Android Security Key Management Workshop

Android Security Key Management Workshop

DroidCon Italy Torino 2014

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Mobile Security Lab

February 06, 2014
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  1. Android Security Key Management Roberto Piccirillo (r.piccirillo@mseclab.com) Roberto Gassirà (r.gassira@mseclab.com)

    Workshop DroidCon Italy Torino, 6/7 February
  2. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Roberto Piccirillo •  Senior Security Analyst - Mobile Security Lab ◦  Vulnerability Assessment (IT, Mobile Application) ◦  Hijacking Mobile Data Connection ▪  BlackHat Europe 2009 ▪  DeepSec Vienna 2009 ▪  HITB Amsterdam 2010 ◦  Android Secure Development @robpicone
  3. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Roberto Gassirà •  Senior Security Analyst - Mobile Security Lab ◦  Vulnerability Assessment (IT, Mobile Application) ◦  Hijacking Mobile Data Connection ▪  BlackHat Europe 2009 ▪  DeepSec Vienna 2009 ▪  HITB Amsterdam 2010 ◦  Android Secure Development •  IpTrack Developer @robgas
  4. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Agenda •  Cryptography in Mobile Application •  CryptoSystem •  Crypto in Android •  Symmetric Encryption •  Symmetric Key Management •  Keychain e AndroidKeyStore •  Tipologie di AndroidKeyStore
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    2014 Requirements •  A computer •  Eclipse with ADT Plugin 22.3.0 •  SDK Android 4.4 ( API 19 rev 2) •  Android SDK Build-tools 19
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    2014 Cryptography in Mobile Applications •  Protect data ◦  Sensitive data ◦  Data on /sdcard ◦  Cryptographic material •  Exchange data securely ◦  Documents ◦  Mail ◦  SMS ◦  Session Keys •  Digital Signature ◦  Documents ◦  Mail
  7. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Key Management "Key management is the management of cryptographic keys in a cryptosystem."
  8. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 CryptoSystem •  "refers to a suite of algorithms needed to implement a particular form of encryption and decryption" •  Two types of encryption: ◦  Symmetric Key Algorithms ▪  Identical encryption key for encryption/decryption ▪  AES, Blowfish, DES, Triple DES ◦  Asymmetric Key Algorithms ▪  Different key for encryption/decryption ▪  RSA, DSA, ECDSA
  9. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Ciphers •  Two types of ciphers: ◦  Block: Process entire blocks of fixed-length groups of bits at a time ( padding may be required) ◦  Stream: Process single byte at a time ( no padding ) •  Block Cipher modes of operation ◦  ECB: each block encrypted independently ◦  CBC, CFB, OFB: the previous block of output is used to alter the input blocks before applying the encryption algorithm starting from a IV ( initialization vector )
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    2014 Crypto in Android •  Based on JCA ( Java Cryptographic Architecture) provides API for: •  Encryption/Decryption •  Digital signatures •  Message digests (hashes) •  Key management •  Secure random number generation •  “Provider” Architecture with CSP •  Bouncy Castle is Android default CSP
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    2014 Bouncy Castle Android Version •  Customized: ◦  Some services and API removed •  Varies between Android versions •  Fixed only in the latest versions •  Solution: Spongy Castle •  Repackage of Bouncy Castle •  Supports more cryptographic options •  Up-to-date
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    2014 Set Spongy Castle •  Include Libs: •  Enable at Application Level:
  13. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 GC overhead limit exceeded •  Solution: modify eclipse.ini with: -­‐Xms256m     -­‐Xmx1024m   -­‐XX:MaxPermSize=1024m  
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    2014 Step 1 Enabling SpongyCastle https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-symmetric-demo-step1
  15. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Import Project from https://github.com/mseclab 1 2 3 4
  16. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Import Project from https://github.com/mseclab 5 6 7
  17. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Import Project from https://github.com/mseclab 8 9 10 https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-symmetric-demo-step3.git
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    2014 The project cannot be built... 1 2 3
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    2014 Cipher Object Secret Key Specification Cipher getInstance Cipher Init Cipher Final
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    2014 SecretKey Specification javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec •  SecretKeySpec specifies a key for a specific algorithm SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES"); Topic of this workshop Cryptographic Algorithm
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    2014 Cipher GetInstance javax.crypto.Cipher •  Provides access to implementations of cryptographic ciphers for encryption and decryption Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding”,“SC”); Trasformation (describes set of operation to perform): •  algorithm/mode/padding •  algorithm Provider ( SpongyCastle )
