, hardened steel, with huge bolts to lock it in place. It certainly looks impressive. We often find the digital equivalent of such a vault door installed in a tent. The people standing around it are arguing over how thick the door should be, rather than spending their time looking at the tent. — Cryptography Engineering by Niels Ferguson, Bruce Schneier, and Tadayoshi Kohno @jtdowney 13
14. • For data in transit • Use TLS (née SSL), SSH, or VPN/IPsec • For data at rest • Use GnuPG • Data to be signed • Use GnuPG @jtdowney 14
15. • Avoid low level libraries • OpenSSL • PyCrypto • Bouncy Castle • Use a high level library • NaCL/libsodium (C, Ruby, PHP, etc) • Keyczar (C++, Python, and Java) @jtdowney 15
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17. Random Number Generation @jtdowney 17
18. Pitfalls 1. Not using a cryptographically strong random number generator 2. Not using random data when it is required 3. Broken random number generators @jtdowney 18
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21. Pitfalls 1. Not using a cryptographically strong random number generator 2. Not using random data when it is required 3. Broken random number generators @jtdowney 21
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23. Pitfalls 1. Not using a cryptographically strong random number generator 2. Not using random data when it is required 3. Broken random number generators @jtdowney 23
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26. MD_Update(&m,buf,j); @jtdowney 26
27. Don't add uninitialised data to the random number generator. This stop valgrind from giving error messages in unrelated code. (Closes: #363516) @jtdowney 27
28. /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */ MD_Update(&m,buf,j); /* We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very insecure keys. */ @jtdowney 28
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31. Recommendations • Use a cryptographically strong random number generator • Unix-like • Read from /dev/urandom • Windows • RandomNumberGenerator in System.Security.Cryptography (.NET) • CryptGenRandom • Java use java.security.SecureRandom @jtdowney 31
32. Hash Functions @jtdowney 32
33. Pitfalls 1. Using weak/old algorithms 2. Misunderstanding checksums 3. Length extension attacks @jtdowney 33
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38. 9EC4C12949A4F31474F299058CE2B22A @jtdowney 38
39. 9EC4C12949A4F31474F299058CE2B22A USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, integrates, synchronizes and conducts activities to: direct the operations and defense of specified Department of Defense information networks and; prepare to, and when directed, conduct full spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries. @jtdowney 39
40. Pitfalls 1. Using weak/old algorithms 2. Misunderstanding checksums 3. Length extension attacks @jtdowney 40
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42. Pitfalls 1. Using weak/old algorithms 2. Misunderstanding checksums 3. Length extension attacks @jtdowney 42
43. Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag = MAC(key, value) • Takes: • key - shared secret • value - value to protected integrity of • Returns: • tag - value that represents the integrity @jtdowney 43
44. Naive approach tag = sha256(key + value) @jtdowney 44
45. Length Extension Attacks secret = "my-secret-key" value = "buy 10 units at $1" signature = sha256(secret + value) @jtdowney 45
46. Length Extension Attacks secret = "my-secret-key" value = "buy 10 units at $1" + " or $0" signature = sha256(secret + value) @jtdowney 46
47. Fixed secret = "my-secret-key" value = "buy 10 units at $1" signature = hmac_sha256(secret, value) @jtdowney 47
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50. Recommendations • Use SHA-256 (SHA-2 family) • Choose HMAC-SHA-256 if you want a signature • Use BLAKE2b if you need speed • Stop using MD5 • Stop using SHA1 @jtdowney 50
51. Passwords @jtdowney 51
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62. Hash functions are fast @jtdowney 62
63. 1. One-way • Value can be used for verification 2. Randomized • Can largely defeat pre-computed tables • Forces attackers to focus on one password 3. Slow @jtdowney 63
64. Adaptive Hashing bcrypt, scrypt, argon2, or PBKDF2 @jtdowney 64
65. Recommendations • Delegate authentication if possible • Facebook, Twitter, Google, Github • Store one-way verifiers using bcrypt, scrypt, argon2, or PBDKF2 @jtdowney 65
66. So your password storage is bad @jtdowney 66
67. It will be ok, you can fix it @jtdowney 67
68. Example: password_hash column is sha1(salt + password) @jtdowney 68
69. • Don't wait for user to login and silently upgrade • Wrap bcrypt around existing scheme • Use bcrypt(sha1(salt + password) • Upgrade all passwords in place • This does require the previous password scheme wasn't atrociously bad (e.g. DES crypt) @jtdowney 69
