Bram Vaassen: Mental Causation for Naturalist Dualists

Transcript

1. Mental Causation for Naturalist Dualists Bram Vaassen Ume˚ a University bram.vaassen@umu.se May 24, 2016 Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 1 / 21
2. Overview 1 Set-up of the Problem 2 Counterfactualism and Supernomological dualism Kroedel’s Solution Problems for Kroedel 3 An Alternative Solution Control Variables Arguments for weak perspectivism 4 Final (and definitive?) Objection Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 2 / 21
3. Dualism and Mental Causation Sloppy Premise Zombie-styled dualism cannot accommodate causally potent conscious states Conscious states are nomologically determined by subvenient physical states Purported effects of conscious states are nomologically determined by their subvenient physical states Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 3 / 21
4. Dualism and Mental Causation Sloppy Premise Zombie-styled dualism cannot accommodate causally potent conscious states 1 Nomological closure of the physical 2 Common cause scenario 3 Dialectical considerations Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 4 / 21
5. Lewisian Counterfactualism Causation E causally depends on C iff C →E and C → E Semantics of → C →E is true iff there is a possible world where C and E hold which is closer to the actual world than any possible world where C and E hold (or there are no possible worlds where C holds). Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 5 / 21
6. Possible World Geography Semantics of → C →E is true iff there is a possible world where C and E hold which is closer to the actual world than any possible world where C and E hold (or there are no possible worlds where C holds). What determines the distance between possible worlds? 1 The force of the modal law that was ‘broken’ 2 Spatiotemporal similarity Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 6 / 21
7. Counterfactual Causation Heavy Rain After heavy rain(=R) my lawn is wet (=L) and I crash my car on the slippery roads (=C). The rain caused the wet lawn R →L R → L The rain caused the car crash R →C R → C But The wet lawn did not cause the car crash * L → C* The common cause worry is averted. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 7 / 21
8. Counterfactual Causation Head Ache Quale I have a terrible head ache quale(=Q) which nomologically supervenes on some physical state(=P) and decide to take an aspirin(=A). The physical state caused me to take an aspirin P →A P → A *the quale caused me to take an aspirin* Q →A * Q → A* Dualist qualia are still epiphenomenal Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 8 / 21
9. Supernomological Dualism Thomas Kroedel (2013) proposed a solution based on the following claim: Supernomological Dualism Psychophysical laws are supernomological: stronger than regular nomological laws but weaker than metaphysical laws. Formally, it works: Q →A Q → A (and it also copes with Bennett’s (2008) redirected exclusion argument) However, the central claim itself is in tension with both dualism and Lewisian counterfactualism. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 9 / 21
10. Problems for Kroedel I Supernomological dualism is either problematically ad hoc or unstable No independent motivation for the central claim Any motivation is likely to result in non-reductionist physicalism SN-Dualism is in an awkward dialectical position Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 10 / 21
11. Problems for Kroedel II Supernomological dualism rekindles the common cause worry Remember: The quale causes me to take the aspirin Q →A Q → A And by Kroedel’s own lights: The physical state caused the quale P →Q P → Q The physical state caused me to take an aspirin P →A P → A Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 11 / 21
12. Conclusion on Counterfactualism I submit that counterfactualism cannot help the dualist because it still requires the mental states to inherit their causal powers from the underlying physical states. Therefore, The dualist is dialectically in the weakest position The common cause worry naturally arises Instead we should focus on their properties qua mental states, and how those relate to the properties of their purported effects. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 12 / 21
13. Control Variables Sloppy Solution Causation is a relation between salient variables whose values systematically correlate under certain interventions. cf. Campbell’s volume knob and belief examples (Campbell 2008). Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 13 / 21
14. Control Variables Sloppy Solution Causation is a relation between salient variables whose values systematically correlate under certain interventions. cf. Campbell’s volume knob and belief examples (Campbell 2008). However, this conception of causation seems too convenient, lightweight and perspectivist. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 14 / 21
15. Negative Causation Schaffer (2004) remarked that causation by omissions and double prevention is too pervasive in patently causal processes to be waived as ‘second-rate causation’. However, one does not want to be too inclusive about which omissions counts as causes. e.g. What caused my plants to die? Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 15 / 21
16. Negative Causation Schaffer (2004) remarked that causation by omissions and double prevention is too pervasive in patently causal processes to be waived as ‘second-rate causation’. However, one does not want to be too inclusive about which omissions counts as causes. e.g. What caused my plants to die? Me not watering them My neighbour not watering them? D. Trump not watering them? Therefore, a criterion of salience should play a role in selecting causes. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 16 / 21
17. Time-Asymmetry of Causation In the actual world, causes precede their effects. However, There is nothing intrinsically different between the backward determination process and the forward determination process that holds between two physical states. Elga (2001) noticed that The backward process is fragile in a sense which the forward process is not The collection of backward determining states with similar effects has no intrinsic unity: a ‘gerrymandered’ collection Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 17 / 21
18. Subconclusion If one conceives of causation as a relation between salient variables that systematically correlate under certain interventions, naturalist dualism does not necessarily result in epiphenomenalism. Note: The actual world containing more causes than Zombie world seems les problematic on this picture Moreover, such a view on causation is motivated by considerations independent of the issue of mental causation and is hence more promising than the view proposed by Kroedel. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 18 / 21
19. What kind of intervention? Interventionist Causation (Woodward 2003: 59) (M) A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) direct cause of Y with respect to a variable set V is that there be a possible intervention on X that will change Y or the probability distribution of Y when one holds fixed at some value all other variables Zi in V. Although some exceptions to the holding fixed condition, nomological supervenience can plausibly be taken to be too weak. Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 19 / 21
20. Tentative Solutions The criteria for being a cause seem to be set by the way we interact with the world. From that perspective, nomological supervenience is as strict as any supervenience Embrace epiphenomenalism, use my wasted efforts to construct an error theory Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 20 / 21
21. Thank you Bram Vaassen (Ume˚ a University) Mental Causation May 24, 2016 21 / 21