  22. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Cipher Init javax.crypto.Cipher •  Initializes the cipher instance with the specified operational mode, key and algorithm parameters. cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, keySpec, new IvParameterSpec(iv)); Operational Mode: •  ENCRYPT_MODE •  DECRYPT_MODE •  WRAP_MODE •  UNWRAP_MODE SecretKeySpec Specify Cipher Algorithm parameters ( IV for CBC )
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    2014 Cipher Final javax.crypto.Cipher •  Finishes a multi-part transformation (encryption or decryption) byte[] encryptedText = cipher.doFinal(clearText.getBytes()); Encrypted Text in byte ClearText in bytes
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    2014 Step 2 Encryption Example https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-symmetric-demo-step2
  25. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 SecureRandom java.security.SecureRandom •  Cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator SecureRandom secureRandom = new SecureRandom(); Default constructor uses the most cryptographically strong provider available •  Seeding SecureRandom is dangerous: ◦  Not Secure ◦  Output may change
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    2014 Some SecureRandom Thoughts... •  Android security team discovered a JCA improper PRNG initialization in August 2013 •  Applications invoking system-provided OpenSSL PRNG without explicit initialization are also affected •  Key Generation, Signing or Random Number Generation not receiving cryptographically strong values •  Developer must explicitly initialize the PRNG PRNGFixes.apply()
  27. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES”,“SC”); keyGenerator.init(outputKeyLength, secureRandom); SecretKey key = keyGenerator.generateKey(); Generate Secret Key javax.crypto.KeyGenerator •  Symmetric cryptographic keys generator API Specify Key Size Algorithm and Provider Key to use in Cipher.init()
  28. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Key Management: Store on device •  Protected by Android Filesystem Isolation •  Plain File •  SharedPreferences •  Keystore File (BKS, JKS) •  More secure with Phone Encryption •  Store safely ◦  MODE_PRIVATE flag ◦  Use only internal storage /data/data/app_package
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    2014 Key Management: Store on device •  Device Rooted?
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    2014 Step 3 Rooted device demo https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-symmetric-demo-step3
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    2014 Key Management: Store in App •  Uses static keys or device specific information at run-time (IMEI, mac address, ANDROID_ID) •  Android app can be easily reversed ( live demo ) •  Hide with Code obfuscation •  Security by Obscurity is never a good idea...
  32. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Key Management: Store in App •  unzip: APK -> DEX •  dex2jar: DEX -> JAR •  JD-GUI: JAR -> Source
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    2014 Reversing Demo
  34. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Key Management: PBKDF2 •  Password Based Key Derivation Function (PKCS#5) •  Variable length password in input •  Fixed length key in output •  User interaction required •  Params: ◦  Password ◦  Pseudorandom Function ◦  Salt ◦  Number of iteration ◦  Key Size
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    2014 KeySpec keySpec = new PBEKeySpec(password.toCharArray(), salt, NUM_OF_ITERATIONS, KEY_SIZE); SecretKeyFactory secretKeyFactory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance(PBE_ALGORITHM); encKey = secretKeyFactory.generateSecret(keySpec); Key Management: PBKDF2 javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec •  PBE Key specification and generation A good PBE algorithm is PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1 User Password N. >= 1000
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    2014 SecretKeyFactory factory; if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.KITKAT) { // Use compatibility key factory -- only uses lower 8-bits of passphrase chars factory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1And8bit"); } else { // Traditional key factory. Will use lower 8-bits of passphrase chars on // older Android versions (API level 18 and lower) and all available bits // on KitKat and newer (API level 19 and higher). factory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1"); } SecretKeyFactory API in Android 4.4
  37. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Step 4 PBE Example https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-symmetric-demo-step4
  38. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Key Management: Other solutions •  Store on server side •  Internet connection required •  Use trusted and protected connections (HTTPS, Certificate Pinning) •  Store on external device ◦  NFC Java Card (NXP J3A081) ◦  Smartcard ◦  USB PenDrive ◦  MicroSD with secure storage •  AndroidKeyStore???
