Consciousness #01

What is physicalism? In this session, Tim Crane discusses several ways to understand physicalism, and how they feed into our understanding of the mind-body problem.

Transcript

1. Consciousness #1
3. New directions in the study of the mind
4. New directions in the study of the mind • A project based in Cambridge, supported by the John Templeton Foundation
5. New directions in the study of the mind • A project based in Cambridge, supported by the John Templeton Foundation • Investigating non-physicalist, non-reductionist approaches to the mind
6. New directions in the study of the mind • A project based in Cambridge, supported by the John Templeton Foundation • Investigating non-physicalist, non-reductionist approaches to the mind • In particular: consciousness and intentionality
7. This seminar
8. This seminar • 2015-16: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on consciousness
9. This seminar • 2015-16: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on consciousness • 2016-17: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on intentionality
10. This seminar • 2015-16: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on consciousness • 2016-17: 20-week seminar on non-physicalist, non- reductionist perspectives on intentionality • For part II philosophy students, philosophy graduate students (MPhil & PhD) and any member of the University
11. Prospectus 2015-16
12. Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes
13. Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism
14. Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism 2. Conceptions of consciousness
15. Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism 2. Conceptions of consciousness 3. The history of phenomenal consciousness: sense-data, the given, qualia etc.
16. Prospectus 2015-16 Michaelmas term 2015: Themes 1. Preliminaries: physicalism, reductionism 2. Conceptions of consciousness 3. The history of phenomenal consciousness: sense-data, the given, qualia etc. 4. Phenomenal consciousness without qualia
17. Physicalism etc.
18. Physicalism etc. • Materialism
19. Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism
20. Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism
21. Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism • Reductionism
22. Materialism
23. Materialism • Everything is material/matter
24. Materialism • Everything is material/matter • Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius
25. Materialism • Everything is material/matter • Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius • Gassendi, Hobbes
26. Physicalism: origins
27. Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism
28. Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism • Otto Neurath ‘Physicalism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle’ (1931)
29. Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism • Otto Neurath ‘Physicalism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle’ (1931) • Rudolf Carnap ‘Psychology in physical language’ (1932)
30. Physicalism: origins • Logical positivism • Otto Neurath ‘Physicalism: the philosophy of the Vienna Circle’ (1931) • Rudolf Carnap ‘Psychology in physical language’ (1932) • Thesis about the language of science
31. Physicalism as an ontological thesis • ‘Everything is physical’?
32. Rutherford “There is physics; and there is stamp-collecting”
33. Two questions
34. Two questions 1. What does ‘everything’ mean?
35. Two questions 1. What does ‘everything’ mean? 2. What does ‘physical’ mean?
36. ‘Everything’ • Every object/particular/substance? • Everything whatsover (including every property, relation, fact etc.)
37. Stoljar’s two conceptions of the physical • The theory conception: subject-matter of physics • The object conception: paradigm physical objects
 Daniel Stoljar, ‘Physicalism’ SEP
38. Hempel’s dilemma (1969) • Suppose physicalism = the doctrine that everything is physical • Either ‘physical’ refers to current physics, and so physicalism is false • Or ‘physical’ refers to some as-yet-undescribed future physics, and so physicalism is virtually trivial
39. Rutherford “There is physics; and there is stamp-collecting”
40. What about the stamp-collecting?
41. What about the stamp-collecting? • Weaker forms of physicalism
42. What about the stamp-collecting? • Weaker forms of physicalism • Supervenience versions of physicalism
43. What about the stamp-collecting? • Weaker forms of physicalism • Supervenience versions of physicalism • David Lewis, ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’ (1983); Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics (1998)
44. Physicalism as a contingent thesis
45. Physicalism as a contingent thesis • Worlds, duplicates, physical duplicates
46. Physicalism as a contingent thesis • Worlds, duplicates, physical duplicates • Not: any two two worlds which are physical duplicates are duplicates
47. Physicalism as a contingent thesis • Worlds, duplicates, physical duplicates • Not: any two two worlds which are physical duplicates are duplicates • Physicalism is a contingent thesis
48. What would God have to do to create this world?
49. Lewis & Jackson
50. Lewis & Jackson • Any world which is a (minimal) physical duplicate of this world is a duplicate simpliciter
51. Lewis & Jackson • Any world which is a (minimal) physical duplicate of this world is a duplicate simpliciter • This is the thesis of supervenience physicalism
54. The definition of physicalism • Doesn’t appeal to what is fundamental, or to essence, or to explanation • Does appeal to the idea of ‘the physical’
55. Physicalism etc.
56. Physicalism etc. • Materialism
57. Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism
58. Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism
59. Physicalism etc. • Materialism • Physicalism • Naturalism • Reductionism
60. What about the mind?
61. What about the mind? • The traditional mind-body question
62. What about the mind? • The traditional mind-body question • Mental and material ‘substances’
63. Substance • Subjects of predication • Natural unities • Capable of independent existence
64. Substance
65. Substance Cartesian substances are capable of independent existence
66. Substance Cartesian substances are capable of independent existence (NB Cartesian souls are not ‘made of mental stuff’)
67. Substance Cartesian substances are capable of independent existence (NB Cartesian souls are not ‘made of mental stuff’)
68. Hence today’s formulation of the mind- body problem • A zombie is a physical duplicate of one of us who is not conscious • Physicalism implies zombies are impossible • Dualism implies zombies are possible