Android Key Management

DroidCon London 2014

Transcript

1. Android
   Key Management
   Roberto Piccirillo (r.piccirillo@mseclab.com)
   Roberto Gassirà (r.gassira@mseclab.com)
   Droidcon
   London 2014
   

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2. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Roberto Piccirillo
   ● Senior Security Analyst - Mobile Security Lab
   ○ Vulnerability Assessment (IT, Mobile Application)
   ○ Hijacking Mobile Data Connection
   ■ BlackHat Europe 2009
   ■ DeepSec Vienna 2009
   ■ HITB Amsterdam 2010
   ○ Android Secure Development
   ● GDG Rome Lab
   @robpicone
   

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3. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Roberto Gassirà
   ● Senior Security Analyst - Mobile Security Lab
   ○ Vulnerability Assessment (IT, Mobile Application)
   ○ Hijacking Mobile Data Connection
   ■ BlackHat Europe 2009
   ■ DeepSec Vienna 2009
   ■ HITB Amsterdam 2010
   ○ Android Secure Development
   ● GDG Rome Lab
   @robgas
   

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4. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Android Key Management: Agenda
   ● Mobile Application Cryptography
   ● Key Management and CryptoSystem
   ● Crypto in Android
   ● Symmetric Encryption
   ● Symmetric Key Management
   ● Asymmetric key: Encryption/Digital Signature
   ● Keychain e AndroidKeyStore
   

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5. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Mobile Application Cryptography
   ➢ Exchange data securely:
   ➢ Protect Data:
   ○ Sensitive Data
   ○ Backups on /sdcard
   

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6. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Key Management
   "Key management is the management of cryptographic keys in a
   cryptosystem."
   

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7. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   CryptoSystem
   "refers to a suite of algorithms needed to implement a particular
   form of encryption and decryption"
   ● Two types of encryption:
   ○ Symmetric Key Algorithms
   ■ Identical key for
   encryption/decryption
   ■ AES, Blowfish, DES, Triple DES
   ○ Asymmetric Key Algorithms
   ■ Pair of keys (public/private) for
   encryption/decryption
   ■ RSA, DSA, ECDSA
   

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8. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Symmetric Key Algorithms: Ciphers
   ● Two types of ciphers:
   ○ Block: Process entire blocks of fixed-length
   groups of bits at a time (padding may be
   required)
   ○ Stream: Process single bit at a time(no
   padding)
   ● Block Cipher modes of operation:
   ○ ECB: each block encrypted independently
   ○ CBC, CFB, OFB: (feedback mode) each block
   is encrypted combined with the previous
   encrypted block (starting from an IV)
   ○ CTR: each block xored with the encrypted
   successive values of a counter ( starting
   from a nonce)
   ECB
   CBC
   

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9. Android
   Key Management Droidcon London 2014
   Crypto in Android
   ● Framework based on JCA ( Java
   Cryptography Architecture)
   ● Provides API for:
   ● Encryption/Decryption
   ● Message digests (hashes)
   ● Key management
   ● Secure random number generation
   ● API implemented by Cryptographic
   Service "Provider"
   ● "Dynamic" Provider:
   javax.crypto.*
   java.security.*
   

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10. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Default Providers
    ➢ From the beginning
    ○ Bouncy Castle (Customized):
    ■ Some services and API removed
    ■ Varies between Android versions
    ■ Fixed only in the latest versions
    ○ Crypto (Apache Harmony)
    ■ Few basic services
    ■ Only for backward compatibility
    ➢ From Android 4.0
    ○ AndroidOpenSSL:
    ■ OpenSSL JNI
    ■ Performance Improved
    ■ Vulnerable to Heartbleed in 4.1.1
    

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11. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    ➢ Spongy Castle (SC)
    ○ Repackage of Bouncy Castle
    ○ Supports more cryptographic options
    ○ Not vulnerable to the Heartbleed Bug
    ○ Up-to-date
    ➢ GPS Dynamic Security Provider
    ○ Available from Play Services 5.0
    ○ Based on OpenSSL ( No Heartbleed)
    ○ Rapid delivery of security patches
    ○ Vendor independent !!!
    Dynamic Providers
    

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12. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Cipher Benchmarks
    Run on Google Nexus 5 Android 4.4.4
    CBC CTR
    