  39. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Asymmetric Algorithms •  Public/Private Key ◦  Public Key -> encrypt/verify signature ◦  Private Key -> decrypt/sign •  Advantages: ◦  Public Key distribution is not dangerous •  Disadvantages: ◦  Computationally expensive •  Usually used with PKI (Public Key Infrastructure for digital certificates)
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    2014 Public-key Applications •  Can classify uses into 3 categories: ◦  Encryption/Decryption (provides confidentiality) ◦  Digital Signatures (provides authentication and Integrity) ◦  Key Exchange (of session keys) •  Some algorithms are suitable for all uses (RSA), others are specific to one
  41. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 PKCS for Asymmetric Algorithms •  PKCS is a group of public-key cryptography standards published by RSA Security Inc •  PKCS#1 (v.2.1) ◦  RSA Cryptography Standard •  PKCS#3 (v.1.4) ◦  Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard •  PKCS#8 (v.1.2) ◦  Private-Key Information Syntax Standard •  PKCS#10 (v.1.7) ◦  Certification Request Standard •  PKCS#12 (v.1.0) ◦  Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
  42. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Android: RSA KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.getIstance(”RSA"); Java.security.KeyPairGenerator •  KeyPairGenerator is an engine capable of generating public/private keys with specified algorithms Cryptographic Algorithm
  43. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Available Providers for RSA Algorithm KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(”RSA”,”SEC_PROVIDERS”); Java.security.KeyPairGenerator •  Different security providers could be used (could change for different OS versions) “AndroidOpenSSL” “BC” “AndroidKeyStrore” Version 1.0 Version 1.49 Version 1.0
  44. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 •  KeySize – 1024,2048,4096 bits KeyPairGenerator: Initialization and Randomness KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.initialize(2048); Java.security.KeyPairGenerator •  KeyPairGenerator initialization with the key size Key Size
  45. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 KeyPairGenerator: Initialization and Randomness KeyPairGenerator kpg = KeyPairGenerator.initialize(2048,sr); Java.security.KeyPairGenerator, Java.security.SecureRandom •  KeyPairGenerator initialization with a SecureRandom SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom();
  46. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Generating RSA Key Java.security.KeyPair •  KeyPair is a container for a public/private key generated by the KeyPairGenerator KeyPair keypair = kpg.genKeyPair() •  We can retrieve public/private keys from KeyPair Key public_key = kaypair.getPublic(); Key private_key = kaypair.getPrivate();
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    2014 Using RSA Keys: cipher example Javax.crypto.Cipher •  Cipher provides access to implementation of cryptography ciphers for encryption and decryption Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance(“RSA”,”SEC_PROVIDER); Transformation “AndroidOpenSSL” “BC” “AndroidKeyStrore”
  48. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Using RSA Key: cipher example Javax.crypto.Cipher •  Encryption cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,public_key); •  Decryption byte[] encrypted_data= cipher.doFinal(“Droidcon2014”.getBytes()); cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,private_key); byte[] decrypted_data= cipher.doFinal(cipherd_data);
  49. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Parameters of RSA Keys java.security.KeyFactory, java.security.spec, •  Retrieve RSA Key parameters using KeyFactory RSAPublicKeySpec rsa_public = keyfactory.getKeySpec(keypair.getPublic(), RSAPublicKeySpec.class); RSAPrivateKeySpec rsa_private = keyfactory.getKeySpec(keypair.getPrivate(), RSAPrivateKeySpec.class);
  50. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Extract Parameters of RSA Keys Java.security.spec.RSAPublicKeySpec, java.security.spec.RSAPrivateKeySpec •  Retrieved parameters can be stored BigInteger m = rsa_public.getModulus(); BigInteger e = rsa_public.getPublicExponent(); BigInteger d = rsa_private.getPrivateExponent(); Is Private
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    2014 Step 1 RSA Keys generaration https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-asymmetric-demo.git
  52. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 AndroidKeyStore •  Custom Java Security Provider available from Android 4.3 version and beyond •  An App can generate and save private keys •  Keys are private for each App •  2048-bit key size (4.3), 1024-2048-4096-bit key size (4.4) can be stored •  ECDSA support added from Android 4.4