70. Now: password_hash column is bcrypt(sha1(salt + password)) @jtdowney 70
71. Ciphers @jtdowney 71
72. Pitfalls 1. Using old/weak algorithms 2. Using ECB mode for block ciphers 3. Not using authenticated encryption @jtdowney 72
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76. Pitfalls 1. Using old/weak algorithms 2. Using ECB mode for block ciphers 3. Not using authenticated encryption @jtdowney 76
77. AES - primitive ciphertext = AES_Encrypt(key, plaintext) plaintext = AES_Decrypt(key, ciphertext) • Function over: • key - 128, 192, or 256 bit value • plaintext - 128 bit value • ciphertext - 128 bit value @jtdowney 77
78. ECB Encrypt while (remaining blocks) { block = ... # next 16 byte (128 bit chunk) ouput.append(AES_Encrypt(key, block)) } @jtdowney 78
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81. Pitfalls 1. Using old/weak algorithms 2. Using ECB mode for block ciphers 3. Not using authenticated encryption @jtdowney 81
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86. World of hurt @jtdowney 86
87. Recommendations • Prefer to use box/secret box from NaCL/ libsodium • Stop using DES • Stop building your own on top of AES • Stop encrypting without protecting integrity @jtdowney 87
88. What if you have to use AES • Do not use ECB mode • Be sure to use authenticated encryption • GCM mode would be a good first choice • Verify the tag/MAC first • Still easy to mess up in a critical way @jtdowney 88
89. TLS/SSL @jtdowney 89
90. Pitfalls 1. Not verifying the certificate chain or hostname 2. Misconfigured server settings 3. Using a broken library @jtdowney 90
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95. Hostname verification @jtdowney 95
96. Hostname verification • Check that you got the certificate for who you intended to connect to • Hostname verification is protocol dependent • OpenSSL doesn't have it built in @jtdowney 96
97. Pitfalls 1. Not verifying the certificate chain or hostname 2. Misconfigured server settings 3. Using a broken library @jtdowney 97
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99. SSL Labs https://www.ssllabs.com @jtdowney 99
100. testssl.sh https://testssl.sh @jtdowney 100
101. TLS Server Settings https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/ @jtdowney 101
102. Pitfalls 1. Not verifying the certificate chain or hostname 2. Misconfigured server settings 3. Using a broken library @jtdowney 102
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105. Recommendations • Do ensure you're validating connections • Lean on a framework/library if possible • But check that it also does the right thing • Setup and automated test to validate this setting (badssl.com) @jtdowney 105
106. Trust @jtdowney 106
107. The authenticity of host 'apollo.local (10.0.2.56)' can't be established. RSA key fingerprint is 04:63:c1:ba:c7:31:04:12:14:ff:b6:c4:32:cf:44:ec. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? @jtdowney 107
108. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY! Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)! It is also possible that the RSA host key has just been changed. The fingerprint for the RSA key sent by the remote host is 04:63:c1:ba:c7:31:04:12:14:ff:b6:c4:32:cf:44:ec. Please contact your system administrator. @jtdowney 108
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110. Certificate Pinning @jtdowney 110
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112. Recommendations • Think about what organizations you really trust • Investigate certificate pinning for your apps @jtdowney 112
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114. Stanford Crypto Class http://crypto-class.com @jtdowney 114
115. Matasano Crypto Challenges http://cryptopals.com @jtdowney 115
116. Questions John Downey | @jtdowney @jtdowney 116
117. Bonus Round @jtdowney 117
118. Quantum Computers @jtdowney 118
119. Pitfalls 1. Assuming current crypto will last forever @jtdowney 119
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122. Recommendations • Follow the PQCrypto discussion • Stay away from PQCrypto until the industry starts to standardize • Hope that researchers are moving fast enough @jtdowney 122
123. Images • https://flic.kr/p/6eagaw • https://flic.kr/p/4KWhKn • https://flic.kr/p/9F2BCv • https://flic.kr/p/486xYS • https://flic.kr/p/7Ffppm • https://flic.kr/p/8TuJD9 • https://flic.kr/p/4iLJZt • https://flic.kr/p/4pGZuz • https://flic.kr/p/48w7wP • https://flic.kr/p/8aZWNE • https://flic.kr/p/5NRHp • https://flic.kr/p/7p7raq • https://flic.kr/p/aZEE1Z • https://flic.kr/p/7WtwAz • https://flic.kr/p/6AN9mM • https://flic.kr/p/6dt62u • https://flic.kr/p/4ZqwyB • https://flic.kr/p/Bqewr • https://flic.kr/p/ecdhVE • https://flic.kr/p/AV1Nd • https://flic.kr/p/5tWgh4 @jtdowney 123