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13. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Cipher Class
    Secret Key Specification
    Cipher getInstance
    Cipher Init
    Cipher Final
    

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14. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    SecretKey Specification
    javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec
    ● SecretKeySpec specifies a key for a specific algorithm
    SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES");
    Encryption/Decryption
    Key
    Cryptographic Algorithm
    

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15. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Cipher GetInstance
    javax.crypto.Cipher
    ● Create cryptographic cipher
    Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding”,“SC”);
    Transformation
    (describes set of operation to
    perform):
    • algorithm/mode/padding
    • algorithm
    Provider
    ( SpongyCastle )
    

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16. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Cipher Init
    javax.crypto.Cipher
    ● Initializes the cipher instance with the specified operational
    mode, key and algorithm parameters.
    cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, keySpec,
    new IvParameterSpec(iv));
    Operational Mode:
    • ENCRYPT_MODE
    • DECRYPT_MODE
    • WRAP_MODE
    • UNWRAP_MODE
    SecretKeySpec Specify Cipher
    Algorithm parameters
    ( IV for CBC )
    

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17. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Cipher Final
    javax.crypto.Cipher
    ● Complete a multi-part transformation (encryption or
    decryption)
    byte[] encryptedText = cipher.doFinal(clearText.getBytes());
    Encrypted
    Text in byte
    ClearText in
    bytes
    

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18. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Generation: SecureRandom
    java.security.SecureRandom
    ● Cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
    SecureRandom secureRandom = new SecureRandom();
    Default constructor uses the
    most cryptographically
    strong provider available
    ● Seeding
    SecureRandom is
    dangerous:
    ○ Not Secure
    ○ Output may change
    

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19. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Some SecureRandom Thoughts...
    ● Android security team discovered in August 2013 an improper
    PRNG initialization for default OpenSSL provider
    ● Applications invoking system-provided OpenSSL PRNG without
    explicit initialization are also affected
    ● Key Generation, Signing or Random Number Generation not
    receiving cryptographically strong values
    ● Developer must explicitly initialize the PRNG
    PRNGFixes.apply()
    http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/08/some-securerandom-thoughts.html
    

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20. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    KeyGenerator keyGenerator = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES","SC");
    keyGenerator.init(outputKeyLength, secureRandom);
    SecretKey key = keyGenerator.generateKey();
    Generate Secret Key
    javax.crypto.KeyGenerator
    ● Symmetric cryptographic keys generator
    Specify Key Size
    Algorithm
    and Provider
    Key to use in Cipher.init()
    

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21. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Management: Store on device
    ● Protected by Android Filesystem Isolation
    ● Plain File
    ● SharedPreferences
    ● Keystore File (BKS, JKS)
    ● More secure with Phone Encryption
    ● Store safely
    ● MODE_PRIVATE flag
    ● Use only internal storage
    /data/data/app_package
    

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22. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Management: Store on device
    ➢ Device rooted?
    ○ Check at run-time...
    

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23. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Management: Store in App
    ● Uses static keys or device specific information at run-time
    (IMEI, mac address, ANDROID_ID)
    ● Android app can be easily reversed
    ● Hide with Code obfuscation
    REVERSING
    

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24. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Management: PBKDF2
    ● Password Based Key Derivation Function (PKCS#5)
    ● Variable length password in input
    ● Fixed length key in output
    ● User interaction required
    ● Params:
    ○ Password
    ○ Pseudorandom Function
    ○ Salt
    ○ Number of iteration
    ○ Key Size
    ● Available with BC
    

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25. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    KeySpec keySpec = new PBEKeySpec(password.toCharArray(), salt,
    NUM_OF_ITERATIONS, KEY_SIZE);
    SecretKeyFactory secretKeyFactory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance
    (PBE_ALGORITHM);
    encKey = secretKeyFactory.generateSecret(keySpec);
    Key Management: PBKDF2
    javax.crypto.spec.PBEKeySpec
    ● PBE Key specification and generation
    A good PBE algorithm is
    PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1
    User
    Password
    N. >= 1000
    