  53. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Key Management Evolution API LEVEL 14 API LEVEL 18 Global Level: KeyChain ( Public API ) App Level: KeyStore ( Closed API ) Global Level Only: Default TrustStore cacerts.bks (ROOTED device) Global Level: KeyChain ( Public API ) App Level and per User Level: AndroidKeyStore ( Public API )
  54. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 AndroidKeyStore Storage •  Two kinds of storage ◦  Hardware-backed (Nexus 7, Nexus 4, Nexus 5 :-) with OS >= 4.3) ◦  Secure Element ◦  TPM ◦  TrustZone ◦  Software only (Other devices with OS >= 4.3)
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    2014 Type of Storage import android.security.KeyChain; if (KeyChain.isBoundKeyAlgorithm("RSA")) // Hardware-Backed else // Software Only
  56. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Certificate parameters Context cx = getActivity(); String pkg = cx.getPackageName(); Calendar notBefore = Calendar.getInstance(); Calendar notAfter = Calendar.getInstance(); notAfter.add(1, Calendar.YEAR); import android.security.KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder; Builder builder = new KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder(cx); builder.setAlias(“DEVKEY1”); String infocert = String.format("CN=%s, OU=%s", “DEVKEY1”, pkg); builder.setSubject(new X500Principal(infocert)); builder.setSerialNumber(BigInteger.ONE); builder.setStartDate(notBefore.getTime()); builder.setEndDate(notAfter.getTime()); KeyPairGeneratorSpec spec = builder.build(); Times parameters Self-Signed X.509 •  Common Name (CN) •  Subject (OU) •  Serial Number Generate certificate ALIAS to index the certificate
  57. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Generating Public/Private keys KeyPairGenerator kpGenerator; kpGenerator = KeyPairGenerator .getInstance("RSA", "AndroidKeyStore"); kpGenerator.initialize(spec); KeyPair kp; kp = kpGenerator.generateKeyPair(); Engine to generate Public/ Private key Init Engine with: •  RSA Algorithm •  Provider: AndroidKeyStore Init Engine with certificate parameters After generation, the keys will be stored into AndroidKeyStore and will be accessible by ALIAS •  Generating Private/Public key
  58. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore"); keyStore.load(null); Now we have the KeyStore reference that will be used to access to the Private/Public key by the ALIAS Should be used if there is an InputStream to load (for example the name of imported KeyStore). If not used the App will crash AndroidKeyStore Initialization Get a reference to the AndroidKeyStore
  59. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Step 2 AndroidKeyStore Gen Keys https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-asymmetric-demo.git
  60. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 RSA Digital Signature •  Digital Signature ◦  Authentication, Non-Repudiation and Integrity ◦  RSA Private key to Sign ◦  RSA Public Key to Verify KeyStore.Entry entry = ks.getEntry(“DEVKEY1”, null); byte[] data = “Droidcon Torino 2014!”.getBytes(); Signature s = Signature.getInstance(“SHA256withRSA”); s.initSign(((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getPrivateKey()); s.update(data); byte[] signature = s.sign(); String result = null; result = Base64.encodeToString(signature, Base64.DEFAULT); Access to Private/Public key identified by ALIAS Algorithm choice Private key to sign Signature and Base64 encoding
  61. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Verify RSA Digital Signature byte[] data = input.getBytes(); byte[] signature; signature = Base64.decode(signatureStr, Base64.DEFAULT); KeyStore.Entry entry = ks.getEntry(“DEVKEY1”, null); Signature s = Signature.getInstance("SHA256withRSA"); s.initVerify(((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getCertificate()); s.update(data); boolean valid = s.verify(signature); Base64 decoding Access to the Private/Public key identified by ALIAS==DEVKEY1 Algorithm choice Public Key in certificate to verify signature TRUE == Verified FALSE== Not Verified
  62. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Step 3 AndroidKeyStore Sign/Verify https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-asymmetric-demo.git