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26. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    SecretKeyFactory factory;
    if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.KITKAT)
    // Use compatibility key factory -- only uses lower 8-bits of passphrase chars
    factory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1And8bit");
    else if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= 10)
    // Traditional key factory. Will use lower 8-bits of passphrase chars on
    // older Android versions (API level 18 and lower) and all available bits
    // on KitKat and newer (API level 19 and higher)
    factory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBKDF2WithHmacSHA1");
    else // FIX for Android 8,9
    factory = SecretKeyFactory.getInstance("PBEWITHSHAAND128BITAES-CBC-BC");
    SecretKeyFactory API in Android 4.4
    

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27. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Management: Other solutions
    ● Store on server side
    ● Internet connection required
    ● Use trusted and protected connections (HTTPS, Certificate
    Pinning)
    ● Store on external device
    ● NFC Java Card (NXP J3A081)
    ● Smartcard
    ● USB PenDrive
    ● MicroSD with secure storage
    ● AndroidKeyStore???
    

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28. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Asymmetric Algorithms
    ● Public/Private Key
    ○ Public Key -> encrypt/verify signature
    ○ Private Key -> decrypt/sign
    ● Advantages:
    ○ Public Key distribution is not dangerous
    ● Disadvantages:
    ○ Computationally expensive
    ● Usually used with PKI (Public Key Infrastructure for digital
    certificates)
    

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29. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Public-key Applications
    ● Can classify uses into 3 categories:
    ○ Encryption/Decryption (provides Confidentiality)
    ○ Digital Signatures (provides Authentication and Integrity)
    ○ Key Exchange (of Session Keys)
    ● Some algorithms are suitable for all uses (RSA),
    others are specific to one
    

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30. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    PKCS for Asymmetric Algorithms
    ● PKCS is a group of public-key cryptography
    standards published by RSA Security Inc
    ● PKCS#1 (v.2.1)
    ○ RSA Cryptography Standard
    ● PKCS#3 (v.1.4)
    ○ Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Standard
    ● PKCS#8 (v.1.2)
    ○ Private-Key Information Syntax Standard
    ● PKCS#10 (v.1.7)
    ○ Certification Request Standard
    ● PKCS#12 (v.1.0)
    ○ Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard
    

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31. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Android: RSA
    KeyPairGenerator kpg =
    KeyPairGenerator.getIstance(”RSA");
    Java.security.KeyPairGenerator
    ● KeyPairGenerator is an engine capable of
    generating public/private keys with specified
    algorithms
    Cryptographic Algorithm
    

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32. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Available Providers for RSA Algorithm
    KeyPairGenerator.getInstance(”RSA”,”SEC_PROVIDERS”);
    Java.security.KeyPairGenerator
    ● Different security providers could be used (could
    change for different OS versions)
    “AndroidOpenSSL”
    “BC”
    “AndroidKeyStore”
    “GmsCore_OpenSSL”
    Version 1.0
    Version 1.49
    Version 1.0
    

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33. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    ● KeySize – 1024,2048,4096 bits
    KeyPairGenerator: Initialization and
    Randomness
    KeyPairGenerator kpg =
    KeyPairGenerator.initialize(2048);
    Key Size
    Java.security.KeyPairGenerator
    ● KeyPairGenerator initialization with the key size
    

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34. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    KeyPairGenerator: Initialization and
    Randomness
    KeyPairGenerator kpg =
    KeyPairGenerator.initialize(2048,sr);
    Java.security.KeyPairGenerator, Java.security.SecureRandom
    ● KeyPairGenerator initialization with a
    SecureRandom
    SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom();
    

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35. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Generating RSA Key
    Java.security.KeyPair
    ● KeyPair is a container for a public/private key
    generated by the KeyPairGenerator
    KeyPair keypair = kpg.genKeyPair()
    ● We can retrieve public/private keys from KeyPair
    Key public_key = kaypair.getPublic();
    Key private_key = kaypair.getPrivate();
    

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36. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Using RSA Keys: cipher example
    Javax.crypto.Cipher
    ● Cipher provides access to implementation of
    cryptography ciphers for encryption and decryption
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance(“RSA”,”SEC_PROVIDER);
    Transformation
    “AndroidOpenSSL”
    “BC”
    “AndroidKeyStore”
    “GmsCore_OpenSSL”
    

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37. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Using RSA Key: cipher example
    Javax.crypto.Cipher
    ● Encryption
    cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE,public_key);
    ● Decryption
    byte[] encrypted_data=
    cipher.doFinal(“DroidconUK-2014”.getBytes());
    cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,private_key);
    byte[] decrypted_data=
    cipher.doFinal(cipherd_data);
    

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38. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Parameters of RSA Keys
    java.security.KeyFactory, java.security.spec,
    ● Retrieve RSA Key parameters using KeyFactory
    RSAPublicKeySpec rsa_public= keyfactory.
    getKeySpec(keypair.getPublic(),
    RSAPublicKeySpec.class);
    RSAPrivateKeySpec rsa_private = keyfactory.getKeySpec
    (keypair.getPrivate(),
    RSAPrivateKeySpec.class);
    

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39. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Extract Parameters of RSA Keys
    Java.security.spec.RSAPublicKeySpec, java.security.spec.RSAPrivateKeySpec
    ● Retrieved parameters can be stored
    BigInteger m = rsa_public.getModulus();
    BigInteger e = rsa_public.getPublicExponent();
    BigInteger d = rsa_private.getPrivateExponent();
    Is Private
    

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40. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    AndroidKeyStore
    ● Custom Java Security Provider available from Android 4.3
    version and beyond
    ● An App can generate and save private keys
    ● Keys are private for each App
    ● 2048-bit key size (4.3), 1024-2048-4096-bit key size (4.4) can
    be stored
    ● ECDSA support added from Android 4.4
    

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41. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Key Management Evolution
    API LEVEL 14 API LEVEL 18
    Global Level:
    KeyChain
    ( Public API )
    App Level:
    KeyStore
    ( Closed API )
    Global Level Only:
    Default TrustStore
    cacerts.bks
    (ROOTED device)
    Global Level:
    KeyChain
    ( Public API )
    App Level and per
    User Level:
    AndroidKeyStore
    ( Public API )
    

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42. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    AndroidKeyStore Storage
    ● Two kinds of storage
    ○ Hardware-backed (Nexus 7, Nexus 4,
    Nexus 5 :-) with OS >= 4.3)
    ○ Secure Element
    ○ TPM
    ○ TrustZone
    ○ Software only (Other devices with OS
    >= 4.3)
    

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43. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Type of Storage
    import android.security.KeyChain;
    if (KeyChain.isBoundKeyAlgorithm("RSA"))
    // Hardware-Backed
    else
    // Software Only
    

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44. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Certificate parameters
    Context cx = getActivity();
    String pkg = cx.getPackageName();
    Calendar notBefore = Calendar.getInstance();
    Calendar notAfter = Calendar.getInstance();
    notAfter.add(1, Calendar.YEAR);
    import android.security.KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder;
    Builder builder = new KeyPairGeneratorSpec.Builder(cx);
    builder.setAlias(“DEVKEY1”);
    String infocert = String.format("CN=%s, OU=%s", “DEVKEY1”, pkg);
    builder.setSubject(new X500Principal(infocert));
    builder.setSerialNumber(BigInteger.ONE);
    builder.setStartDate(notBefore.getTime());
    builder.setEndDate(notAfter.getTime());
    KeyPairGeneratorSpec spec = builder.build();
    Time parameters
    Self-Signed X.509
    ● Common Name(CN)
    ● Subject(OU)
    ● Serial Number
    Generate certificate
    ALIAS to index the
    certificate
    

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45. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Generating Public/Private keys
    KeyPairGenerator kpGenerator;
    kpGenerator = KeyPairGenerator
    .getInstance("RSA", "AndroidKeyStore");
    kpGenerator.initialize(spec);
    KeyPair kp;
    kp = kpGenerator.generateKeyPair();
    Engine to generate
    Public/Private key
    Init Engine with:
    ● RSA Algorithm
    ● Provider: AndroidKeyStore
    Init Engine with certificate parameters
    After generation, the keys will be stored into AndroidKeyStore and will be
    accessible by ALIAS
    ● Generating Private/Public key
    

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46. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    AndroidKeyStore Initialization
    keyStore = KeyStore.getInstance("AndroidKeyStore");
    keyStore.load(null);
    Now we have the KeyStore reference that will be used to
    access to the Private/Public key by the ALIAS
    Should be used if there is an InputStream to load
    (for example the name of imported KeyStore). If not
    used the App will crash
    Get a reference to the AndroidKeyStore
    