  63. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 RSA Encryption •  Encryption ◦  Confidentiality ◦  RSA Public key to Encrypt ◦  RSA Private key to Decrypt PublicKey publicKeyEnc = ((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry) .getCertificate().getPublicKey(); String textToEncrypt = new String(”Droidcon Torino 2014"); byte[] textToEncryptToByte = textToEncrypt.getBytes(); Cipher encCipher = null; byte[] encryptedText = null; encCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding"); encCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, publicKeyEnc); encryptedText = encCipher.doFinal(textToEncryptToByte); Access to Public key to encrypt •  Algorithm •  Encryption with Public key Ciphered
  64. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 RSA Decryption Cipher decCipher = null; byte[] plainTextByte = null; decCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding"); decCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, ((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getPrivateKey()); plainTextByte = decCipher.doFinal(ecryptedText); String plainText = new String(plainTextByte); Algorithm Decryption with Private key Plaintext
  65. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Step 4 AndroidKeyStore Enc/Dec https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-asymmetric-demo.git
  66. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 It is observed that... •  Different screen lock •  The choice of screen lock impactsthe keys •  If you change the screen lock the keys are deleted
  67. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Expected behavior? •  The official documentation shows: •  The keys should ramain intact when the type of screen lock is changed by the user
  68. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Cryptographic material on devices •  Device with Storage “Hardware-backed” •  Device with Storage “Software-only”
  69. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 KeyChain •  KeyChain ◦  Accessible by any Application •  Typically used for corporate certificates
  70. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Example: Import Certificates •  Import .p12 certificates Intent intent = KeyChain.createInstallIntent(); byte[] p12 = readFile(“CERTIFICATE_NAME.p12”); Intent.putExtra(KeyChain.EXTRA_PKCS12,p12); Specify PKCS#12 Key to install startActivity(intent); The user will be prompted for the password
  71. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 KeyChain.choosePrivateKeyAlias( Activity activity, KeyChainAliasCallBack response, String[] keyTypes, Principal[] issuers, String host, Int port, String Alias); Example: Retrieve the key •  The KeyChainAliasCallback invoked when a user chooses a certificate/private key
  72. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 @Override public void alias(String alias){ . . PrivateKey private_key = KeyChain. getPrivateKey(this,alias); . . X509Certificate[] chain = KeyChain. getCertificateChain(this,”Droidcon”); . PublicKey public_key = chain[0].getPublicKey(); } Example: Retrieve and use the keys •  KeyChainAliasCallbak must implement the abstract method alias: Private Key Public Key
  73. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Step 5 KeyChain https://github.com/mseclab/droidconit2014-asymmetric-demo.git
  74. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 References •  http://developer.android.com/about/versions/android-4.3.html#Security •  http://developer.android.com/reference/java/security/KeyStore.html •  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption •  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature •  http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2013/08/credential-storage-enhancements-android-43.html •  http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2012/05/storing-application-secrets-in-androids.html •  http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2012/04/using-password-based-encryption-on.html •  http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2011/11/ics-credential-storage-implementation.html •  http://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/KeyPairGeneratorSpec.html •  http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/02/using-cryptography-to-store- credentials.html •  http://www.bouncycastle.org/ •  http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/08/some-securerandom-thoughts.html •  http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2013/10/signing-email-with-nfc-smart-card.html •  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS •  http://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/KeyChain.html •  http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/12/changes-to-secretkeyfactory-api-in.html
  75. Android Security Key Management DroidCon Italy – Torino – February

    2014 Thank you Q&A www.mseclab.com www.consulthink.it research@mseclab.com goo.gl/TA8EA1