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47. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    RSA Encryption
    ● Encryption
    ○ Confidentiality
    ○ RSA Public key to Encrypt
    ○ RSA Private key to Decrypt
    KeyStore.Entry entry = keyStore.getEntry(“DEVKEY1”, null);
    PublicKey publicKeyEnc = ((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry)
    .getCertificate().getPublicKey();
    String textToEncrypt = new String(”DroidconUK-2014");
    Cipher encCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding");
    encCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, publicKeyEnc);
    byte[] encryptedText = encCipher.doFinal(byteTextToEncrypt);
    Access to Public key to
    encrypt
    ● Algorithm
    ● Encryption with
    Public key
    Ciphered
    Access to keys identified
    by ALIAS
    

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48. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    RSA Decryption
    Cipher decCipher = null;
    byte[] plainTextByte = null;
    decCipher = Cipher.getInstance("RSA/ECB/PKCS1Padding");
    decCipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE,
    ((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getPrivateKey());
    plainTextByte = decCipher.doFinal(byteEcryptedText);
    String plainText = new String(plainTextByte);
    Algorithm
    Decryption with
    Private key
    Plaintext
    

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49. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    s.initVerify(((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getCertificate());
    s.update(data);
    boolean valid = s.verify(signature);
    RSA Digital Signature
    ● Digital Signature
    ○ Authentication, Non-Repudiation and Integrity
    ○ RSA Private key to Sign
    ○ RSA Public Key to Verify
    KeyStore.Entry entry = keyStore.getEntry(“DEVKEY1”, null);
    s.initSign(((KeyStore.PrivateKeyEntry) entry).getPrivateKey());
    Access to Private/Public key
    identified by ALIAS
    Private key to sign
    Public Key in
    certificate to verify
    signature
    

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50. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Issue 61989 …
    

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51. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    KeyChain
    ● KeyChain
    ○ Accessible by any Application
    ● Typically used for corporate certificates
    

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52. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Example: Import Certificates
    ● Import .p12 certificates
    Intent intent = KeyChain.createInstallIntent();
    byte[] p12 = readFile(“CERTIFICATE_NAME.p12”);
    Intent.putExtra(KeyChain.EXTRA_PKCS12,p12);
    Specify PKCS#12 Key to install
    startActivity(intent);
    The user will be prompted
    for the password
    

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53. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    KeyChain.choosePrivateKeyAlias(
    Activity activity,
    KeyChainAliasCallBack response,
    String[] keyTypes,
    Principal[] issuers,
    String host,
    Int port,
    String Alias);
    Example: Retrieve the key
    ● The KeyChainAliasCallback invoked when a user chooses a
    certificate/private key
    

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54. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    @Override
    public void alias(String alias){
    .
    .
    PrivateKey private_key = KeyChain.
    getPrivateKey(this,alias);
    .
    .
    X509Certificate[] chain = KeyChain.
    getCertificateChain(this,”DroidconUK-2014”);
    .
    PublicKey public_key = chain[0].getPublicKey();
    }
    Example: Retrieve and use the keys
    Private Key
    Public Key
    ● KeyChainAliasCallbak must implement the abstract method
    alias:
    

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55. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    References
    ● http://developer.android.com/about/versions/android-4.3.html#Security
    ● http://developer.android.com/reference/java/security/KeyStore.html
    ● http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption
    ● http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature
    ● http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2013/08/credential-storage-enhancements-android-43.
    html
    ● http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2012/05/storing-application-secrets-in-androids.html
    ● http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2012/04/using-password-based-encryption-on.html
    ● http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2011/11/ics-credential-storage-implementation.html
    ● http://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/KeyPairGeneratorSpec.html
    ● http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/02/using-cryptography-to-store-
    credentials.html
    ● http://www.bouncycastle.org/
    ● http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/08/some-securerandom-thoughts.html
    ● http://nelenkov.blogspot.it/2013/10/signing-email-with-nfc-smart-card.html
    ● http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKCS
    ● http://developer.android.com/reference/android/security/KeyChain.html
    ● http://android-developers.blogspot.it/2013/12/changes-to-secretkeyfactory-api-in.
    html
    

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56. Android
    Key Management Droidcon London 2014
    Thank you
    Q&A
    www.mseclab.com
    www.consulthink.it
    research@mseclab.com
    

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